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Preface 
The European Commission's Directorates-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
and for Budgets asked a group of independent economists to examine the role of 
Community public finance in the perspective of economic and monetary union. 
The group held four meetings under the chairmanship of Horst Reichenbach, acting 
Director of the Economic Service of Community policies at the Commission, who also 
contributed the 'Highlights' and 'Summary and conclusions'. Marc Vanheukelen was 
the rapporteur for Chapters 1 to 11 of the report. In addition, the group was supported 
in its work by contributions from officials in the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs — Antonio Cabrai, Declan Costello, Alexander Italianer, Joost 
Kuhlmann, Knud Munk, Theodore Papaspyrou, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Pedro Santos, 
Manfred Teutemann, Rod Meiklejohn and Jim McKenna — and in the Directorate-
General for Budgets — Jean-Pierre Bachè, Charles Groutage and Daniël Hanekuyk. 
Valuable organizational and secretarial assistance was provided by Verena Barwig 
and Anna Maria Dürr. 
This report draws heavily on the much larger body of analysis and evidence contained 
in a separate, supporting volume of individual papers entitled 'The economics of 
Community public finance', forthcoming in the series 'Reports and studies' of Euro-
pean Economy. 
Heinrich Matthes 
Chairman of the Editorial Board 
of European Economy 
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Highlights 
Highlights 
1. In the perspective of economic and monetary union, 
European Community (EC) decisions on spending and its 
financing will be at the heart of policy-making. Even if the 
present EC budget is small (1,2% of GDP compared to the 
average of 48% of GDP for national spending in the Member 
States), these decisions have a profound impact on the prin-
ciples of fairness, stability and democratic power-sharing. 
2. With regard to policy-making, there are clear advantages 
with decentralization. The burden of proof should be on 
those proposing to centralize. The report acknowledges and 
welcomes the fact that this concern has been captured in 
the principle of subsidiarity as enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union, and it strongly recommends 
using the principle effectively as a safeguard against unwar-
ranted centralization tendencies. 
3. Concerning fairness, the report recommends that interre-
gional solidarity should be expressed through Community 
public finance, i.e. that, on balance, resources should flow 
from richer regions of the union to poorer ones; the degree 
of explicit interregional transfers being largely a matter of 
political choice. While recognizing that strong political for-
ces and Community objectives are at play, the economic 
case for a permanent and substantial increase in interregional 
redistribution, as a consequence of economic and monetary 
union, is found to be weak. Policy instruments for transfer-
ring resources must attempt to minimize the inherent dangers 
of interregional redistribution, such as distributional inertia, 
aid dependency, 'grantsmanship', moral hazard and econ-
omic inefficiency. 
4. As to stability, the report comes to two main conclusions: 
Community-wide stabilization should be achieved by the 
single monetary policy and the coordination of national 
budget policies. Effective policy coordination will be one of 
the main challenges in the future management of EMU. No 
explicit Community-wide stabilization role is foreseen for 
the Community budget. 
However, there is a strong case for the Community to help 
Member States cope with severe specific shocks, which will 
become more difficult as, with a single currency, the ex-
change rate is lost as an adjustment instrument. Inexpensive 
and effective mechanisms, explicitly designed for stabiliza-
tion, could be operated at EC level for assisting Member 
States hit by adverse economic developments. 
5. With respect to democratic power-sharing, greater EC 
spending and revenue raising will require greater trans-
parency and democratic accountability, and therefore a 
strengthening of the responsibility of the European Parlia-
ment in the budgetary field for spending as well as revenue 
raising. Further deepening beyond economic and monetary 
union and an enlargement of the Community to more than 
20 members must be founded on a fundamental change in 
the constitution and the institutions of the Community. 
6. Over the next few years, until the introduction of a 
single currency, a further step forward should be made in 
improving the economic efficiency of Community spending, 
in particular for the common agricultural policy and for 
economic and social cohesion. The common agricultural 
policy should be reoriented away from price support to direct 
income support, and also here, the principle of subsidiarity 
should be applied in a stringent way. The guiding idea for a 
further improvement in the operation of the Structural 
Funds is that they should become more performance-related 
rather than expenditure-related. 
7. In the transition to EMU, the present financing system 
of the EC budget based on customs duties, agricultural 
levies, VAT and GNP will have to be continued; however 
proportionality should be secured, i.e. Member States should 
finance the budget in accordance with their share in Com-
munity GDP. 
8. In the early years following the introduction of a single 
currency (i.e. in about 10 to 15 years) a small EC budget of 
about 2% of Community GDP is capable of sustaining 
economic and monetary union, including the discharge of the 
Community's growing external responsibilities (see Table 1). 
Such a budget should be composed of an effective interre-
gional stabilization mechanism; reduced agricultural expen-
diture; an increased but still limited Community involvement 
in environment, R&D, trans-European networks and higher 
education; some further increase in expenditure for economic 
and social cohesion; and a strong rise in aid to third 
countries. 
9. In economic and monetary union, the Community budget 
should be financed in a way different from the present one. 
European Central Bank profits are as convincing a candidate 
for new own resources. Other well-suited candidates are a 
tax on C0 2 emissions and corporate taxes. In the perspective 
of a truly single capital market, an overhaul of Community 
loan instruments appears necessary: the EIB should be en-
trusted with all project and programme financing and the 
Commission with borrowing and lending operations related 
to macroeconomic policy. There is an opportunity to step 
up Community lending to third countries, in particular to 
1 
Highlights 
Eastern Europe, where the Community's credit reputation 
could play a valuable role. 
10. The accession of some EFTA countries is assumed in 
this report to have taken place before the introduction of a 
single currency. Further enlargement of the Community to 
the East is also becoming a pressing political priority, even 
if full membership of a significant number of countries might 
still be far off. The main budgetary implications of such a 
further enlargement derive from the Structural Funds. On 
the basis of present per capita levels of cohesion assistance 
of about ECU 200 per capita per year to Greece and Portu­
gal, an Eastern European population of 100 to 200 million 
inhabitants would require assistance of about 0,4 to 0,8% 
of Community GDP. 
Table 1 
EC expenditure in the early years following the introduction of a single currency and comparison with the 1992 budget 
Expenditure categories 
1. Agricultural expenditure 
2. R&D, infrastructure, energy, education, 
environment 
3. Structural expenditure (including Cohesion 
Fund) 
4. External aid (including EDF') 
5. Expected outlays under regional stabiliz­
ation mechanism 
6. Other 
Total 
Indicative % 
οΓ EC 
GDP 
0,4 to 0,5 
0,15 to 0,2 
0,4 to 0,5 
0,5 to 0,55 
about 0,2 
0,1 
1,75 to 2,05 
% share 
23 
10 
23 
27 
12 
5 
100 
1992 budget 
as % οΓ 1992 
GDP 
0,67 
0,06 
0,32 
0,07 
0,07 
1,19 
•/.share in 1992 
including EDF' 
56 
5 
27 
6 
_ 
6 
100 
1 EDF = European Development Fund. 
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Summary and conclusions 
I — Scope and focus 
in a separate but supporting volume of individual papers 
prepared by members of the expert group and by Com-
mission staff involved in drawing up the report. 
The European Community (EC) is on its way towards the 
introduction of a single currency by 1999 at the latest. It 
has become a pole of attraction for many other European 
countries and has growing responsibilities on the inter-
national stage. The budgetary consequences of these devel-
opments, from an economic point of view, form the general 
subject matter of this report. 
At present, the Community budget is very small, 1,2% of 
Community GDP, compared to the average of 48% of GDP 
for national spending by Member States. Without major 
changes, European economic and monetary union would 
therefore have a particular feature which is unique in history: 
a single monetary policy coupled with largely decentralized 
fiscal policies. One of the core issues for the future is whether 
European union will also need a big central budget, to make 
EMU successful and sustainable. 
In addressing this issue, this report focuses on the minimum 
requirements for an economic and monetary union in terms 
of EC public finance. Consequently, a major part of the 
analysis is devoted to working out what the budget could 
look like in the early years following the introduction of a 
single currency. For the sake of convenience, full partici-
pation is postulated for all Member States and it is assumed 
that only some EFTA countries or countries with very small 
populations would have become full members of the EC. 
The report briefly covers a longer-term perspective, including 
further deepening of European integration in terms of de-
fence and social union and an enlargement of the Com-
munity to more than 20 members. 
Recognizing the strong linkage between the political process 
in its various facets and Community responsibilities for 
spending and revenue raising, the report argues that deepen-
ing and widening of the Community will bring to a head 
the question of whether it is willing to adopt more direct 
democracy, and a European government in a long-term 
perspective. 
Like its predecessor, the 1977 MacDougall report on the 
role of public finance in European integration, this report 
builds on and further develops the literature on the distri-
bution of responsibilities between different levels of govern-
ment. In addition, a significant part of the work has drawn 
on the rich experience of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, 
Canada, Australia and the United States. This is reflected 
II — Past and present 
Spending, and the financing of expenditure, are at the heart 
of democratic power-sharing, fairness and policy-making: 
the Community is no exception in this respect. In fact, 
Community finances have been an important institutional 
battleground between the two branches of the Community 
budget authority, the Council and the European Parliament, 
and budgetary fairness has been an important concern. Dif-
fering views of Member States on this question have given 
rise to serious tensions. 
Table 2 provides a synopsis of current Community policies 
and their public finance implications. An analysis of the 
budget's present structure and past development reveals the 
following main features: 
(i) As far as spending is concerned, agricultural expenditure 
still makes up more than half of the Community budget 
and continues to grow at a rapid pace. This growth has 
occurred in spite of major efforts to reform the common 
agricultural policy since 1984. It also shows the limited 
effectiveness of the budgetary guideline for agricultural 
expenditure, which was introduced informally 10 years 
ago and which has become more binding since 1985. 
(ii) With the enlargement of the Community in 1981 to 
include Greece and in 1986 Portugal and Spain, struc-
tural problems and in particular regional disparities 
have dramatically increased. The Community has re-
sponded to this by substantially stepping up its efforts 
to assist backward and declining regions to cope with 
their situation, and to promote retraining of the unem-
ployed and the modernization of the agricultural sector. 
(iii) There are some financial activities of the Community 
outside the general budget. These concern expenditure 
for development aid in the European Development 
Fund and for industrial reconversion in the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) operational budget. 
In addition, there are significant borrowing and lending 
operations by the European Investment Bank and others 
(ECSC, Euratom, balance of payments loans). The 
Community financial involvement in research, energy, 
industry, environment, and infrastructure is thus more 
important than the bare figures of the general budget 
might suggest. The same holds true for Community 
external assistance. 
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(iv) As far as the revenue side of the budget is concerned, 
the Community aspiration to be funded autonomously 
has largely failed. Unlike customs duties and agricul-
tural levies, representing about one quarter of total 
revenue, the VAT and GNP-based so-called 'own re-
sources' are, from an economic point of view, effectively 
national contributions balancing revenue and expendi-
ture in the general budget. 
Table 2 
The EC general budget, other expenditure and lending — Structure and development 
EC general budget' (1992) 
Agricultural expenditure 
Structural expenditure 
R&D, infrastructure, energy, 
environment 
External aid 
Other 
Other expenditure (1991) 
European Development Fune 
ECSC budget 
Lending (1990) 
EIB 
Other 
1 Payment appropriations. 
Sources: The EC general budget for 1992, 
education, 
1 
European 
Total 
Economy 50, 
Million ECU % of 
general 
budget 
36 039 57,4 
17 619 28,0 
2 930 4,7 
2 269 3,6 
3 971 6,3 
62 827 100,0 
1 460 2,3 
500 0,8 
12 605 20,1 
1 017 1,6 
December 1991 and Supplement A. January 1992. 
% o f 
EC GDP 
0,67 
0,32 
0,06 
0,04 
0,07 
1,16 
0,03 
0,01 
0,27 
0,02 
Average 
annual growth 
1986-92 
8,5 
18,9 
25,2 
11,6 
-3,5 
i 0,1 
3,0 
12,1 
17,2 
-22,1 
III — General insights and recommendations 
Against the background of past and present Community 
public finance, the report draws and enlarges on valuable 
theoretical and empirical evidence. However, the evidence 
cautions against a mechanistic view of further evolution. 
Much depends on the political process embracing the consti-
tutional foundations, the rules of cooperation among the 
several levels of government, the characteristics of the demo-
cratic system and the sharing of power between the executive 
and legislative branches of government. 
There is, thus, no prefabricated optimal model for the struc-
ture of economic and monetary unions in general and of the 
Community in particular. Nevertheless, theory and practice 
of intergovernmental relations provide some important in-
sights which have led the group to formulate general rec-
ommendations, relating to competences, stabilization and 
equity. 
Beware of centralization 
Even if, at present, federations function with strongly vary-
ing degrees of expenditure centralization, their historical 
development has provided ample evidence that the risk of 
ever-growing centralization is considerably greater than that 
of regions taking away power from the federal level. There 
are three main reasons for this: the desire for more power 
by the federal bureaucracy; the generally greater taxing pow-
ers of the federal level; and the growing importance of equity 
and stability objectives. 
Clear advantages are seen in decentralization. Public goods 
and services can be tailored more to the preferences of the 
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population; democratic control is more effective, reducing 
the risk of excessive bureaucracy; and innovation and ef-
ficiency are encouraged through competition among jurisdic-
tions. Consequently, the burden of proof should be on those 
proposing to centralize, and such proposals should be sub-
stantiated by a careful analysis of the benefits of centraliza-
tion compared to its cost. 
Benefits of centralization are likely to occur in the pursuit 
of a certain level of fairness or stability, when the policies 
in one jurisdiction have a positive or negative impact on well-
being in other jurisdictions, and when there are economies of 
scale, including greater bargaining power, in particular vis-à-
vis third countries. Even then, voluntary coordination might 
provide a more appropriate response than centralization. 
The report acknowledges and welcomes the fact that these 
concerns have been captured in the principle of subsidiarity 
as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 
and it strongly recommends using the principle effectively 
as a safeguard against unwarranted centralization tendenc-
ies. As far as spending is concerned, the proper application 
of this principle should give rise to an in-depth assessment 
of the cost and benefits of EC involvement. 
Positive integration 
Applying the principle of subsidiarity, the report sees an 
economic rationale for some limited additional Community 
spending in: environmental protection; road, rail, telecom-
munications infrastructure and common energy carriers; re-
search and development; and, to a lesser extent, higher 
education. Such Community expenditure could largely sub-
stitute for less efficient national spending and provide a 
positive integration complement to the completed internal 
market. 
External aid: growing strong 
In existing federations, expenditure related to external policy 
is almost entirely carried out at the highest level. An im-
portant economic reason is that the advantages of external 
aid accrue also to neighbours, e.g. by helping to stem poten-
tial migratory flows. Coupled with greater bargaining power 
and efficiency considerations, this implies that an increasing 
proportion of third country assistance should be provided 
by the Community, which would thus be able to show that 
it has matured in terms of its international responsibilities. 
Criteria for revenue competences 
With regard to revenue, apart from customs duties and 
central banks' profits, there is no important tax which is 
invariably allocated to the highest level of government in 
major federations. As federal practice offers little guidance, 
the case for Community involvement in taxation will also 
have to be based on a thorough analysis of its advantages 
and disadvantages. 
In doing so, it is important to distinguish between EC 
responsibility in tax legislation and the allocation of taxes 
for the financing of the Community budget. The report 
focuses on the second question, in response to which the 
group recommends that the assignment of new own re-
sources to the EC level should be guided by reference to one 
or more of three main criteria: 
(i) tax revenues are difficult or impossible to allocate be-
tween Member States (e.g. customs duties and central 
banks' profits); 
(ii) the tax base is highly mobile, implying that a low rate 
in one Member State, e.g. on capital income, erodes the 
tax base of other Member States; 
(iii) the tax is most effective in achieving agreed Community 
policy objectives (e.g. C0 2 taxes). 
Budgetary fairness and interregional transfers 
Interregional solidarity should be expressed through central 
public finances, i.e. resources should flow from richer regions 
of the union to poorer ones. This resource flow principle 
does not pronounce on the degree of solidarity. In existing 
federations, explicit interregional transfers take place from 
richer to poorer regions through tax sharing, and general 
and specific purpose grants, even if as between countries, 
e.g. Germany and the USA, their intensity and composition 
differs. Through direct federal expenditure and social secur-
ity and, to some minor extent, through the regional impact 
of taxation there are additional implicit flows of funds. 
On the basis of this empirical evidence and Member States' 
sensitivity with regard to budgetary fairness, the report ar-
gues that the resource flow principle should, as a minimum, 
also be reflected in EC public finance. This is coherent 
with the objective of economic and social cohesion, the 
importance of which was underlined by the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union. 
The extent of regional transfers undertaken in applying the 
resource flow principle is a matter of political choice, which 
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should depend on an assessment of the distribution of the 
overall costs and benefits of integration; the scale and the 
effects of migration; the degree of homogeneity in terms of 
citizenship, culture and language; and the economic ef-
ficiency of the transfers. 
On none of these grounds does European economic and 
monetary union, when established, call for a substantial 
permanent increase in interregional redistribution. A tem-
porary special Community effort may be necessary as the 
costs of economic and monetary unification are high in the 
transition and fall to a greater extent on weaker Member 
States. However, in the final stage, poorer Member States 
are likely to benefit more than the richer ones, in particular 
from the elimination of transaction costs and exchange-
rate uncertainty, as long as the loss of the exchange-rate 
instrument would be covered by the Community assisting 
them to absorb major shocks. Migration between Member 
States is unlikely to pose serious problems, given persisting 
cultural and language differences. In this respect, monetary 
union at European level is entirely different from the monet-
ary and social union in the process of German unification. 
the group concludes that no explicit role in Community-
wide stabilization needs to be foreseen for the EC budget. 
In existing federations, the central budget has a significant 
regional stabilization effect. This takes place mainly through 
automatic stabilizers via budgetary flows principally serving 
other purposes, e.g. social security. There are very few ex-
plicit instruments designed to help regions in the case of 
economic difficulties. 
The group shares the view of much of the literature on EMU 
that there is a strong case for a Community role in assisting 
Member States to absorb severe specific shocks. This is in 
order to compensate for the loss of the exchange rate as an 
adjustment instrument and for the loss of an independent 
monetary policy, and should help to prevent longer lasting 
economic deterioration which could increase the pressure 
for greater redistribution. It should also make it easier for 
Member States to respect fiscal discipline rules. 
IV — A small 'EMU budget' 
Even though the economic case for greater interregional 
transfers in EMU is weak, the group none the less recognizes 
the political forces at play which are fuelled by three major 
sources: the longer-term trends in disparities, the decision-
making process and the emerging European citizenship. 
The explicit instruments for interregional redistribution 
should attempt to minimize the inherent dangers of interre-
gional redistribution: distributional inertia preventing funds 
from being allocated according to changing needs; aid depen-
dency leading to higher factor prices, hindering rather than 
fostering productivity gains and innovation; 'grantsman-
ship', profiting often richer and better organized recipients; 
moral hazard, i.e. creating eligibility artificially; and simple 
economic inefficiency, i.e. 'cathedrals in the desert'. 
Stabilization 
In existing federations, central governments are responsible 
for fiscal policy, with their budgets regarded as a potential 
union-wide stabilization instrument alongside the single 
monetary policy. For Community-wide stabilization the 
monetary policy of the European system of central banks at 
EC level will be available in the same way as in existing 
federations. The group considers that, in addition, attention 
needs to be paid to the aggregate budgetary stance through 
the coordination of national budgetary policies. Making 
such coordination effective will thus be one of the main 
challenges in the future management of EMU. Nevertheless, 
Based on these insights and recommendations, the report 
has focused on the necessary size of the EC budget after a 
single currency will have been introduced. 
No necessity is seen for EC spending in a number of areas 
representing the bulk of central government expenditure in 
existing federations, namely on social security and welfare, 
defence, and general purpose grants. Moreover, since the 
EC also does not and should not in the future run deficits, 
interest payments on debt, which represent significant out-
lays in most federations, do not occur. 
A small budget will do 
The central message of the report is that a small 'EMU 
budget' of about 2% of Community GDP is capable of 
sustaining European economic and monetary union, includ-
ing the discharge of the Community's growing external re-
sponsibilities (see Table 1). 
This is clearly contrary to much of the conventional econ-
omic wisdom, reflected in the MacDougall report as well as 
in the literature on economic and monetary union. Three 
distinctive features of this report compared to previous 
analyses explain the difference in the group's conclusions: 
(i) The principle of subsidiarity is applied rigorously. 
(ii) No explicit role is foreseen for the Community budget 
in Community-wide macroeconomic stabilization. 
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(iii) While recognizing that strong political forces are at 
play and that the reduction of regional disparities is an 
important Community objective, the economic case for 
a permanent and substantial increase in interregional 
redistribution, as a direct consequence of EMU, is found 
to be weak. 
Inexpensive but effective interregional stabilization 
Moreover, the group's confidence in this unconventional 
conclusion rests on one of its main findings. Inexpensive and 
effective mechanisms can be operated for assisting Member 
States hit by adverse economic developments (shock absorp-
tion) if they are explicitly designed for this purpose rather 
than being the automatic implicit consequence of much 
larger budgetary flows serving mainly other purposes as in 
existing unions. Such a shock-absorption mechanism would 
provide a cushion against adverse developments in the Mem-
ber States to a similar degree as automatic stabilizers do, for 
example, in the USA. For a shock absorption scheme based 
on changes in unemployment rates, the group estimates that 
the average annual expenditure might be of the order of 
0,2% of EC GDP. 
Evolution of expenditure 
In addition to a cheap but effective specific stabilization 
instrument, no major new Community expenditure category 
would be necessary. However, the structure of expenditure 
should change significantly (see Table 2), leading to a drop 
in agricultural expenditure to about 25% of the total budget; 
an increased but still limited involvement (less than 0,2% of 
GDP) in expenditure on environment, R&D, trans-Euro-
pean networks and higher education; further strengthening 
of Structural Fund expenditure (including the new Cohesion 
Fund); and a strong increase in aid to third countries (includ-
ing the integration of the European Development Fund into 
the general budget). 
Revenue 
Here the following changes are advocated. New Community 
own resources should substitute, at least partially, for the 
present third and fourth resource, while at least maintaining 
proportionality, i.e. ensuring that poorer countries do not 
pay more and richer ones not less than their GDP shares. 
European Central Bank profits are as convincing a candidate 
for new own resources as customs duties. Other well-suited 
candidates are a tax on C0 2 emissions and corporate taxes. 
Borrowing and lending 
By making a truly single capital market possible, economic 
and monetary union can be expected to reduce greatly the 
usefulness of and necessity for Community loan instruments 
for operations within the Community. A real overhaul of 
Community loan instruments would appear necessary in this 
context. The most rational way would be to entrust the EIB 
with all project and programme financing operations for 
structural improvements, whereas the Commission should 
continue to be responsible for borrowing and lending oper-
ations related to macroeconomic occurrences. The reduced 
relevance of Community loan instruments for internal finan-
cing provides an opportunity for stepping up efforts in 
third countries, in particular Eastern Europe, where the 
Community's credit reputation could play an invaluable 
role. 
V — Towards EMU 
For the years leading up to the introduction of a single 
currency, the report advocates a gradual build up of Com-
munity spending towards the 'EMU budget' motivated case 
by case on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. On the 
expenditure side, economic efficiency should be improved, 
jn particular for the common agricultural policy and the 
Structural Funds; for revenues, a fairer distribution of the 
financing burden should be assured. 
Common agricultural policy: from price support to 
income support 
A decisive effort should be made to put the CAP on an 
economically sounder footing. The fundamental aim of the 
changes should be to separate the allocation and redistri-
bution aspects of current agricultural policy. This implies a 
reorientation of the CAP away from price support to direct 
income support, which may be supplemented by national 
income transfers to farmers, subject to the fulfilment by 
beneficiaries of public tasks such as environmental manage-
ment. This shift from price support (i.e. substantial transfers 
from the consumers to the agricultural sector) to direct 
income support from the Community and national budgets 
might require in the immediate future some increases in 
total budgetary outlays in order to make the policy reform 
politically palatable. However, over the medium-term such 
a reform would not only be beneficial from the point of view 
of economic efficiency, but should also lead to a reduction 
in overall budgetary outlays since the income support would 
become degressive and more and more targeted. 
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Structural Funds: towards better performance VI — Further deepening and widening 
The report also argues for a significant improvement in 
the operation of the Structural Funds, including the new 
Cohesion Fund. The guiding idea is that they should become 
more performance-related rather than expenditure-related. 
Consequently, fixed a priori allocations to a Member State 
should be avoided and incentives provided for achieving 
verifiable targets. Such verification of performance should 
be carried out on three levels: first, the actual programme 
or project realization; second, the contribution to the overall 
improvement in structural adjustment; and third, the macro-
economic policy achievements. The macroeconomic policy 
framework has been found to be of crucial importance for 
the effectiveness of structural assistance. 
Revenue: from regressivity to proportionality 
As far as Community revenues are concerned, none of the 
three new own resource candidates advocated for full EMU 
can, technically and politically speaking, be made quickly 
available for Community financing. In the transition to 
EMU, therefore, the present financing system will have to 
be continued. However, it has a major defect arising from 
its regressive impact in relation to GDP on some Member 
States, i.e. poorer Member States tend to pay more than 
their 'fair' GDP share. The group strongly recommends that 
this defect be eliminated by securing proportionality, i.e. 
Member States should finance the budget in accordance with 
their share of Community GDP. 
It is mainly VAT as the present third own resource which 
introduces very peculiar biases to Member States' financing 
shares. There are three broad ways in which the regressive 
nature of the present own resources system could be over-
come. First, one could abolish VAT as an own resource. 
This has the advantage of clarity and simplicity but the 
major disadvantage of being a further step backward in 
terms of apparent autonomy in financing the budget, and it 
would close the door on VAT becoming a genuine own 
resource in the future. 
The second pragmatic solution is a combination of VAT 
capping and a reduction of its weight in overall revenues. 
The drawback of this solution is that it goes only part of 
the way towards achieving the goal of proportionality. The 
third possibility would be to align Member States' actual 
shares in each year with their GDP share by offsetting 
payments and contributions in the subsequent year. This is 
a technically feasible and transparent way of achieving the 
desired objective, but would create some uncertainty and 
might, as a balancing item, create some political reluctance. 
In looking towards the longer term, beyond EMU, the report 
concludes that further expenditure requirements arising from 
economic integration alone should not be subject to a further 
quantum change beyond the limit of 2% of EC GDP sug-
gested previously. Instead, the development of EC public 
finance in the longer term will be driven primarily by the 
implications of the intensification of efforts to construct 
a defence and social union as well as by the prospective 
enlargement of the Community towards the East. 
Defence and social union 
In most existing federations, defence expenditure is 100% 
centralized (in Switzerland only 86%) and represents, on 
average, about 2,5% of GDP. There are very strong argu-
ments for centralization in terms of the cost-effectiveness of 
military deterrence. A good economic case can thus be made 
for a fully fledged defence union, but this, of course, would 
imply a monumental change in perceptions of national sover-
eignty and therefore be politically highly controversial. Es-
tablishment of a rapid deployment force under the authority 
of the union in response to the needs for peace-keeping 
abroad, and for greater flexibility and speed, might be less 
objectionable. Its cost could be met by less than 0,2% of 
GDP. 
While the concept and the economics of defence union are 
quite straightforward, the concept of social union and its 
economic and public finance aspects are highly complex. In 
fact, there are really two main aspects: the regulatory aspect 
of social union, and the fiscal aspect. The former relates to 
the Social Charter and is an essential part of economic 
union. This regulatory aspect need not have direct budgetary 
implications, and this is what has been assumed for the main 
thrust of the report. 
However, in the longer run, two basic forces might lead to 
the necessity for the Community to give substance to the 
fiscal aspect of the social union. First, migration flows be-
tween Member States, motivated purely by tax or transfer 
considerations, would be economically inefficient and might 
call for intergovernmental grants, which have been demon-
strated possibly also to be welfare-enhancing for the donor 
countries in such circumstances. Second, the feeling of com-
mon citizenship and solidarity might increase. This could 
imply that an unconditional fiscal equalization mechanism, 
as exists in most mature federations, might no longer meet 
with fierce political objections. 
Finally, there is a risk that the wage demonstration effects 
will lead to higher unemployment, even if the combined 
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policy efforts of the Community and the Member States 
should be able to ensure that wage flexibility will become 
greater rather than smaller. Higher unemployment could 
increase the pressure for greater interregional transfers. 
Enlargement to the East 
While these reflections on further deepening with regard to 
defence and social union are of a somewhat speculative 
nature, consideration of the further enlargement of the Com-
munity to the East will very soon become a pressing political 
priority even if full membership of a significant number 
of countries might still be far off. The main budgetary 
implications of such a further enlargement derive from the 
Structural Funds. 
The eventual increase in budgetary outlays arising from 
enlargement to the East will depend crucially on how econ-
omically backward the new members are at the time of their 
accession, which in turn will be influenced by the amount 
of assistance they get before becoming members, and on 
how generous internal solidarity through the cohesion in-
struments will be when they enter. The future growth of 
internal spending in favour of economic and social cohesion 
and of external assistance to East European countries is 
thus of great relevance: the report calls for a balanced 
development with somewhat higher increases for external 
assistance. 
On the basis of present per capita levels of cohesion assist-
ance of about ECU 200 per year to Greece and Portugal, an 
East European population of 100 to 200 million inhabitants 
would require assistance of ECU 20 to 40 billion, i.e. 0,4 to 
0,8% of Community GDP. 
VII — More democracy and a European 
government 
Being composed of economists, the group felt that it had 
limited claim to expertise in the design of concrete proposals 
for institutional change. Nevertheless, the group is convinced 
that the public finance dimension of European integration 
is closely interwoven with the political process in its three 
main components: the constitution, institutional design, and 
decision-making procedures. The report therefore also con-
tains some tentative reflections on directions for change in 
these areas. 
Without pronouncing on the strong doubt that has been 
raised about the efficiency and democratic virtues of the 
Maastricht institutional and decision-making arrangements, 
the group considers that greater EC spending and revenue 
raising will require greater democratic accountability, and 
therefore a strengthening of the role of the European Parlia-
ment in the budgetary field. This should involve a greater 
say on expenditure where the present artificial distinction 
between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and 
the respect of the 'maximum rate' of increase in non-compul-
sory expenditure continues severely to marginalize the Par-
liament's role. In economic and monetary union the Par-
liament should also be given responsibility for raising rev-
enues. 
In the group's opinion further deepening beyond economic 
and monetary union and an enlargement of the Community 
to more than 20 members must be founded on a fundamental 
change in the constitution and the institutions of the Com-
munity. With regard to constitutional change, two ideas 
were considered. First, a popular referendum could provide 
the Community with an element of direct democracy which, 
if used for major policy decisions, could provide a good 
safeguard against undue centralizing tendencies. However, 
contrary to the experience of some small countries, a refer-
endum at Community level would of course be a major 
operation involving heavy informational and administration 
costs. More importantly, this form of direct democracy 
squares badly with the traditions and experiences of some 
of the bigger Member States. 
Secondly, a genuine participation of the European Parlia-
ment in intergovernmental conferences leading to changes 
in the Treaties would already be an important and necessary 
step for reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the Com-
munity if Member States are unable to accept the suggestion 
that the European Parliament, in cooperation with national 
Parliaments, be entrusted with the task of working out a 
new European constitution. 
Concerning the institutions, the group believes that in the 
longer run a genuine European government would need to 
be created based on a democratic system in which European-
wide political parties have as strong an influence as national 
representatives, in other words the creation of a genuine two 
chamber system. This clearly corresponds to the federal view 
on European development which the group recognizes to be 
a long way from being a consensual one. 
The report concludes that for the well-functioning of a 
further deepening of the Community and more acutely so 
for its inevitable widening it will be necessary to strengthen 
the democratic legitimacy of the Community and to improve 
present decision-making rules. 
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Chapter 1 — General introduction 
Chapter 1 to ignore national political interests and instead takes the 
need to maximize the welfare of the Community as a whole 
as its objective. 
General introduction 
1.1. Motivation of the report 
All 12 Member States of the European Community have 
now ratified the Treaty on European Union agreed upon by 
the Heads of State or Government at the Maastricht Summit 
in December 1991. 
The ratification period has been difficult for the European 
integration process, not only because of the temporary blow 
of the 'No' in the first Danish referendum, the small margin 
of victory in the French vote and the deep controversy in 
the United Kingdom over Maastricht, but also because the 
Community was confronted with a number of major and 
continuing challenges, such as the sharp recession and the 
concomitant rise in unemployment, the turbulence in the 
EMS and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Neverthe-
less, it also managed to achieve a number of important 
successes. The task of completing the internal market was 
virtually concluded, for instance, and the enlargement nego-
tiations with several EFTA countries were launched. 
Arguably, the most striking and definitely the most laborious 
achievement of 1992 was the Edinburgh agreement on the 
development of the EC budget for the period 1993-99, which 
should ensure a relative calm on the budgetary front 
throughout this decade, much as a similar agreement in 1988 
did for the years up to 1993. 
The Edinburgh agreement addressed the EC public finance 
requirements in the short to medium term, with regard to 
the new Treaty. It was the fruit of a pragmatic approach, 
taking account from the outset of what was politically feas-
ible in a situation where national authorities faced consider-
able difficulties keeping their public sector deficits in check. 
This report takes a fresh look into these matters. In 1977, 
the MacDougall report undertook a pioneering effort to 
assess in a systematic way the role of public finance in 
European integration. Building on an analysis of the role of 
the central budget in several federal and unitary States 
and on the insights from the available 'fiscal federalism' 
literature, the MacDougall report formulated a number of 
policy recommendations, in particular towards strengthen-
ing the capacity of the EC budget. Following these rec-
ommendations, the budget would need to grow to a mini-
mum of 2 to 2,5% of GDP. Although it did not elaborate 
the matter at any length, given the breakdown of the first 
EMU attempt, the MacDougall group deemed that the 
budget had to be raised to 5 to 7% of EC GDP for it to be 
compatible with monetary union. 
Despite the fact that little has come in the way of concrete 
execution of its policy recommendations, the MacDougall 
report can be seen as a benchmark for thinking about the 
EC budget because it took a far-sighted view and large parts 
of its analytical underpinnings remain valid. However, the 
normative economics of EC integration since the end of the 
1970s have undergone appreciable changes as a result of, on 
the one hand, a better analytical grasp of and longer experi-
ence with the integration process itself, and of the altered 
views on the role and effectiveness of public economic inter-
vention on the other. The debates on the contents and design 
of, first, an internal market, and, afterwards, an economic 
and monetary union, and the associated benefits and costs, 
have enabled a clearer insight into what EMU entails. The 
poor economic performance of most European countries 
between roughly 1975 and 1985 has prompted strong doubts 
about the usefulness of discretionary policy activism in the 
macroeconomic domain. Instead, the emphasis has come to 
lie more on the need for structural adjustment in goods and 
factor markets, leading to a reappraisal of the microecon-
omic responsibilities of government by way of the provision 
of public goods, deregulation or reregulation and incentives 
related to taxes and transfers. 
The present report, the writing of which largely preceded 
the debate that culminated in the Edinburgh agreement, 
deliberately keeps some intellectual distance from the politics 
that inevitably played a dominant role in the intense bar-
gaining process. It attempts to provide an in-depth, long-
term analysis of the functions to be discharged at Com-
munity level and the attendant size and composition of the 
EC budget in the perspective of EMU. The strength of the 
report, which is at the same time its weakness, is that it tends 
This shift of emphasis has in several countries gone hand in 
hand with a decentralist tendency, which, apart from politi-
cal motives, was inspired by a concern to improve the quality 
of government intervention. The recent past has thus been 
characterized in several Member States by a gradual dimin-
ution of the economic role of the traditional nation-State to 
the benefit of higher and lower levels of government. With 
federalism in vogue, there are no signs that this remarkable 
trend is about to be halted, let alone reversed. Yet, the 
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disarray in the former Soviet Union and the appalling events 
in the former Yugoslavia hold out a strong warning that a 
rearrangement of the distribution of power, let alone se-
cession, has to occur in an orderly manner, reflecting a broad 
consensus among constituent parts. 
Against the backdrop of these important recent develop-
ments, the present report essentially seeks to examine in a 
systematic way what economic policy responsibilities oc-
casioning significant supranational expenditure need to be 
undertaken at the EC level in EMU and through what 
sources of finance should this expenditure be funded. 
1.2. Scope of the report 
Community public finance and European integration are 
indissolubly linked for both economic and political reasons. 
A deepening of economic integration calls for changes in the 
EC budget which, in the event that they are not introduced, 
may occasion systemic defects that threaten to undermine 
the acquis communautaire. The reinforcement of the EC 
budget may in turn be conducive to a further improvement 
of the functioning of EMU. Conversely, friction over the 
budget may paralyse the integration process, as was demon-
strated by the protracted crisis of the early 1980s. The 
Fontainebleau accord of 1984 and the Brussels package of 
1988 have proved to be among the key factors laying the 
foundation for the remarkable upswing in the integration 
process since 1985 and the successful implementation of the 
Single European Act notwithstanding the accession of Spain 
and Portugal, two relatively poor countries. By the same 
token, the new agreement for 1993-99 should facilitate the 
attainment of the Maastricht objectives. 
Whilst the evolution of the EC budget should reflect econ-
omic imperatives, it is equally clear that at the same time it 
is an inherently political question as well, since the power 
to tax and spend constitutes one of the hallmarks of political 
sovereignty. Consequently, the volume, composition and 
financing of and the decision-making procedure regarding 
the EC budget also mirror the degree of acceptance of the 
emergence of a supranational level of government. Past 
disputes on the EC budget and their settlement have in-
variably displayed an important political dimension, and 
actual outcomes have often been different from what would 
be considered optimal from an economic point of view. 
Although admittedly on several questions, such as the rev-
enue-side of the budget and the streamlining of the budgetary 
procedure and framework, the distinction is not easy to 
make as there is an obvious interface between the two 
aspects, the scope of this report is limited to the economics, 
not the politics, of the evolution of the EC budget. 
As far as the report's time-horizon is concerned, a major 
part of the analysis covers the transition to EMU, and 
primarily the period beyond. Stage III of EMU can now 
reasonably be assumed to start in 1999, since a majority 
of Member States currently look unlikely to respect the 
Maastricht convergence norms by 1997. Hence, in calendar 
terms, the scope of this report covers the next 10 to 15 years. 
By virtue of the available literature on the economics of 
EMU and the fact that the nature of the EMU amendments 
to the Treaty has become fully clear following the wide 
debate on the consequences of Maastricht, it is possible to 
spell out rather precisely the structural characteristics and 
national policy constraints on which to base the discussion 
of the desirable properties of the EC budget once the single 
currency has been introduced. 
The discussion with respect to what should happen there-
after, which is broached at the end of this report, will 
inevitably be more speculative as it depends on the specific 
choice of working hypotheses. Nevertheless, one can point 
to the probable budgetary implications of possible transfers 
of competences to the supranational level that are not strictly 
necessary for the viability of EMU. 
Although this report is written from an economic angle, 
concrete policy recommendations, to be relevant, cannot be 
out of step with what is considered politically feasible. Policy 
recommendations will accordingly be formulated in a gradu-
alist fashion, with more far-reaching proposals requiring 
higher degrees of political responsibility at EC level. 
1.3. Definitions and basic assumptions 
In order to avoid misunderstandings in the assessment of 
the analysis and recommendations that will be set out in the 
remainder of this report, it is important to be clear about 
the meaning of some key concepts as well as about a number 
of working hypotheses one needs to adopt on aspects of the 
development of the Community in the next 10 to 15 years 
that, while not strictly related to EMU, may impinge strongly 
on the future course of the EC budget. These hypotheses 
will be relaxed when the report is brought to a close. 
This section deals first with the economic contents of EMU. 
It then goes on to discuss the 'social union' concept and its 
components, and formulates the basic assumption that the 
Community will not seek to establish any cross-border inter-
personal transfer system in the period under consideration. 
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Subsequently, the report's hypotheses with respect to EC 
enlargement will be made explicit. 
The economic contents of EMU 
Like other stages in the integration process, the basic defi-
nition of economic and monetary union is legal and insti-
tutional. 
This set includes primarily EC interventions of a regulatory 
nature, such as competition policy, the harmonization or 
approximation of national rules, or the imposition of con-
straints on national budget deficits. However, as will be 
argued later on in the report, it also encompasses Com-
munity public interventions with a budgetary incidence. 
The concept of social union 
As to its economic meaning, there is a widespread consensus 
that a monetary union implies, pursuant to the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty: 
(i) the complete freedom of capital movements and a single 
market for financial services, including the total con-
vertibility of currencies; 
(ii) a single currency (or at least the irrevocable locking of 
exchange-rate parities). 
The first attribute formed part of the '1992' programme. 
The question of interest to this report concerns the policy 
implications at EC level of the pursuit of a single monetary 
policy geared to price stability and of the abandonment by 
individual Member States of the exchange-rate instrument. 
The contents of economic union cannot be defined as clearly, 
because it involves policy interventions relating to different 
fields. It is also, by its nature, a more open-ended concept 
than monetary union, the need for measures at supranational 
level depending inter alia on the actual degree of integration 
of goods and factor markets, which evolves over time. 
Economic union can be said to consist of four basic elements: 
(i) a completed internal market; 
(ii) competition policy and other measures aimed at 
strengthening market mechanisms; 
(iii) common policies aimed at structural change and re-
gional development; 
(iv) economic policy coordination and assistance to achieve 
stable macroeconomic development, including rules on 
national budgetary policies. 
In brief, an economic union is thus constituted by a single 
market flanked by a set of common policies (so-called 'posi-
tive integration') designed to reap all welfare gains from the 
existence of one market and one money (allocation and 
stabilization) and where all regions are given the opportunity 
to seize them (cohesion). 
Whereas in the case of the German unification process, the 
introduction of a single currency and common economic 
regulation was accompanied by the establishment of 'social 
union', it will be assumed in this report that the Community 
will not seek to pursue on the road to EMU those aspects 
of social union giving rise to explicit interpersonal redistri-
bution across borders. 
Social union is an even vaguer concept than economic union 
but it is taken here to consist of two main parts, one regulat-
ory, the other financial: 
(i) the existence of a common set of minimum rights in the 
area of labour law; 
(ii) guaranteed union-wide minimum income or public ser-
vice levels, and/or social security systems financed, at 
least partly, by central funding. 
With a view to realizing the so-called social dimension of 
the internal market, which was given a more concrete shape 
by the 1989 Social Charter, the Community — probably 
without the UK as it obtained an opt-out on the social 
policy agreement in the new Treaty — is to adopt in the years 
to come labour market measures of a regulatory nature, 
although it should ensure that these do not hamstring the 
adjustment capacity of factor markets. 
Observing the latter caveat, the Community may also wish, 
in a bid to promote the long-term upward convergence of 
social protection in the EC, to issue recommendations or 
even adopt directives setting norms — desirably country-
specific — on minimum income levels and social security 
regimes, but the financial implications of any EC initiatives 
in this field are supposed to be borne fully by the individual 
Member States concerned. 
This assumption is essentially inspired by the lack of any 
significant political support, especially in the northern part 
of the Community, for the creation of commonly funded 
welfare or social security schemes. This lack of support is 
very likely to prevail throughout the decade, in particular, 
in view of the growing political unease in richer regions of 
several individual Member States, such as Belgium, Ger-
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many and Italy, about the working of national solidarity 
mechanisms. Neither will cross-border migration take on 
such dimensions that it will complicate in any significant 
manner the conduct of redistribution policy within Member 
States. In addition, as will be set out in this report, there are 
powerful economic and managerial reasons why interper-
sonal redistribution should remain a national competence. 
At the same time, it must be remarked that the absence of 
a Community-wide social security scheme poses a challenge 
for regional stabilization policy in EMU, to which the pre-
sent report will map out a response. 
Community enlargement 
Another important question on which working hypotheses 
have to be adopted is that of which European countries will 
become full members of the Community before EMU has 
reached its steady state. This question is both very complex 
and delicate as it bears on the fundamental issues of the 
ultimate destination and internal organization of the Com-
munity as well as of international relations in Europe in 
general. Whilst obviously lying beyond the scope of this 
report, one cannot ignore here the question altogether since 
the answer to it is clearly not without budgetary conse-
quences. 
Turkey, Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Norway 
and Switzerland have already handed in their formal ac-
cession requests and several more applications are expected 
to be lodged in the coming years. Although, in the light 
of political events in Europe over the last five years, any 
hypothesis in relation to this issue is uncertain, it will be 
assumed that enlargement will be clearly restricted in num-
ber, with full accession being reserved to a limited number 
of EFTA countries or countries with small populations. 
A combination of factors renders this assumption plausible. 
First, there is a long time-lag between application and event-
ual accession, the examination, negotiation and ratification 
stages jointly having taken up five years or more in recent 
cases.1 Second, with the new Treaty on European Union 
leaving the institutional distribution of powers largely un-
changed, a significant extension of membership would risk 
leading to the breakdown of the Community's decision-
making process; there is a clear limit to 'widening' prior to 
institutional 'deepening' so as to reduce the weight of the 
intergovernmental dimension. Restoring the institutional 
balance is likely to be a key issue for the next intergovern-
mental conference due to be held in 1996 and it is only on 
1 In spite of the pressure to accelerate the process, it is by no means a 
foregone conclusion that the entry of the most 'easy' applicants, Austria, 
Sweden and Finland, will take place any faster. 
the basis of the outcome of that conference that the question 
of renewed widening can be tackled in earnest. Third, as 
far as countries of the former Eastern bloc are concerned, 
membership — entailing the acceptance of the entire acquis 
communautaire — can only be seriously considered upon 
successful transition from a command to a market economy. 
Although its duration differs strongly from country to coun-
try, this transition is bound to take a considerable number 
of years. Fourth, and related to the third factor, Member 
States may be reluctant to extend the Community to large 
and relatively underdeveloped countries because of the siz-
able impact this would have on EC spending. By way of 
illustration, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 
the inclusion of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic 
could, with current cohesion policies, raise expenditure on 
the Structural Funds by about ECU 11,5 billion in 1992 
prices, which would amount roughly to a 65% increase in 
present outlays on this item. This compares with approxi-
mately ECU 1,5 billion that these three countries received 
in 1992 from the Community and its Member States in the 
form of economic restructuring grants. Although aid to 
Eastern Europe will be stepped up in the years to come, 
the orders of magnitude of support to countries inside the 
Community as distinct from those outside will stay far apart. 
They may diverge even more as a result of the Edinburgh 
agreement because, whilst assistance to non-EC countries is 
to go up by 55%, structural operations are due to grow by 
60%, with a further concentration of the means on the 
Community's least developed areas. 
1.4. Plan of the report 
This report is built up by means of four logically consecutive 
parts. Part A sets the general background by providing a 
concise account of the past evolution of the Community 
budget and its present economic characteristics. 
Part B, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, examines in depth the 
implications of EMU for EC public finance. Chapter 3 
reviews the theoretical 'fiscal federalism' framework in which 
these implications need to be studied, as well as the current 
distribution of spending and tax powers in mature feder-
ations. Chapter 4 addresses the key set of analytical issues of 
the report, centring around the question of what additional 
competences with a significant budgetary incidence need to 
be assigned to the EC level of government to ensure a 
properly functioning EMU. 
The concrete, operational implications of the insights arrived 
at in Chapter 4 are elaborated in Part C, containing Chapters 
5 to 10. The desirable development of Community expendi-
ture of a regular, recurrent nature is discussed in Chapter 5, 
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whereas outlays to improve resource allocation, spending on 
cohesion policy and aid to third countries are dealt with in 
turn. Chapter 6 concerns the question of macroeconomic 
stabilization and analyses the possible functioning of a Com-
munity financial support mechanism to assist Member States 
in their adjustment to country-specific shocks. It also as-
sesses, on the basis of simulations, the appropriate annual 
budgetary envelope for interventions under such a mechan-
ism. The sensitive matter of budgetary 'fairness' is broached 
in Chapter 8, setting out the advantages and disadvantages 
of various ways of ensuring that individual Member States' 
net budgetary benefits are broadly in line with their relative 
prosperity per capita levels. Chapter 9 concerns the role and 
use of Community loan instruments and how they should 
change with the advent of EMU. Chapter 10 takes a look 
at some important regulatory and public administration 
aspects of the EC budget. It notably discusses in a nutshell 
the benefits and drawbacks of multiannual budgetary pro-
gramming and ways to improve the decentralized execution 
of the budget. 
Finally, the long term is contemplated in Part D, where the 
public finance consequences of the completion of social 
union and Community enlargement to Eastern Europe are 
briefly explored. 
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Chapter 2 — The EC budget — past and present 
Chapter 2 already written into the Treaty of Rome, was reformed in 
1971 and given a strengthened role. The European Regional 
Development Fund was established in 1975. 
The EC budget — past and present 
2.1. The past development of the EC budget 
In the first 20 years or so of the Community's existence, the 
evolution of the budget was determined by the quest for 
funding fledgling common policies, for financial autonomy, 
and for a balance between the institutions in the exercise of 
powers over the budget. 
The foundations of the Community's main expenditure cate­
gories were laid during that period. The price guarantee and 
structural investment Funds (EAGGF) associated with the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) were created in 1962 and 
came into full swing at the end of the 1960s. As can be 
gauged from Graph 1, which portrays the evolution of the 
aggregate size and composition of Community spending 
over the last two decades, agricultural outlays accounted for 
more than 80% of the total in 1971. The Social Fund, 
From 1958 to 1970, the budget was financed by a system of 
Member State contributions, with the exception of the ECSC 
levy financing the coal and steel policy. In 1970 the system 
of 'own resources' was introduced, the revenue from which 
the Community became legally entitled to. They consisted 
of customs duties, agricultural levies, and the revenue of a 
1% rate on Member States' VAT base. As indicated in 
Graph 2, the latter has soon become the Community's princi­
pal source of finance. 
Under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, the adoption 
of the budget was the exclusive prerogative of the Council. 
The European Parliament was given an important role by 
virtue of the 1975 Brussels Treaty. Since then the Council 
and Parliament form the two arms of the budgetary autho­
rity; the Parliament has the last say on some expenditure 
items (excluding the EAGGF) and can reject the budget 
altogether. 
At the end of the 1970s, the Community budget entered a 
prolonged phase of crisis, caused by a host of factors. Aside 
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GRAPH 2 : EC general budget revenue 
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from clashes of a more political nature between the two 
arms of the budgetary authority, with Parliament resolved 
to exploit its new powers to the full, a conflictual debate 
arose over Member States' net budgetary positions. More­
over, available own resources were becoming increasingly 
inadequate to finance the Community's growing policy am­
bitions. This posed a serious problem since the Community, 
pursuant to Article 199 of the EEC Treaty, is not allowed 
to run budget deficits. 
The acrimonious juste retour debate was triggered by the 
specific position of the UK, which, notwithstanding the fact 
that its GNP per capita level lay below the Community 
average (prior to the accession of Spain and Portugal), was 
a substantial net contributor to the budget because of its 
small agricultural sector and its large VAT base relative to 
GNP. To remedy this problem, laborious agreements were 
concluded in 1975 and 1979, as well as at the 1984 Fontaine­
bleau Summit whose 'UK abatement' arrangement is basi­
cally still in force today. 
Revenue under existing own resources did not grow fast due 
to the declining yield of customs revenues and agricultural 
levies, and the fact that the VAT base did not expand as 
quickly as GNP. By contrast, EC expenditure went up steep­
ly as social and regional Funds were reinforced, the first 
framework programme for R&D was launched, and, last 
but not least, the Community turned out to be unable to 
keep CAP spending in check. 
The shortfall of revenue relative to expenditure requirements 
was tackled in earnest for a first time at the 1984 Fontaine­
bleau Summit. The ceiling of the VAT resource was raised 
from 1 to 1,4% — which was, however, reached yet again 
in 1987. In addition, the European Council attempted to 
give a clear content to the notion of 'budgetary discipline', 
principally by stipulating that CAP spending ought not to 
increase faster than the own resources base. This attempt 
did not meet with great success, however, because the agri­
cultural Council of Ministers did not feel in a position to 
observe this discipline rule. 
The growing imbalances between financial means and needs 
resulted from the combined effect of the erosion of own 
resources and the continuous pressure for strong rises in 
expenditure. 
As the adequacy of the Fontainebleau settlement proved 
short­lived, a new comprehensive discussion was launched 
in 1987. It led to the adoption of the 'Delors package' in 
1988, to which both Council and Parliament subscribed by 
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way of an interinstitutional agreement. The economic goals 
of the 'package' were basically twofold. First, by covering 
the period 1988-92, it aimed at providing the Community 
with sufficient and stable resources to fund the implemen-
tation of the Single European Act. Secondly, it secured an 
agreement regarding the medium-term evolution of expendi-
ture by means of, on the one hand, a translation in financial 
terms of policy priorities, and, on the other, the deployment 
of a more effective brake on the growth of agricultural 
spending. 
cated, imparting a degree of rigidity within the available 
means. Second, and most important, because the framework 
revision procedure is fairly cumbersome, the budget has 
difficulties in responding to unforeseen events, such as Ger-
man unification, emergency aid to the former Eastern bloc, 
or the Gulf crisis. In any event, raising the ceiling on expendi-
ture in the financial perspective by making revisions should 
not lead, in application of the principle of budgetary equilib-
rium, to a situation where the ceiling on own resources (fixed 
as a percentage of Community GNP) is itself exceeded.1 
2.2. The economic characteristics of the present 
EC budget 
2.2.1. Limited room for manœuvre due to legal and 
institutional constraints 
The Community budget since 1989 is highly specific in that, 
as a result of an interinstitutional agreement of 1988 which 
is very likely to be renewed in 1993 for the period up to 
1999, it is subject to a set of year-on-year constraints which 
strongly limit the scope for discretionary budgetary policy. 
The main aspects of this agreement can be summarized as 
follows: 
(i) The spending ceiling up to 1994 inclusive amounts to 
1,2% of EC GDP, climbing gradually to 1,27% in 1999. 
The annual growth ofligncultural expenditure (more 
precisely the guarantee section) must not exceed three 
quarters of GDP growth, such that the share of agricul-
tural spending in the total budget, which stood at 65% 
in 1988, declines over time to below 50%. 
(ii) The budget evolves in a medium-term framework by 
means of a 'financial perspectives' plan laying down on 
an annual basis ceilings for the EC's principal expendi-
ture categories (like agricultural support, the Structural 
Funds in their entirety, aid to third countries, or multi-
annual grants such as those destined for research and 
development). 
Besides avoiding recurrent clashes between the Council, Par-
liament and Commission which might otherwise cause politi-
cal damage, the advantage of programming is that it permits 
a smooth development of the budget as the projected am-
ounts in the financial perspectives are accepted as binding 
during each annual budgetary round. The drawbacks of the 
current regime are essentially twofold. First, as the frame-
work does not only determine the real growth of the global 
envelope but also of its major constituent parts, transfers 
from one broad expenditure category to another are compli-
With multiannual programming, the Community has an 
open debate every five years or so on policy priorities and 
their budgetary translation, and some degree of automaticity 
in the intervening periods. An important question therefore 
is whether this medium-term approach is appropriate at the 
EMU-stage of integration or whether more flexibility is 
necessary, for instance to respond to economic and political 
contingencies inside and outside the Community. This issue 
will be dealt with in Chapter 10. 
Apart from the foregoing limitations, it needs to be recalled 
that the Treaty forbids the Community to run budget defi-
cits. Accordingly, the budget cannot play any significant 
stabilizing role for the overall EC economy. 
Turning to the revenue side, the EC does not possess fiscal 
sovereignty, since the Community's budgetary authority has 
not been empowered to introduce taxes on its own initiative. 
The Community has four sources of finance. Besides customs 
duties, agriculture and sugar levies, and a tax of 1,4% 
maximum on a uniform VAT base, it can since 1988 call on 
a fourth own resource on the basis of GNP to cover the 
difference between expenditure and the receipts from the 
first three own resources. But any decision to expand or 
modify own resources requires the unanimous consent of 
the Member States. As a consequence, the current revenue 
composition does not stem primarily from optimal taxation 
considerations, such as economic neutrality or ability to pay. 
2.2.2. The EC budget's specific economic incidence 
As shown in Table 3, the 1992 budget totalled almost 
ECU 60 billion or roughly 1,1% of Community GDP, i.e. 
some 0,1% short of the expenditure limit. This year's budget 
looks set to use all the available resources, and care will 
The financial framework agreed at Edinburgh was built, on the basis 
of economic forecasts available at the time, in such a way as to have a 
margin of 0,01% of GNP between the ceiling of expenditure and that 
of own resources (i.e. less than 1% of total expenditure). The margin 
which was initially held back in the agreement of 1988 was 0,03% of 
GNP. 
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have to be taken not to go beyond the ceiling in the wake 
of the worse-than-expected GDP growth and the substantial 
changes in intra-EC exchange rates. 
Using the familiar Musgravian triptych of public economic 
functions, this table suggests that the overwhelming part of 
spending goes to allocative policies, the more so as aid to 
the backward and declining regions through the Structural 
Funds takes mainly the form of action to improve local 
supply-side conditions. 
However, this preponderance is primarily due to the expendi-
ture associated with the CAP, which although being forced 
on a downward trend since the 1988 agreements, still ab-
sorbed in 1992 close to 54% of total expenditure (in favour 
of a sector generating less than 5% of Community value-
added). Furthermore, notwithstanding the presence of allo-
cative aims in its original mandate (Article 39 EEC) spending 
under the CAP has increasingly come to serve chiefly sectoral 
redistributive purposes in support of farmers' income and 
agro-industry (see Section 5.1.4). 
Leaving aside agricultural support and the Structural Funds, 
EC expenditure for the promotion of the efficient allocation 
of resources is nearly ECU 3 billion. Although minor in 
absolute size, this amount is by no means completely negli-
gible bearing in mind that, first, the principal policy instru-
ment relative to allocation is regulation — which also ex-
plains why at the national level expenditure on so-called 
economic services does not account for more than 10% of 
the national budget — and, second, that in line with the 
subsidiarity principle (see Section 3.1.1) Community involve-
ment in the provision of public goods and services as a 
general rule requires the problem at hand to exhibit a clear 
cross-border dimension. 
More than two thirds of these ECU 3 billion are devoted to 
R&D support, equalling about 5% of what is spent to this 
effect by the Member States. The relative importance climbs 
to over 10% in three areas, namely energy research, R&D 
on infrastructure and general planning of land use and 
R&D on industrial production and technology. 
The magnitude of current EC spending in other areas where 
the cross-border dimension is potentially large, such as en-
Table 3 
The composition of the EC budget 1991-93' 
I — Expenditure2 
Agricultural policy 
Structural operations 
External policy 
Research policy 
Administrative expenditure 
Other policies 
II — Revenue 
Agricultural and sugar levies 
Customs duties 
VAT 
Additional resource (GNP) 
Miscellaneous3 
In % of EC GDP 
Total 
Total 
1991 
Million ECU 
30 961 
13917 
2 209 
1 706 
2 656 
2 146 
53 650 
2 486 
11476 
30 269 
7 445 
4 573 
56 849 
% 
57,7 
25,9 
4,1 
3,2 
4,9 
4,0 
100 
4,0 
20,4 
53,8 
13,2 
8,1 
100 
1,06 
1992 
Million ECU 
31 243 
18 384 
2 064 
1 945 
2 751 
1 759 
58 147 
1 988 
11 292 
34 659 
8 322 
3 450 
59 718 
% 
53,7 
31,6 
3,5 
3,3 
4,7 
1,3 
100 
3,3 
18,9 
58,0 
13,9 
5,8 
100 
1,11 
1993 
Million ECU 
35 052 
20 709 
2 997 
2 201 
3 401 
1 161" 
65 523 
2 239 
13 118 
35 677 
14 030 
457 
65 523 
% 
53,4 
31,6 
4,6 
3,3 
5,2 
1,8 
100 
3,4 
20,0 
54,5 
21,4 
0,7 
100 
1,20 
1 The data for 1991 and 1992 are final outcomes; 1993 data refer to the budget as adopted. 
2 Payment appropriations. 
3 Includes mainly: tax and other deductions from staff salaries, interest on bank deposits and lhe remainder of the balance from the preceding year. 
4 Until 1993 national authorities were reimbursed part of the proceeds of own resources for covering their cost of collection. Sincel993 national authorities withhold this fee at source. 
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vironmental protection or infrastructure, is hard to measure 
because it is scattered over a variety of budgetary lines. For 
instance, an important part of the R&D budget is directed 
to environmental and energy-saving technology, whilst a 
sizable portion of the Structural Funds goes to infrastructure 
works. 
The explicit budgetary lines in support of these policies 
remain trivial, with token amounts that risk being too thinly 
spread to have any real impact. As far as environmental 
protection is concerned, this may no longer be the case when 
the sum is made of all scattered outlays. Spending on the 
environment then rises to about ECU 1 billion per annum, 
1,8% of the total (statistical information on these matters 
is incomplete and not always comparable). Moreover, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) gives loans to environmen-
tal projects to the tune of ECU 1,5 to 2 billion per year. 
Apart from regional infrastructural assistance within the 
Structural Funds' envelope, current Community support for 
infrastructure networks such as rail and road transport or 
telecommunications, at about ECU 160 million, remains 
marginal compared to Member States' spending where the 
heading 'transport and communications' oscillates around 2 
to 4% of GDP, or ECU 100 to 200 billion per annum. Yet 
in this respect as well the role of the EIB deserves to be 
mentioned, providing yearly ECU 2 to 3 billion of loan 
finance to transport and telecommunications projects in the 
Community. 
Besides agriculture, and, to a much lesser extent, steel and 
coal, the Community does not pursue sectoral policies oc-
casioning significant expenditure, it being understood, how-
ever, that the ECU 0,8 billion or so on R&D grants in 
support of industrial technology is liable to have a pro-
nounced sectoral impact. 
Finally, the large and increasing third-country component 
in the budget is worth noting. At about ECU 3 billion 
pencilled in for 1993, aid to third countries accounts for 5% 
of total spending, to which should be added the ECU 1,5 
billion under the European Development Fund. The latter 
Fund is still kept outside the ordinary budget, inter alia 
because its mode of financing is different. 
The Community budget cannot at present play any stabiliza-
tion role for the Community economy as a whole for three 
reasons: it is of too small a size, it is prohibited from running 
a deficit, and due to multiannual programming it lacks the 
necessary flexibility. In fact, the budget displays a procyclical 
bias in that its spending ceiling is expressed in Community 
GDP terms. 
It cannot serve a regional stabilization purpose either for 
want of automatic stabilizers or other regional shock absorp-
tion instruments operating at EC level. In this respect, the 
Community differs markedly from mature federal and uni-
tary countries where regional disturbances are to a signifi-
cant extent (see Section 4.2.2) offset through the national 
direct tax and social security system. 
The EC budget's general redistributive capacity is weak. 
Its redistributive impact is essentially determined by three 
factors: a country's contribution to the Community's VAT 
receipts, the share of agriculture in national GDP, and the 
interventions of the Structural Funds, which exhibit a strong 
geographical concentration. 
Operating by way of specific-purpose (and thus conditional) 
matching grants, the Structural Funds transfer quite im-
portant amounts to some parts of the Community, notably 
the small less developed Member States: the grants received 
in 1992 by Ireland, Portugal and Greece each represented 
more that 2,5% of GDP, equivalent to more than 75% of 
gross fixed capital formation by the public sector. 
Although, as will be pointed out in Chapter 8, it is difficult 
(and also politically very delicate) to calculate its effective 
incidence on Member States since several expenditure and 
revenue items cannot be assigned to specific countries, the 
EC budget has in the past been criticized (notably by the 
UK and increasingly Spain) for not being 'fair', the principal 
distortion arising from the disproportionate share of agri-
culture. Thus, whereas, the budgetary 'bottom-line' for Ire-
land and Greece is very positive (net receipts exceeding 5% 
of GDP) it is already much less the case for Spain and 
Portugal, in spite of the fact that the latter is clearly poorer 
per capita than Ireland. For the same reasons, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, enjoying a higher than average GDP 
per head, used to be net beneficiaries until the recent past. 
The 1984 Fontainebleau settlement of the British budget 
problem, which provided for a special arrangement on the 
revenue side, was largely maintained in the 1988 own re-
sources decision. As a consequence of this arrangement, the 
UK now contributes in net terms approximately 0,4% of 
its GDP, instead of 0,6% otherwise. More generally, the 
regressivity of the revenue side has been mitigated since 1989 
by the rule that the VAT assessment base to which a rate of 
1,4% is applied, is capped at 55% of national GNP. 
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2.3. The 'Delors IF package and the 
Edinburgh agreement 
As the 1988 accord expired after five years, a new general 
debate on the future of the EC budget was called for in 
1992. Initiated in February by Commission proposals known 
as the 'Delors II package',1 the debate was founded on 
the need to provide the financial means for realizing the 
Community's enhanced internal and external ambitions fol-
lowing the successful conclusion of the new Treaty and 
the events in Eastern Europe. Throughout, the debate was 
strongly influenced by concern not to imperil the ratification 
process in Member States with a hesitant public opinion on 
Europe, and by the rapidly deteriorating economic situation 
and the state of national public finances. As it contains 
little or no provisions with a clearly quantifiable budgetary 
incidence, the Treaty did not entail any automatic or obliga-
tory financial consequences. Thus, one cannot consider the 
agreed increase in the budget from now until 1999 to be the 
'invoice of Maastricht' although the media often presented 
it in this manner. 
The initial plan of the Commission proposed the conclusion 
of a new five-year accord (1993-97) during which maximum 
Community spending would increase in real terms from 
ECU 63 billion in 1992 to ECU 83 billion in 1997, requiring 
a rise in the own resources ceiling from 1,20% to 1,37% of 
GNP. The extra money was essentially to serve three pur-
poses. In keeping with the reinforced emphasis on economic 
and social 'cohesion', as reflected in the protocol to that 
effect of the new Treaty, half was to be devoted to a rise 
of expenditure on 'structural operations', so as to reach 
approximately ECU 30 billion in 1997. A second priority 
was to strengthen the Community's role on the international 
scene by a 75% expansion over the period of the EC's 
envelope for external aid. With a view to bolstering the 
competitive position of European industry, the third area to 
be privileged was that of spending on research and develop-
ment, as well as the deployment of trans-European networks, 
the supranational competence of which has been foreseen in 
the Maastricht Treaty (Articles 129b to 129d). The cohesion 
protocol also was the chief source of inspiration for the 
Commission's ideas with regard to the revenue side.2 It was 
proposed to increase the role of the GNP-based own resource 
and at the same time to lower that of the VAT-based own 
resource. No candidates for a new own resource were put 
forward. 
Member States responded rather favourably to the external 
assistance part of the Delors II package, but considered the 
expenditure plans in support of competitiveness to be over 
ambitious. They were clearly divided over the proposals to 
raise considerably the Community's structural outlays. 
As the economic downswing took hold in more and more 
countries and national public finances came under strong 
pressure, rendering future compliance with the 'excessive 
deficit' criteria of Maastricht increasingly problematic, a 
number of Member States argued for a closer parallelism 
between the pace of expansion of the EC budget and their 
own public spending. They criticized the proposed increase 
in the own resources ceiling as being too high, which 
prompted the Commission in November to extend the time-
frame of the requested rise in expenditure to 1999. 
In the event, the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992 
managed to reach a unanimous position on the development 
of the EC budget until 1999, the main ingredients of which 
are presented in Table 4. The last row in the table indicates 
the overall constraint imposed on the budget with the own 
resources ceiling staying unaltered until 1994, and growing 
very gradually thereafter to 1,27% in 1999.3 Expenditure 
was classified into six broad headings, each being subjected 
to specific annual expansion limits. The first relates to agri-
cultural spending, where the aforementioned guideline ac-
cording to which outlays on agriculture must not increase 
by more than 74% of Community GDP growth continues 
to apply. In fact, the spending curbs on agriculture were 
tightened as a number of expenditure items that used to be 
outside the coverage of the guideline (e.g. income support, 
market support measures for fishing) will now be incorpor-
ated.4 The budgetary consequences of the CAP reform ag-
reed in 1992 and the inclusion of the new German Länder, 
estimated in 1992 prices at approximately ECU 1,5 billion 
by 1999, will thus have to be borne by the available resources 
under the guideline.5 
The Commission proposals were first presented in the communication 
'From the Single Act to Maastricht and beyond' (COM(92) 2000), and 
detailed in 'EC public finance between now and 1997' (COM(92) 2001). 
The protocol provides that greater account should be taken of the 
contributive capacity of individual Member States in the system of own 
resources. 
The successive sum totals of payment appropriations were based on a 
GDP growth hypothesis of 1,1% in 1992, 1,4% in 1993, 2,2% in 1994, 
and 2,5% thereafter. 
This measure did not pose a major political problem as hitherto actual 
spending under the CAP fell short of the allowed maximum by a fairly 
wide margin, largely because the base year of the guideline proved to 
be generous. 
The Edinburgh Summit also extended the purpose of the monetary 
reserve under the sixth heading. Until now, this reserve was meant to 
cushion the adverse consequences for agricultural spending resulting 
from dollar/ecu exchange-rate changes. The reserve can in the future 
also be drawn on to fund extra CAP spending owing to exchange-rate 
fluctuations between EC currencies. Because of the use of the costly 
switch-over system which raises agricultural expenditure following an 
appreciation of a national currency vis-à-vis the ecu, it remains to be 
seen whether this extension of the reserve's task is consistent with halving 
its volume as of 1995. 
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Despite deep initial divisions over the Commission proposal, 
the projected expenditure for structural operations was 
raised very considerably and the expenditure foreseen by the 
Commission for 1997 will effectively be reached in 1999. The 
regions with a GDP per capita below or close to 75% of the 
EC average will enjoy a two-thirds increase in Structural 
Fund transfers.1,2 By virtue of this increase and the creation 
of the Cohesion Fund pursuant to the provisions in the 
Maastricht Treaty, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain will 
altogether receive (in 1992 prices) twice as much from these 
EC structural operations as in 1992, implying an almost 
In addition, the transfers to the new German Länder will be adjusted 
upward such that the latter receive similar treatment on a per capita 
basis to the other lagging regions of the Community. 
The increases in spending agreed at Edinburgh are generally expressed 
vis-à-vis the level of 1992. However, in the case of structural expenditure, 
this is somewhat misleading because in 1989 the envelope for the Struc-
tural Funds was fixed for the period to 1993 inclusive. Apart from 
determining the size of the Cohesion Fund, operative since 1993, the 
Edinburgh agreement relative to the Structural Funds therefore pertains 
defacto to the period 1994-99. If one takes the difference between 1999 
structural spending as foreseen in the Edinburgh financial perspectives 
and 1993 expenditure as planned in real terms in 1989, i.e. without the 
Cohesion Fund, the increase in structural outlays amounts to 51%. 
fourfold expansion since 1988.3 Structural Fund outlays for 
other purposes are to rise by nearly 50%. The overriding 
attribute of the Edinburgh agreement is therefore the im-
portant reinforcement of the EC budget's redistributive di-
mension. 
As to spending related to internal policy, consisting princi-
pally of expenditure on R&D, the environment, trans-Euro-
pean networks of transport and communications, and edu-
cation, Member States decided to allow for a 30% increase 
over seven years, compared to the 50% requested by the 
Commission. R&D should take up between one half and 
two thirds of the overall figure under the 'internal policies' 
heading. 
Starting from a low level, assistance to third countries will 
grow by more than 40% to ECU 5,6 billion in 1999, to 
which should be added the reserve set up to cover the cost 
of unforeseen emergency relief. A supplementary ECU 300 
The establishment of the Cohesion Fund is stipulated in Article 130d 
and is designed to contribute to projects in countries, as distinct from 
regions, with a GDP per capita of 90% below the EC average in the 
fields of environment or transport infrastructure forming part of trans-
European networks. 
Table 4 
Financial perspective for 1993-99 as agreed at the Edinburgh Summit on 12 December 1992 
(approriations for commitments — million ECU, 1992 prices) 
1. CAP 
2. Structural operations 
Structural Funds' 
Cohesion Funds 
3. Internal policies 
4. External action2 
5. Administrative expenditure 
6. Reserves 
Monetary reserve 
External loan guarantees 
Exceptional external expenditure 
Total commitment appropriations 
Payment appropriations required 
As a % of GNP 
Margin for revision as a % of GNP 
Own resources ceiling as a % of GNP 
1 Objective 1 regions 
2 Total external expenditure including reserves 
1993 
35 230 
21 277 
19 777 
1 500 
3 940 
3 950 
3 280 
1 500 
1 000 
300 
200 
69 177 
65 908 
1,20 
0,00 
1,20 
12 328 
4 450 
1994 
35 095 
21 855 
20 135 
1 750 
4 084 
4 000 
3 380 
1 500 
1 000 
300 
200 
69 944 
67 036 
1,19 
0,01 
1,20 
13 220 
4 500 
1995 
35 722 
23 480 
21 480 
2 000 
4 323 
4 280 
3 580 
1 100 
500 
300 
300 
74 485 
69 150 
1,20 
0,01 
1,21 
14 300 
4 880 
1996 
36 364 
24 990 
22 740 
2 250 
4 520 
4 560 
3 690 
1 100 
500 
300 
300 
75 224 
71 290 
1,21 
0,01 
1,22 
15 330 
5 160 
1997 
37 023 
26 526 
24 026 
2 500 
4710 
4 830 
3 800 
1 100 
500 
300 
300 
77 987 
74 491 
1,23 
0,01 
1,24 
16 396 
5 430 
1998 
37 697 
28 240 
25 690 
2 550 
4910 
5 180 
3 850 
1 100 
500 
300 
300 
80 977 
77 249 
1,25 
0,01 
1,26 
17 820 
5 780 
1999 
38 389 
30 000 
27 400 
2 600 
5 100 
5 600 
3 900 
1 100 
500 
300 
300 
84 089 
80 114 
1,26 
0,01 
1,27 
19 280 
6 200 
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billion reserve was created to finance an insurance fund 
against the risk of third countries defaulting on debts guaran-
teed by the Community. Following the collapse of the com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe, the outstanding stock of 
such debts has been growing steadily. In April 1993, about 
80% of committed loans or ECU 3,8 billion had been taken 
up. 
While the increments in overall Community spending plan-
ned for the rest of the decade are all in all quite moderate, 
especially in terms of Community GDP or, as shall be noted 
later, with respect to public outlays at national level, the 
Edinburgh decisions on the revenue side did not mark a 
substantial break with the past either. By reducing step-wise 
the call-up rate of the VAT resource from 1,4 to 1%, as well 
as the size of the uniform VAT base to maximum 50% 
instead of 55%, the relative importance of the fourth re-
source is bound to rise further from 1995 onward. The 
controversial UK rebate formula also was left unchanged. 
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The purpose of this part is to explore in depth the economics of the nexus between EMU and EC 
public finance. It occupies a central position in this report as it constitutes the analytical lynch-
pinfor the operational propositions put forward in Part C. 
This part comes in two chapters. First a concise review is offered of the theoretical framework in 
which this nexus should be discussed. The fiscal federalism literature points to various possible 
grounds for shifting policy competences from the national to supranational level, but at the same 
time it makes clear that any centralization is also likely to entail some drawbacks in terms of 
welfare such that the assignment of competences between levels of government should rest on a 
cost-benefit analysis. Economic federalism places the burden of the proof with those wishing to 
centralize, which accords fully with the subsidiarity paradigm that the Community has adopted 
as the guiding principle for the organization of its economic system. Besides providing the 
theoretical underpinnings, Chapter 3 also gives a concise, stylized account of the current distribution 
of spending and taxation powers in mature federations, which will also serve as a benchmark for 
the arguments developed in Part D. 
Building on the insights from fiscal federalism and the extensive analysis that has been brought 
to bear recently on the economics of EMU, Chapter 4 will then address the key set of questions 
of the report. Despite its shortcomings, the familiar Musgravian division of public economic 
functions is used to get a handle on the different aspects of the consequences of EMU. The 
principal conclusions ensuing from the analysis can be summed up as follows: 
(i) Solid economic arguments can be advanced to strengthen the Community's budgetary means 
to promote common policies in areas like environmental protection, infrastructure, and R&D. 
There also exists a powerful case for attributing more responsibilities and funds to the EC 
level of government with regard to aid to third countries. On the other hand, the conduct of 
new common sectoral policies ought not to lead to significant demands on EC budget 
expenditure. Greater Community involvement can be advocated concerning capital income 
taxes, corporate taxes, and some types of environmental taxes. 
(ii) The Community budget will not be able to fulfil an EC-wide stabilization role. This should 
not apose a serious problem so long as the broad compatibility of the Community's aggregate 
fiscal stance with the single monetary policy is ensured by the coordination of Member 
States' budgetary policies. The loss of the national exchange-rate instrument calls for the 
deployment of an EC scheme to support regional adjustment. Infederai and unitary countries 
this stabilization support is in large degree delivered automatically through the central tax 
and social security system. In addition to the fact that the Community budget is not 
sufficiently flexible and much too small to produce such effects, there are convincing 
microeconomic and managerial reasons to doubt the desirability of automatic stabilizers at 
EC level. Preference should go instead to a mutual insurance mechanism against country-
specific shocks of macroeconomic significance. 
(iii) Economic analysis does not shed conclusive light on the impact of EMU on regional 
disparities. Other things being equal, the move to EMU will therefore not necessarily have 
to be accompanied by a strong expansion of the cohesion budget. The Community has no 
role to play in interpersonal redistribution. In the pre-federal stage, unconditional interre-
gional fiscal equalization flows are not to be recommended either. 
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Chapter 3 
Public finance in a system 
of multi-layer government 
able, or at least questionable, in the Community context.2 
This observation is corroborated by the finding that the 
literature is weak when it comes to recommendations about 
how federations ought to evolve through time. 
3.1.1. Competence assignment criteria 
3.1. Fiscal federalism and subsidiarity 
The economic principles involved in assigning different ex-
penditure and tax/transfer functions to different levels of 
government are dealt with in a branch of public finance 
economics commonly called fiscal federalism. The modern 
literature originated in the late 1950s and came of age with 
Oates' classical work Fiscal federalism (1972), which formed 
an important source of inspiration for the MacDougall re-
port. It is obviously beyond the scope of this report to discuss 
extensively developments since then and the interested reader 
is referred to Walsh (1993). However, it is fair to say that 
apart from a few notable exceptions in particular as regards 
income redistribution, the main messages of the literature 
have not changed significantly over the last 15 years. This 
is in part due to the fact that the theory of the second best, 
which has strongly permeated most other branches of the 
public finance literature, has not yet been applied systemati-
cally to the assignment of competences question.1 
In a way, the fiscal federalism literature has now become 
more relevant to the discussion of EC issues than at the 
time of the MacDougall report because it presupposes the 
existence of an internal market and a single currency. Never-
theless, the lessons for the Community to be derived from 
it are bound to be limited, essentially on account of the fact 
that fiscal federalism theory has primarily been concerned 
with the provision of local public goods and thus with local 
versus national assignment questions, thereby putting strong 
emphasis on the allocation dimension of economic policy 
functions. However, as already argued in Forte (1977), the 
parallel between the national v. supranational and the local 
v. national dichotomy is defective with respect to a number 
of crucial economic policy domains, such as in defence, or 
stabilization or redistribution policy. As a result, some of 
the usual fiscal federalism policy prescriptions are inadvis-
The general maxim of economic theory is to favour as far 
as possible the decentralization of economic decisions and 
to leave them in private hands as it achieves the best match of 
individual preferences and the supply of goods and services. 
Governments should only step in to provide 'public' goods 
or incentives through taxes, subsidies or regulations, when 
private markets do not secure social efficiency or equity, and 
then only inasmuch as their actions do not create larger 
distortions than those they seek to rectify. 
Lower levels of government are in principle better placed to 
fulfil such public functions than higher ones. Consequently, 
with a view to maximizing welfare of the Community as a 
whole, policy competences should normally remain vested 
with the national (or regional) instead of the Community 
level of government. The usual arguments invoked to sup-
port this view are: 
(i) Member States are more apt to offer a specific bundle 
of public goods and services tailored and financed ac-
cording to the tastes and preferences of the national 
electorate. By virtue of smaller jurisdictions, public sup-
plies can be differentiated, reducing the size of minorit-
ies that feel frustrated because their views have not been 
accounted for; 
(ii) people have typically better access to national govern-
ments and their administration than to the European 
decision-making bodies, making democratic control 
more effective and thereby diminishing the risk of 
government failure;3 
(iii) decentralized supply of public goods and services per-
mits greater competition among jurisdictions and inno-
vation, in particular when individuals, firms and capital 
This is rather paradoxical as the fundamental hypothesis of fiscal federal-
ism theory is of a second-best nature, namely that central government 
is unable to provide regionally differentiated goods and services. 
In addition, the fiscal federalism literature typically assumes that some 
form of representative democratic government exists at all levels of 
decision-making. Due account of decision-making processes charac-
terized by veto powers or 'democratic deficits' is liable to modify views 
on the appropriate distribution of competences. 
The arguments on preferences and democratic control reflect the notion 
that decentralized decision-making brings government closer to the 
people. This idea has been given a formal treatment in Tresch (1981). 
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exhibit a high degree of cross­border mobility.1 The 
threat of 'voting with the feet' will exert pressure on 
national governments to deliver value for money. More­
over, national autonomy permits policy flexibility and 
scope for experiments, which, if successful, could be 
copied by other Member States. 
lowing for efficiency gains when the policy is performed at 
a higher level of government. In a similar vein, as the 
whole weighs more than the sum of the units, a Community 
approach may strengthen the EC's bargaining position vis­
à­vis third countries, improving the chances of a favourable 
outcome of international negotiations. 
Against the benefits of decentralization need to be set the 
potential costs in terms of efficiency and equity. The latter 
can be neutralized either by a voluntary coordination process 
between national authorities or by a transfer of competences 
to the supranational level. Failing voluntary coordination,2 
the fiscal federalism literature identifies three basic sets of 
circumstances in which the Community may be better placed 
than the Member States for the effective delivery of a policy. 
The first two are closely related to the pursuit of optimal 
welfare for the Community as a whole, the third is more of 
a politico­economic nature as it concerns equity. 
The first is the existence of cross­border spill­over effects 
giving rise to so­called externalities: when domestic policies 
have a (positive or negative) impact on the economies of the 
other Member States which a national government ignores, 
these policies are bound to be suboptimal for the Community 
in its entirety. The more integrated national economies grow, 
the more prominent externalities will tend to become, with 
powerful spill­over mechanisms at play in all major fields of 
economic policy. As new channels of spill­overs emerge, the 
Community's task is to internalize externalities that evolve 
over time, which is tantamount to the statement that econ­
omic union is an open­ended concept. 
The second circumstance pertains to all policy functions 
characterized by economies of scale or indivisibilities, al­
The role of mobility as an instrument for the revelation of preferences 
was highlighted first in Tiebout (1956). The advantages arising from 
competition among jurisdictions are stressed in the 'public choice' litera­
ture on public finance, as illustrated in Schneider (1993), or Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980). However, competition and mobility may also 
spawn undesired effects (see Section 4.1.2 and Part D). 
Voluntary coordination often proves elusive because the conditions for 
efficient bargaining are stringent. All parties should for instance have 
perfect knowledge about each other's preferences. For strategic reasons, 
bargainers may have an incentive to conceal their true preferences. In 
addition, some parties may be convinced that agreement may not be 
respected by all involved. It follows that the mere possibility of a 
mutually advantageous accord does not guarantee that such an agree­
ment will be reached. The costs of coordination within a broader 
analytical framework featuring other sources of costs such as preference 
revelation and mobility are discussed in depth in Breton and Scott 
(1978). Prima facie their analysis suggests that, generally speaking, the 
degree of policy centralization in the Community is too low because 
supranational interests are underrepresented in the main decision­mak­
ing body and the EC's access to financial resources is strictly circum­
scribed. See Walsh (1993). 
The third rationale for competences at EC level concerns 
the pursuit of a certain level of homogeneity or fairness. 
This may be inspired by largely economic considerations — 
like the prevention of secession or congestion in affluent 
regions — or by more altruistic motives deriving from feel­
ings of common citizenship. If it is deemed necessary that a 
certain (relative) level of purchasing power per capita be 
reached, or that all regions of Member States be given the 
opportunity in terms of structural endowments to compete 
fairly inside the Community, transfers need to be decided 
on and organized at the supranational level. 
The distribution of powers between the Community and the 
Member States may often be clear­cut on the basis of the 
above assignment criteria. However, in quite a number of 
policy areas a fine trade­off between efficiency or homogen­
eity and the advantages of diversity is required. Given that 
European integration is a voluntary 'bottom­up' process 
involving sovereign countries that insist on keeping their 
powers as unfettered as possible, the benefit of the doubt in 
this regard should be granted to the national level. Cast 
in more political terminology, the principle of subsidiarity 
stipulating that a higher level of government should only 
assume responsibilities that cannot be taken care of effec­
tively by a lower level of government, should be observed. 
The subsidiarity principle, which is enshrined explicitly in 
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (the new Article 
3b) entails several important operational implications. For 
one thing, the transfer of competences to the Community 
should respect a degree of proportionality. It is only when 
independent national measures lead to significant externalit­
ies or are unable to harvest considerable efficiency gains that 
the EC should come into play. Put differently, in developing 
the distribution of economic powers to flank EMU, the 
Community ought not to lapse into systemic overshooting. 
For another, as the ultimate purpose of a higher level of 
government is the increase in total welfare, EC involvement 
is only justifiable if the gains it generates from substituting 
for failures of coordination between Member States are not 
offset by high administrative or compliance costs, or by the 
possibly poor quality of the Community policy replacing 
previous national ones. 
One channel to avert the latter set of problems is to devolve, 
as far as possible, the executive facets of the competences 
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assigned to the Community level to national or regional 
administrations, or even to private sector bodies. A high 
degree of decentralization of implementation of EC measures 
would be in keeping with the modern 'cooperative federal-
ism' practice in most federations and with a precept of public 
management that those responsible for executing measures 
be close to the private agents for whom they are destined.1 
It would at the same time remove the need for a considerable 
expansion of the 'federal' administration. 
In a number of policy areas, the Community has already 
pursued this line of conduct,2 albeit with mixed results as 
can be inferred from the volume of fraud the revenue and 
in particular the expenditure side of the budget are presumed 
to suffer from. As will be argued in Chapter 10, for the 
efficiency advantages from executive devolution to be 
reaped, it is essential that more thought be given to the 
unavoidable principal/agent problem with administrative de-
centralization. 
3.1.2. The use of 'federal' public finance instruments 
The foregoing assignment criteria and executive devolution 
principle can be applied as a general rule to all economic 
policy instruments that any government can theoretically 
avail itself of, i.e. regulation, spending, taxation (including 
charges) and borrowing. 
Cooperative federalism typically helps to reduce preference revelation 
costs but may create new problems, including the perverse effects of 
grants, or decision-making traps. See Scharpf (1988). 
Examples are the collection of the Community's own resources, the 
detailed execution of the common trade and agricultural policies, the 
writing and updating of technical product requirements by standardiz-
ation bodies like CEN and Cenelec. 
This subsection looks at how the use of these instruments 
should be conceived within the specific context of multi-
layer government. Given this report's remit, it will leave 
aside purely regulatory intervention, it being understood, 
however, that hitherto, regulation has been the Community's 
prime means of action, as exemplified by the wide-ranging 
internal market completion programme. 
It is convenient to discuss these matters with the help of 
an illustrative matrix classification of EC economic policy 
instruments and intervention purposes, as presented in Table 
5. 
The public finance instruments at the disposal of the EC 
are indicated column-wise; the rows refer to the familiar 
Musgravian goals of economic policy: allocation (the ef-
ficient allocation of resources); stabilization (securing 
macroeconomic stability, i.e. minimizing the deviation of 
actual from potential output); redistribution (the correction 
of primary income differentials for the sake of equity). Ignor-
ing the first column, each broad category of public finance 
instrument can be further split into two components on 
account of the 'vertical' structure of the Community. The 
first pertains to direct budgetary action by the EC, the 
second relates to a more indirect incidence, through the 
operation of intergovernmental financial flows and EC rules 
on taxation, which influence Member States' public finance 
behaviour. 
Besides outlays for the direct purchase of goods and services, 
expenditure by the central level of government takes the 
form of grants to subcentral authorities. As reviewed in 
Walsh (1993), Spahn (1993a) and Costello (1993a), there 
exist different types of grants (specific/general, lump-sum/ 
matching, open/closed), which can serve a variety of both 
allocation and redistribution purposes. Specific-purpose 
grants of a matching nature are typically deployed for the 
correction of cross-border externalities, or to promote the 
Table 5 
EC economic policy instruments/intervention areas matrix 
Intervention areas 
Regulation 
(token entry) 
Expenditure 
on direct Grants to 
provision of lower level 
public services of government 
Instruments 
Revenue 
Own 
resources 
Common 
rules on 
taxation 
Borrowing 
For own use For on-lending 
Allocation 
Stabilization 
Redistribution 
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economic potential of lagging regions, for they are meant to 
restrict grantees' spending behaviour.' On the other hand, 
general purpose grants, which are essentially unconditional, 
seek either to eliminate 'vertical imbalance' in access to 
revenue sources and/or to achieve interregional redistri­
bution through transfers on the basis of regional differences 
in fiscal capacity or public service needs. At present, the 
Community's grants to Member State governments are ex­
clusively of the specific purpose kind in the framework of 
the Structural Funds. An important question in the redis-
tributive field to be addressed in Chapters 4 and 5 is whether 
or not the EC's regional transfers should be expanded to 
include general purpose grants as well. 
As regards revenue, it is important to distinguish between 
on the one hand, the centralization of the proceeds from 
taxes for the coverage of EC expenditure, i.e. the size and 
composition of Community 'own resources', and on the 
other, the centralization at EC level of tax legislation, i.e. 
the harmonization of or the adoption of minimum rules on 
national tax regimes for the sake of preventing beggar-
thy-neighbour tax competition with respect to tax bases 
displaying a high degree of cross-border mobility. 
Own resources can in principle be obtained in two sorts of 
ways: through taxes proper, on economic agents' incomes 
or transactions, or via 'intergovernmental' means of uncon­
ditional block grants from every Member State, which may 
reflect the latter's relative prosperity levels in a fiscally neu­
tral or progressive fashion. 
Basically four types of taxes can be distinguished within the 
framework of multi-layer government, depending on the 
vertical distribution of tax competences and/or revenue. 
Ranking them in descending order of autonomy for the level 
of government concerned, these four types are: 
(i) exclusive taxes: the competent level of government en­
joys full autonomy over all aspects over the tax in 
question. Customs duties form a current example for 
the Community; 
(ii) competing taxes: two different layers of government 
collect independently of each other a tax on the same 
transaction or source of income, resulting in an uncoor­
dinated overlap of fiscal competences. While exhibiting 
the advantage of allowing for a high degree of fiscal 
freedom, competing taxes may give rise to a tax jungle, 
with serious administrative and compliance costs; 
(iii) subfederai surcharges (tax base sharing): under this 
regime, states introduce a supplementary levy on the 
tax imposed by the federal government (or vice-versa). 
Surcharges ensure that the definition of the tax base is 
uniform, the subfederai competence being confined to 
fixing its surcharge, resulting in regionally differentiated 
rates;2 
(iv) shared taxes (tax revenue sharing): under this arrange­
ment, the tax base and rates are identical in the entire 
union. The proceeds, levied and possibly collected by 
the central level, are shared vertically with the Member 
States according to predetermined distribution keys. 
The key relative to the horizontal distribution among 
Member States may be based on a pure territoriality 
principle, but by biasing it to the benefit of the least 
prosperous it may also serve as an instrument of interre­
gional redistribution. This bias could also operate by 
means of country-specific keys in the vertical sharing, 
or for that matter in the set-up of a surcharge regime, as 
has been suggested in the past to remedy the regressive 
properties of the Community's VAT receipts. 
In Chapter 7 we examine in detail which taxes should be 
assigned to the Community for own resource purposes and 
of what type they should be, on the basis of the fiscal 
federalism principles set out here. However, at this stage of 
general discussion, and in line with federal practice reviewed 
presently, it may already be remarked that because the case 
for having EC rules on taxation proves easier to make than 
the case for centralizing expenditure competences, it is not 
hard from the viewpoint of economic analysis to identify 
suitable candidates for EC revenue to cover supranational 
spending. As will be explained in Section 4.1.2, the former 
case rests chiefly on the existence of negative cross-border 
externalities when Member States remain fully autonomous 
with respect to the taxation of internationally mobile bases, 
imparting a downward bias to fiscal pressure and inducing 
locational distortions during the tax competition process. 
The obvious way to internalize this externality is through 
common tax rules, which can take the form of a minimum 
or uniform tax across the Community, the proceeds from 
which may then be assigned wholly (exclusive taxes) or partly 
(surcharges or shared taxes) to the supranational budget. 
Engaging in EC borrowing for own use at the supranational 
level is ruled out by the Treaty prohibition on Community 
The 'additionally' issue of the influence of specific-purpose grants on 
grantees' spending behaviour is addressed in Section 5.2.3. 
Contrary to what is sometimes stated, the Community's current VAT 
resource does not correspond to the surcharge regime since it is collected 
on a notional harmonized base, rather than as a supplement to the VAT 
paid on individual purchases to the national fisc. The link with actual 
VAT disappears totally in the case of seven Member States where the 
notional base has been capped at a predetermined level of GDP. See 
Section 7.1.1. 
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budget deficits. By contrast, since the onset of the Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951, a substantial volume of loans has 
been mobilized for on-lending. As explained in Kuhlmann 
(1993), the usefulness of the latter financial tool is rooted in 
the fact that by virtue of either the superior credit rating of 
the initial borrower on capital markets, or the provision of 
a guarantee or of interest subsidies, the effective cost for the 
eventual loan recipient is lowered. Abstracting from interest 
subsidies which are basically equivalent to conditional 
grants, the loan instrument can in principle be employed to 
pursue goals relating to all three domains of public inter-
vention. But for this to be warranted economically, the 
existence of financial market imperfections, causing undue 
credit rationing, biased risk assessment or insufficiently long 
maturities, needs to be demonstrated. The EC's loan oper-
ations are conducted chiefly by the European Investment 
Bank whose interventions within the Community concen-
trate on the co-financing of infrastructure in lagging regions, 
or of large-scale investment projects of interest to more than 
one Member State. However, the loan instrument has in 
the past also been drawn on for stabilization purposes, as 
exemplified by the loans to Italy and Ireland at the launching 
of the EMS, the so-called New Community Instrument to 
help stimulate economic recovery at the turn of the 1980s, 
and the balance of payment loans of which the most recent 
one was extended to Greece in 1991. The main query to be 
addressed in Chapter 9 of this report is what will remain in 
EMU of the role of supranational borrowing for on-lending. 
(i) EM Us can function with widely varying degrees 
of expenditure centralization 
This degree can be read from column (3) of Table 6 which 
relates consolidated central government expenditure, net of 
grants to lower levels of government, to the sum of total 
government spending. It ranges from 42 to 61%, amounting 
to a variation of more than 45%. The width of this range 
demonstrates that there is seemingly a very wide spectrum 
of possibilities for central public finance in EMU. Moreover, 
the influence of central government on economic policy 
can be gauged only in part from relative spending levels. 
Influence can also be exerted by means of framework legis-
lation, which provides for the centralized setting of guidelines 
whose application, with its budgetary implications, are a 
matter for subcentral authorities. 
A functional breakdown of net consolidated central govern-
ment outlays demonstrates that the latter consists to an 
overwhelming extent — typically about three quarters — of 
spending on defence and public order, social security and 
welfare, and interest payments on the national debt. It was 
assumed in Chapter 1 that the EC will not be allotted any 
significant budgetary role in the first two fields and by virtue 
of the prohibition on its incurring deficits, the Community 
does not have to service debt either. Deducting these budget-
ary items, column (6) shows that federal government spend-
ing drops to levels that are no longer completely different 
from the current size of 1,2% of the EC budget, in particular 
in the case of the USA, Canada and Switzerland, which were 
built up as confederations of highly autonomous states. 
3.2. The distribution of public finance 
competences in mature federations (ii) Tax competences are typically more centralized than expenditure competences 
In the period before EMU will have reached its steady state, 
the Community will remain firmly in the pre-federal stage 
of integration, lacking the full social and political union 
dimension characterizing federal and a fortiori unitary 
States. As it cannot therefore be taken as a direct benchmark, 
current federal practice will not be reviewed in this section 
at great length, the more so as the role of central public 
finance in terms of the usual allocation, stabilization and 
redistribution objectives will be touched on in the next chap-
ter. However, a look at the broad distribution of public 
finance powers in a number of mature federations (Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the USA) permits one 
to distil several stylized facts of a systemic nature about 
public finance in EMU. They should not be elevated to the 
status of 'iron laws' but they provide a useful perspective 
for the elaboration of the Community's future budgetary 
regime. 
Except in the United States, where the two bases yielding 
close to 90% of federal fiscal revenue, personal and corpor-
ate income, are utilized 'competitively' by both the federal 
and state levels of government, the central authorities have 
a relatively bigger say on taxation than on spending, as can 
be inferred from Table 7. The two measures presented in 
columns (2) and (3) of the degree of centralization of revenue 
competences exceed in four out of the five federations that 
regarding spending powers. The most salient case is provided 
by Germany where on the second measure tax centralization 
is almost complete, with virtually all fiscal revenue of the 
Länder arising from shared taxes. 
This more pronounced centralization of tax competences 
enables the deployment of vertically organized interregional 
equalization mechanisms through tax sharing arrangements 
and general purpose grants. 
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Table 6 
The centralization of expenditure competences in mature federations 
Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
Switzerland 
USA 
(1988) 
(1988) 
(1987) 
(1984) 
(1988) 
(D 
19,5 
19,0 
28,7 
18,5 
21,5 
(2) 
36,8 
45,4 
47,4 
38,1 
36,4 
(1) Consolidated central government expenditure net of general purpose grants to lower levels of governmcn 
(2) Total government spending as a percentage of GDP. 
(3) (1) divided by (2). 
(4) State spending as a percentage of GDP. 
(5) (1) divided by ((l) + (4)). 
(6) Consolidated central government expenditure net of general purpose grants to state governments, socia 
national debt, as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: IMF, government finance statistics. 
(3) 
0,53 
0,42 
0,61 
0,48 
0,59 
(4) 
17 
22 
13 
13 
9 
. as a percentage of GDP. 
security and welfare outlays. 
(5) 
0,53 
0,46 
0,69 
0,58 
0,70 
defence and public order and 
(6) 
6,8 
4,8 
9,4 
4,6 
5,7 
interest payments on the 
Table 7 
Degree of expenditure and tax competence centralization 
(D (2) (3) 
Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
Switzerland 
USA 
(1988) 
(1988) 
(1987) 
(1984) 
(1988) 
0,53 
0,46 
0,69 
0,58 
0,70 
84 
55 
76 
73 
78 
84 
65 
98,4 
75,4 
30 
(1) Column (5) of Table 6. 
(2) Tax revenue and social security contributions to consolidated central government relative to total tax and social security revenue of consolidated governments (in percentages). 
(3) Exclusive federal taxes and social security contributions plus proceeds of shared taxes and surcharges relative to total tax and social security revenue of central and state governments. 
(Hi) There is an inverse relationship between State public 
finance autonomy and interregional redistribution 
Public finance autonomy should be understood as relating 
to revenue sources, policy competences and the associated 
volume of expenditure and the degree of independence with 
respect to borrowing and levels of budget deficits, whilst 
interregional redistribution pertains to explicit grants as well 
as the regional incidence of federal taxes and expenditure 
and of the social security system. This inverse relationship 
was well­documented in Section 6.7 of the Commission's 
'One market, one money' report, so there is no need here to 
demonstrate it once more. For the sake of convenience, the 
main summarizing table is reproduced below (Table 8). 
Whereas this inverse relationship results, in part mechan­
ically, from the fact that the capacity for interregional redis­
tribution depends ceteris paribus on the size of the federal 
budget relative to the state budgets, it also stems from the 
need to ensure an adequate number of policy instruments 
for economic adjustment.' A State within EMU is faced 
with strongly restricted room for manoeuvre: monetary union 
rules out devaluation and may circumscribe States' capacity 
to borrow; also, economic union requirements often impose 
microeconomic constraints on public spending (as regards 
In some federations, such as the Canadian one, causality has proved to 
run also in the other direction: the increasing degree of interregional 
redistribution is often seen as having allowed for more room for 
manœuvre in the conduct of provincial budgetary policies. 
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State aids, public procurement, and so forth), taxation, and 
labour market regulation. Interregional transfers may be 
needed to make up for the loss of national instruments lest 
the overall economic system become overdetermined. As a 
corollary, the more States' ability to spend, tax and borrow 
is restricted by the rules of EMU, the stronger becomes the 
case for the deployment of interregional insurance mechan­
isms against adverse economic events. 
Empirical estimates, reported in Table 9, suggest that pri­
mary income disparities between states in a federation are 
typically reduced by 30 to 40% as a result of the fiscal 
activities of central governments. On the other hand, around 
20 to 30% of a change in real economic activity in an 
individual state tends to be offset through federal financial 
flows. 
(iv) Federal public finance enables substantial 
interregional income redistribution and 
contributes significantly to regional stabilization 
Both these functions of federal public finance materialize 
largely on an automatic basis on account of the prominence 
of the highest level of government in direct taxation and the 
operation of the social security system. As a consequence, 
they are strongly interrelated in practice, notwithstanding 
the clear conceptual difference between redistribution and 
stabilization.1 
' Whereas interregional redistribution pertains to the level of federal 
expenditure and taxes that are a function of the level of a region's real 
income, stabilization concerns the variations in fiscal expenditure and 
taxes as a function of the rate of change of economic activity. 
Table 8 
Fiscal autonomy and Fiscal equalization in existing federations 
Switzerland 
USA 
Canada 
Germany 
Australia 
NB: Τ relates to highest, '5 ' to lowest. 
Fiscal autonomy is defined here as consisting of three aspects: revenue sources, expenditure 
competences and the degree of independence with respect to borrowing and the level of 
the deficit. Autonomy of revenue sources was evaluated by looking at the percentage of 
exclusive and competing taxes and non-fiscal income in total regional revenue. The degree 
of expenditure competence was assessed on the basis of the share of state and local 
spending in total government (excluding social security). These three criteria together 
permit a rather clear ranking of fiscal autonomy. 
The data on interregional income equalization are derived from the MacDougall report 
and refer to the average of individual regions' reductions in per capita personal income 
differences. 
Source: Commission (1990). 
Ranking of 
fiscal 
autonomy 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
Ranking of 
interregional 
income equalization 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Table 9 
Estimates of the degree of interregional income redistribution and regional stabilization in selected federal and unitary countries through central 
public finance channels 
Interregional 
redistribution 
Regional 
stabilization 
USA 
Canada 
Germany 
Australia 
Switzerland 
France 
UK 
35 to 44% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
50% 
15%2 
53% 
34% 
(Sachs and Sala-I-Martin, 1990) 
(MacDougall, 1977) 
(MacDougall) 
(MacDougall) 
(MacDougall) 
(MacDougall) 
(MacDougall) 
(MacDougall) 
10% 
28% 
20% 
17% 
17% 
24% 
33 to 42% 
— 
— 
37% 
34% 
(Von Hagen, 1991)1 
(Bayoumi and Masson, 1991) 
(Goodhart and Smith, 1993) 
(Pisani-Ferry et al., 1993) 
(Bayoumi and Masson) 
(Goodhart and Smith) 
(Pisani-Ferry et. al.) 
(Pisani-Ferry) 
(Goodhart and Smith) 
NB: Interregional redistribution as defined under Table 10. Regional stabilization is the extent to which regional disposable income is not influenced by changes in local real economic activity, i.e., 
if changes in real activity would not affect regional income at all, stabilization would be at 100 %. See Pisani-Ferry el al.. Chapter 2. 
Tax side only. 
Incomplete data. 
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(v) Explicit grants have stronger interregional 
equalization power than the ordinary federal budget 
and social security system 
than elsewhere, the result of differences between large pay­
ments in opposite directions.' 
Interpersonal redistribution, operating through progressive 
direct income taxes and the social security and welfare sys­
tem, typically has a clear interregional incidence. Conse­
quently, interpersonal redistribution schemes are partly sub-
stitutable for explicit interregional flows. However, the Mac­
Dougall report, which provided much original evidence on 
the interregional redistribution properties of public finance 
in federations, found that explicit grants (or tax sharing 
arrangements) displayed markedly more redistributive 
power than the nation-wide direct tax and income support 
mechanisms (see Table 10). ' Grants achieve relatively large 
redistributive effects with relatively small amounts of federal 
expenditure, because the net interregional transfers are, less 
Redistributive power relates to the extent to which regional primary 
income differentials are reduced. It was computed in the MacDougall 
report as the percentage change of the modified income differential 
relative to the primary income differential. In other words, if a rich 
region is at 120% of national primary income per capita, and after taxes 
and transfers its income has dropped to 115% of the national average, 
the redistributive power of taxes and transfers amounts to 25%. 
Table 10 
The redistributive impact of federal public finance 
Federal taxation and 
social security receipts 
Federal direct public expenditure 
(defence, social security, etc.) 
Specific purpose grants from the 
federation to the states 
General purpose grants from the 
federation to the states 
Total 
% redislributive 
power 
4 
12 
7 
12 
35 
%of 
GDP 
15,0 
14,5 
2,5 
1,2 
— 
NB: Based on data for Germany, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the USA in the early 
1970s. 'Redistributive power' is defined as the (percentage) degree to which inter-state per 
capita income differences are equalized as a resultof inter-state flows of public finance. 
The '% of GDP' figures indicate the amount of expenditure for each category, for the 
unweighted average of the five federations. 
Source: MacDougall report (1977). 
MacDougall report, Volume I, p. 13. 
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Chapter 4 
EMU and EC public finance: 
the central economic issues 
This chapter addresses the question whether supplementary 
economic competences having a public finance incidence — 
be it in terms of expenditure, taxation or borrowing and 
lending — need to be assigned to the Community level of 
government for the sake of the proper functioning of the 
economic and monetary union. 
The discussion will again be organized according to the 
familiar Musgravian division of economic policy functions 
into the three dimensions of allocation, stabilization and 
redistribution. This choice of framework is more inspired by 
considerations of convenience than analytical rigour. Most 
notably, it has become increasingly recognized in the recent 
literature on public finance that if account is taken of the fact 
that taxes and transfers can themselves be serious sources of 
distortion and that therefore the income distribution effects 
of public policies cannot be offset without a welfare loss, a 
clear separation of these three domains, and in particular 
between allocation and redistribution, is hard to uphold.' 
It should also be remembered that there is no neat correspon-
dence between the functional distribution (defence, edu-
cation, public health, etc.) of public spending or the types 
of government revenue and the Musgravian categories of 
intervention. For instance, a rise in excises may, besides 
influencing the consumption of specific goods (allocation) 
have a differentiated impact on households' purchasing 
power (distribution) and, depending on the use of the in-
crease in tax proceeds and the economy's cyclical position, 
exert a (de)stabilizing effect. This remark holds in particular 
for stabilization policy as there is basically no expenditure 
or revenue item that is earmarked for exclusive stabilization 
purposes. Budgetary interventions often have important sta-
bilization properties, usually as a side-effect. It will also be 
evident in Chapter 5 that much EC expenditure that forms 
part of allocation policies is undertaken in the pursuit of 
interregional distribution objectives. 
This chapter will, of course, draw on the various strands of 
analysis that have been brought to bear on the economics 
of EMU. The recent past has seen a rapid burgeoning of the 
literature, but growth has been uneven: monetary union has 
so far received much more attention than economic union, 
and, due to the fact that international monetary economics 
forms part of the macroeconomic discipline, the stabilization 
issue has been privileged within the monetary tier. This 
situation is also mirrored in this chapter, where the new 
analytical insights that will be brought to bear on the econ-
omics of the EC budget will be relatively richest in the part 
on stabilization. 
4.1. Economic union and allocation policy 
Economic union was defined earlier as a single market 
(characterized by the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and persons, and the absence of economic discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality) flanked by a 'positive 
integration' set of common policies and rules designed to 
exploit its full welfare potential.2 In the allocative domain, 
these common policies and rules could be seen as the visible 
hand operating across borders to optimize the use of re-
sources in the Community as a whole. 
Given the Community's fundamentally market-oriented 
economic order (a precept that has been explicitly confirmed 
in Article 3a of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union), 
the question relative to Community involvement in the pro-
motion of economic efficiency is twofold: 
(i) the identification of circumstances where public inter-
vention is likely to offer welfare increments over private 
markets, in the knowledge that public intervention is 
typically costly and distortionary in its own right; 
(ii) the identification of cases where significant benefits ac-
crue that could not be attained by leaving the policy 
responsibility with the Member States. 
The public finance aspects of the nexus between economic 
union and allocation policy thus present themselves in two 
parts. First, what Community microeconomic policies en-
tailing outlays or borrowing for on-lending need to be 
strengthened or deployed to flank the completed internal 
This forms one explanation of why sectoral or commercial policies are 
in practice designed to pursue a mixture of allocation and income 
distribution goals. 
Although it is useful for the sake of analytical clarity to distinguish 
between an internal market and economic union, as is done in textbooks 
on the theory of economic integration where economic union is seen as 
a 'higher' stage, the Community's actual integration pattern has not 
strictly conformed to this distinction, with the provisions enabling the 
establishment of competition policy, legislative harmonization pursuant 
to Article 100 EEC, and a common agricultural and transport policy 
already in the founding Treaty. The Single European Act constituted 
another milestone by widening Community competences to areas like 
R&D and the environment. Many of the building blocks for the ac-
companying policies have thus already been put in place. 
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market and monetary union? Second, what areas of taxation 
should be made subject to Community rules towards uni­
formity, approximation, or minimum levels in order to avert 
the occurrence of a 'beggar thy neighbour' tax competition 
process, harming economic efficiency inter alia by provoking 
locational distortions? 
4.1.1. Stepping up the budgetary means for 
'positive integration' 
As they constitute a positive externality, public goods and 
services delivered below cost tend to be undersupplied when 
they spill-over into other jurisdictions. In principle, when 
there are only a few Member States concerned and the 
magnitude and flow of benefits are clear, the externality 
may be internalized smoothly by voluntary coordination. 
However, efficient bargaining becomes elusive when the 
number of countries involved goes up and stakes are com­
plex. This forms the classical case for the assignment of the 
policy responsibility at Community level, at least as far as 
the spill-over dimension of the competence is concerned. 
The other main motivation resides in the presence of econ­
omies of scale or indivisibilities of such a nature that the 
execution of the function at the level of national governments 
is impossible or inefficient. 
As argued in Costello (1993b), circumstances corresponding 
to either of these motivations may occur regularly as regards 
the provision of public goods and services in fields like: 
(i) environmental protection; 
(ii) road, rail, telecommunications infrastructure and com­
mon energy carriers; 
(iii) research and development; 
(iv) and, to a lesser extent, higher education. 
In what follows the economic rationale for Community 
spending in these areas is developed in some further depth. 
Attendant budgetary magnitudes will be roughly quantified 
in Section 5.1. 
The chief objective of environmental policy is how to ensure 
the appropriate use of scarce but vital resources — like clean 
air and water — that nobody owns. The absence of property 
rights to environmental goods gives rise to market failures 
requiring government intervention. Once polluting activities 
produce effects across borders, international cooperation is 
in order since otherwise countries will be tempted not to 
bear their fair share of the burden, leading to an insufficient 
degree of policy stringency. The main instruments of en­
vironmental policy are regulation and taxation (see Section 
4.1.2), measures which need to be undertaken in a Com­
munity framework since technical and fiscal barriers to trade 
incompatible with the internal market may otherwise arise. 
Environmental policy also displays a public expenditure 
dimension, for which the Community level of government 
may be better placed to undertake than the Member States. 
The rapidly growing awareness of the environmental prob­
lem has highlighted the deficiencies in scientific knowledge, 
statistical information, technology and product and process 
standards. The urgency and scale of the task suggest substan­
tial economies can be obtained through common efforts, in 
which the planned European Environmental Agency should 
play a central role. Community spending may also be re­
quired where EC legislation imposes binding environmental 
standards, the respect of which may place a considerable 
financial burden on lagging Member States. 
The provision of infrastructure has traditionally been in the 
public purview and motivated by the existence of natural 
monopoly conditions, network externalities and the pursuit 
of regional or social goals. However, renewed emphasis on 
the virtues of the market mechanism, along with technologi­
cal developments enabling a reduction in the relative import­
ance of sunk costs and facilitating the collection of fees from 
infrastructure users has led over the last 10 to 15 years to a 
general questioning of this quasi-exclusive public role. Public 
v. private provision of infrastructure has increasingly become 
an empirical matter, centring largely on the ease of collection 
of charges and monitoring by supervisory bodies of private 
suppliers' pricing behaviour. The EC's role in infrastructure 
provision is to coordinate network design ensuring that 
system economies are exploited, to prevent unnecessary tech­
nical incompatibilities from arising, especially in new tech­
nology fields, and to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market by guaranteeing sufficient cross-border link­
ages. While largely having a coordination and regulatory 
role, some EC finance (grants and loans) is required, es­
pecially if the allocation role of infrastructure is combined 
with interregional redistributive objectives of the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund. 
Public support to research and development is warranted 
whenever the fruits of R&D are not entirely appropriable 
by the private investor. This is generally the case as far as 
basic research is concerned, the results of which cannot 
be translated directly into product or process innovation. 
Government intervention usually takes the form of either 
grants or the provision of intellectual property rights. Finan­
cial aid to more downstream projects is harder to argue for 
but may be justified especially when the prohibitive financial 
requirements of high-tech R&D generates strategic industrial 
and trade policy considerations. Community spending on 
R&D should desirably complement national undertakings 
with a strong EC dimension, i.e. where a common effort, 
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apart from avoiding duplication, permits exploitation of 
synergies, reaps economies of scale and takes account of 
international spill-overs. Areas where these conditions are 
seen to apply include industrial production and technology, 
energy (including nuclear), and infrastructure planning and 
general land use. 
Higher education in the EC is overwhelmingly financed 
by public means. Besides equity concerns, this is usually 
motivated by the argument that the availability of expert 
skills and knowledge benefits the whole of the economy. As 
these benefits are likely in the foreseeable future to remain 
chiefly within national borders, no major case can be made 
for a strong budgetary EC involvement. Supranational sup-
port should come mainly through scholarships for covering 
the extra cost of stays abroad. Although they clearly serve 
a political objective as well, such scholarships can be de-
fended on economic grounds as they contribute to overcom-
ing the cultural barriers in the internal market. 
influenced by political factors against the backdrop of the 
wartime memories of food shortages and the 1951 Schuman 
Declaration. Irrespective of the question of their usefulness, 
the pursuit of other common sectoral policies, be they in 
favour of declining or infant industries, ought not on a dual 
account to lead to sizable spending at EC level. For one 
thing, Member States may have very divergent preferences 
as regards both the sector to help and the means to achieve 
it — thus provoking the 'frustration' costs alluded to in 
Section 3.1.1. For another, the disbursement of aid at EC 
level may give rise to fiscal illusion on the part of Member 
States as national electorates are not well-informed about 
the level of budgetary support, thereby impairing democratic 
control and hence the resistance to sectoral lobbies. If direct 
intervention to bolster the competitiveness of European in-
dustry were felt necessary, it would seem advisable instead 
to design a sector-specific EC framework for national State 
aids, possibly, as a last resort, in combination with external 
trade measures. 
As to the future of sectoral policies and their incidence on 
the EC budget, the principal issue, given its 58% share in 
total outlays, is the long-term development of expenditure 
associated with the common agricultural policy. 
This development is surrounded by a strong degree of uncer-
tainty as it will depend on the implementation and the future 
course of CAP reform, which will be related to the eventual 
outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the evol-
ution of EC agricultural trade policy vis-à-vis Eastern Eur-
ope. The CAP reform measures of May 1992 form a substan-
tial step in the direction of desirable reform, the fundamental 
aim of which should be to separate the allocation and redis-
tribution aspects of current agricultural policy. The CAP 
needs to be reoriented to offer direct income support — 
which may be supplemented by national income transfers to 
farmers — subject to the fulfilment by beneficiaries of 'pub-
lic' tasks, such as environment management. 
However, it seems plausible that in the short to medium 
term, with the probable commitment by the EC to reduce 
its external protection, the explicit financial support to the 
agricultural sector will not fall in real terms. In the medium 
to longer term, and provided that intervention is altered to 
take the form of direct income support, real CAP spending 
is likely to decline gradually as more than half of the Com-
munity's farmers are over 50 years old. 
Agriculture and, to a much lesser extent, coal and steel, form 
the only cases of a Community sectoral policy with a strong 
incidence on the EC budget. The way in which they were 
established during the Community's initial phase was heavily 
Finally, a large question mark hangs over the future Com-
munity role outside the commercial and monetary field vis-
à-vis third countries. Although unrelated to the completion 
of EMU, this issue cannot be avoided altogether in the 
present report since, as will become clear in Chapter 5, 
changes in this role are liable to have a significant budgetary 
influence. Given the assumption formulated in Chapter 1 
that the Community will not be given any expenditure-
intensive defence responsibilities in the period under con-
sideration, the discussion is confined here to the assignment 
of competences between the Community and the Member 
States in relation to aid to third countries. 
A greater Community role can be advocated on several 
grounds. To start with, development assistance often brings 
advantages to donor countries which spill over to rich neigh-
bours. For example, if aid by one Member State helps to 
stem a potential migratory wave from Eastern Europe or 
North Africa to the EC, other Member States benefit as 
well. Much like defence expenditure in an alliance, aid to 
third countries exhibits positive externality features, causing 
the volume of development assistance by Community 
countries to be too low for their own good. A common 
policy can serve to rectify this downward bias. 
Additionally, a common attitude will strengthen the Twelve's 
bargaining position vis-à-vis recipient nations, especially in 
cases where aid is subject to broad conditions, like the respect 
of human rights, market reform, or the preservation of 
environmental goods with a global value. If non-compliance 
is seen to prompt a halt of transfers from the whole of the 
Community, recipient countries will undoubtedly be more 
amenable than otherwise to fulfil their part of the contract. 
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Conversely, a common development policy offers more flexi­
bility to beneficiary countries in the execution of projects. 
Recipients are often obliged to use the financial assistance 
for purchases of goods or services in the donor country. 
Inasmuch as such tying-in practices are at all defensible, the 
replacement of national preferences by a single Community 
preference will leave developing countries with a much wider 
choice and ensure them better value for money by virtue of 
the keener competition between potential suppliers. ' 
In these ways, a shift of competences to the EC level of 
government should lead to a development aid policy that is 
superior to the present one in terms of both quantity and 
quality. At the same time it should be recognized, however, 
that the disappearance of a disguised national export subsidy 
instrument may make Member States rather reluctant to 
accept greater Community involvement. 
4.1.2. Widening the acquis communautaire on taxation 
The completion of the internal market and the establishment 
of a single currency will elicit a much closer integration of 
goods' and services' markets as well as enhanced cross-
border mobility of asset holders, enterprises, workers and 
shoppers. If countries are convinced that unilateral tax cuts 
can secure them an economic advantage by providing local 
producers with a competitive edge and out-of-country capi­
tal income earners and consumers with a fiscal incentive to 
carry out their business locally, the possibility looms that, 
in the absence of coordination or supranational measures, 
a mutual outbidding 'tax competition' may be triggered.2 
Already back in the 1970s, Member States harmonized their 
indirect tax base in a bid to reconcile the abolition of border 
controls with the maintenance of the destination principle 
(for VAT-liable economic agents). To keep cross-border 
shopping within reasonable limits, in June 1991 an agree­
ment fixing minimum rates for VAT and excise duties was 
reached. This section addresses briefly in what other areas 
of taxation common (minimum) rules may be called for. 
Adverse consequences of unrestrained tax competition 
Although one ought not to overlook the important micro-
as well as macroeconomic advantages deriving from tax 
This argument is elaborated in Jepma, Jansen and Kamphuis (1992). 
In the discussions on tax competition in the EC it is generally assumed 
implicitly that substitution effects prevail over income effects, i.e. that 
the spill-over bears a negative sign. Recent analytical work on the USA 
as reported in Eichengreen (1990) suggests, however, that this central 
hypothesis does not always hold. 
diversity and tax autonomy, it is obvious that an unbridled 
tax competition process may yield a number of harmful 
consequences for the efficiency of the Community economy 
as a whole. If competition is left to run its course, Member 
States will set tax rates at a lower level than they would 
if acting cooperatively because they neglect the negative 
externality of their lower tax rates on the revenue of their 
neighbours.3 
This tendency would occur most inconveniently at the outset 
of the transitional phase to EMU, as it erodes the tax intake 
at a time when several Member States need to undertake 
great efforts to redress their public finance imbalances and 
put their excessive debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward path 
toward what is deemed acceptable for access to the final 
phase of EMU. 
In addition, significant differences in effective tax rates may 
provoke locational distortions, in the sense of prompting 
decisions on where in the Community to produce, invest or 
collect capital income that would not be made in the absence 
of taxes. Such distortions misdirect resource allocation and 
thereby weaken the Community's economic efficiency. Fi­
nally, distribution problems may emerge among countries 
of the tax proceeds from firms or individuals operating in 
more than one Member State. The absence of common rules 
is likely to foster free-riding behaviour with firms (through 
abusive transfer pricing or thin capitalization practices) or 
individuals in border areas (through the judicious choice of 
fiscal residence) consuming public goods and services at 
prices below marginal cost in countries A and Β but paying 
direct taxes only in country B. 
Base mobility and the scope for tax competition 
Clearly, the risk of beggar-thy-neighbour fiscal competition 
and hence the need for common rules to constrain it is not 
identical for all tax categories. It grows with the international 
mobility of the tax base. 
The most mobile base is beyond doubt income from financial 
assets, which can be shifted rapidly from one jurisdiction to 
another with virtually no transaction costs. As a result of 
the current distinction in fiscal treatment between residents 
and non-residents and/or due to bank secrecy laws, the 
ongoing competitive process threatens to degenerate into a 
situation where each country acts as a tax haven for financial 
asset holders residing in the 11 other Member States. Given 
the extreme mobility of capital, a satisfactory solution may 
even require a worldwide agreement to this effect. 
3 Some economists, notably the adherents to the public choice school of 
thought, would not consider this an undesirable phenomenon, as it 
keeps the national Leviathans in check. They would argue that tax 
coordination amounts to setting up a disguised fiscal cartel. 
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Although little is known as yet with certainty about the 
importance in the EC of corporate taxes in the location 
decision of firms, it is probable that under the impetus of 
deepening economic integration enterprises will grow in-
creasingly mobile and multinational. This may over time 
also necessitate binding rules at EC level, in particular on 
the fiscal treatment of transnational profit flows between 
units of multinational firms. 
In several OECD countries, including some Member States, 
environmental taxes form the newest addition to the arsenal 
of fiscal instruments, or are about to be introduced. If 
pollution displays the characteristic of spilling over across 
borders and an environmental tax is deployed to combat it, 
it is to be expected that if Member States were to decide on 
the matter in a non-cooperative fashion, national rates would 
fall short of what would normally be deemed the optimal 
level (Spahn (1993b)). Especially in cases where the direction 
of international flows of pollution is hard to ascertain with 
a high degree of precision — as with carbon emissions — 
there are strong grounds for empowering the supranational 
government to harmonize the taxable base and set minimum 
rates, or impose an altogether uniform tax if it were con-
sidered that providing a polluter with a different incentive 
to abate depending on his nationality were at variance with 
the notion of fair competition in the internal market. 
In contrast, the scope for serious cross-border externalities 
is minor in the case of taxes on labour income and social 
security contributions since international mobility is likely 
to remain limited, for a long time to come, to very small 
segments of the labour market. By definition, the real-estate 
tax base cannot move to other jurisdictions at all.1 
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that serious 
economic efficiency reasons can be advanced in favour of a 
greater Community involvement regarding capital income 
taxes, corporate taxes, and some types of environmental 
taxes. Carrying the argument one step further, any one of 
them could, in principle, be a convenient source of supra-
national revenue. It is, however, in this context important 
to stress that economic efficiency is one, but by no means 
the sole, factor to be taken into account when assessing the 
relative merits of different types of taxes and of general 
purpose grants from the Member States as EC own resources 
(see Spahn (1993a)). A host of other elements needs to be 
reckoned with, as will be done in Chapter 7, where concrete 
recommendations on the future of own resources will be 
formulated. 
4.2. Monetary union and stabilization aspects 
Macroeconomic stabilization policy refers to any inter-
vention by the government to minimize deviations of actual 
output from potential, full-employment output. It finds its 
motivation in the belief2 that on account of institutional 
rigidities and/or expectational errors, prices, and especially 
that of labour, take time to move to their equilibrium value 
upon the advent of an economic shock and that by means 
of monetary or fiscal policy this adjustment process can be 
smoothed. 
If this belief is adhered to, stabilization policy can potentially 
play a useful role in the response to two quite distinct sorts 
of events: on the one hand, offsetting temporary, cyclical 
fluctuations of real activity; on the other, smoothing the 
adjustment to permanent shocks that ultimately necessitate 
durable changes in the terms of trade or other relative prices. 
Monetary union implies the transfer of national monetary 
policy to a single supranational institution and the removal 
of the devaluation instrument. In order to address correctly 
the ensuing systemic consequences for the conduct of na-
tional stabilization policy, and the subsequent questions on 
the need for modifications in EC public finance, the choice 
of a comparative benchmark is important. In accordance 
with the Commission's 'One market, one money' report and 
the conditions in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 109j) for 
accession to Stage III of EMU (stipulating a minimum of 
two years of stable membership in the EMS), the focus here 
is limited to the move from 'EMS + 1992' to EMU. In 
other words, the difference in the macroeconomic framework 
being considered is that between a full monetary union 
(EMU) and a situation where national currencies can move 
within the narrow 2,25% fluctuation band and where capital 
is free to move internationally. Admittedly, as demonstrated 
by the exchange-rate turbulence between EC currencies since 
September 1992, the long-term sustainability of this com-
parative benchmark may be called into question. A stable 
regime requires either a retrograde step towards greater 
exchange-rate flexibility or restrictions on capital movements 
or, preferably, moving to a single currency. 
To explore the possible implications for EC public finance 
of monetary union, it is convenient to draw a distinction 
between EC-wide stabilization on the one hand and regional 
stabilization on the other. 
1 This does not imply, however, that property taxes do not have any 
direct or indirect incidence on production costs. 
There ¡s a long-standing debate among economists, with the neo-Keyne-
sian and new classical school of thought at the extremes of the spectrum 
of ideas, about the sense of macroeconomic stabilization policy and the 
quality of fiscal policy as an anti-cyclical instrument. For an extensive 
discussion, see Sargent (1987) or Frenkel and Razin (1987). A brief 
review is provided in Majocchi and Rey (1993). 
43 
Part Β — The challenge of EMU for EC public finance 
4.2.1. EC­wide stabilization 
The former relates to the need in EMU to ensure a budgetary 
stance for the Community economy as a whole permitting 
a policy mix with the monetary policy conducted at EC level 
that is adequate for internal and external balance purposes. 
If no attention were paid to the aggregate budgetary stance, 
the stabilization burden on monetary policy might be excess­
ive, especially when, in line with what has been stipulated in 
Article 105 of the Treaty on European Union, the overriding 
aim of the prospective European System of Central Banks 
is the maintenance of price stability. 
The central question in the present context is whether the 
Community budget ought to fulfil a role in the attainment 
of the desired aggregate budgetary stance, or whether this 
should be handled exclusively through policy coordination 
between the Member States. 
Macroeconomic policy coordination is, of course, not spec­
ific to EMU. It is called for whenever national measures 
spill over into other countries through integrated goods and 
capital markets. However, besides the fact that Member 
States no longer possess their own monetary policy instru­
ment to react to policy­induced disturbances from abroad, 
the intensity of spill­over effects is likely to be stepped up 
in EMU and their nature modified through a variety of 
transmission channels, notably the common exchange rate 
and current account vis­à­vis the rest of the world. In sum, 
the move to EMU will heighten the need for national fiscal 
policy coordination. 
In all mature federal countries, it is the central government 
that takes care of macroeconomic stabilization for the union 
as a whole. The assignment of this task to the highest level 
of government arises from several factors. First, monetary 
policy is conducted at central level. Second, its budget is 
relatively large, equalling as a general rule roughly that 
of all states together.' Third, its expenditure and revenue 
categories exhibit a sufficient degree of flexibility: the central 
government is notably wholly or partly responsible for the 
instruments that act as the main automatic stabilizers, 
namely direct taxes and social security contributions and 
payments. Fourth, the historical context should not be over­
looked: the macroeconomic field was never occupied by the 
states, which did not engage in active fiscal policy at home 
nor coordinate their policies for federation­wide stabilization 
purposes; when awareness of the benefits of anti­cyclical 
policy grew, the federal government stepped in to fill a 
vacuum. 
Only the first factor will be present in the Community's 
EMU. As already pointed out in the MacDougall report, 
even if the Community budget were doubled or tripled, 
tremendous swings in revenue and spending would have to 
be allowed for if it were to perform a meaningful anti­
cyclical function. Ideas like that by the Marjolin Committee 
in 1975 for Community public finance to get involved in 
unemployment benefit schemes or the one developed in 
Albert and Ball (1983) to empower the Community to bor­
row for on­lending with interest­rate subsidies to the private 
sector are valid from the viewpoint of economic theory. 
However, to have a significant impact they would require 
budgetary orders of magnitude and rules on Community 
deficits that would be defensible, in the light of subsidiarity, 
only if the alternative in the form of national budgetary 
coordination proved to be unfeasible. 
The challenge of macroeconomic policy coordination in 
EMU 
If the Community economy were subject to a (more or less) 
symmetrical shock, calling for changes in the EC's aggregate 
budgetary stance, the first response would come from auto­
matic stabilizers operating at national level. Subsequently, 
the Council (economic and financial affairs) should decide 
on possible concerted discretionary actions to achieve spec­
ific output and employment, or current account goals. Com­
pared to the 'EMS + 1992' benchmark, such concertation 
should by no means be harder in EMU because, first, there 
will be only one monetary interlocutor and, second, the spill­
over channels which will be added or strengthened by EMU 
do not a priori impart a deflationary or expansionary bias 
to domestic fiscal policy.2 
The last observation ought not, however, to be taken to 
mean that macroeconomic policy coordination in EMU will 
be straightforward to carry out. A score of factors, reviewed, 
for example, in Cooper (1983), can seriously complicate 
agreements on, first, the appropriate aggregate stance at a 
given point in time, and, second, the distribution of the 
burden of adjustment towards the realization of that stance. 
These complications are liable to render budgetary policy 
coordination vulnerable to the well­known Friedman (1953) 
critique that, owing to the slowness of implementation, dis­
cretionary fiscal policy impinges on the economy at the 
When individual states control a budget of considerable size in relative 
terms and their room of manoeuvre is not constrained by binding rules, 
the central government's fiscal policy may at times be frustrated by 
deviant budgetary behaviour at subcentral level. A case in point is 
provided by Ontario in the Canadian federation. See Courchene (1993). 
2 The incremental spill­over effect induced by EMU is of uncertain sign 
as it is contingent on the relative magnitude of import leakage and 
interest­rate effects, as well as the nature of the exchange­rate regime 
with the rest of the world. See Chapter 5 in Commission (1990). 
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wrong moment, thereby amplifying, instead of attenuating, 
cyclical fluctuations. 
Achieving effective fiscal policy coordination will doubtless 
be one of the main challenges in the future management of 
EMU. The so-called 'multilateral surveillance' procedure, 
operative since the beginning of 1990 by virtue of the Council 
Decision in March of that year, will allow very valuable 
experience to be gained to this end during the transitional 
period.' 
4.2.2. Regional stabilization 
The main change implied by the move from EMS to a single 
currency is the abandonment of exchange-rate policy as a 
national macroeconomic adjustment instrument. However, 
compared to the benchmark situation, EMU makes little 
change to the availability of domestic monetary and fiscal 
policy for short-term stabilization purposes in response to 
temporary shocks impinging on a specific Member State. 
Limited effect of EMU on national stabilization capacity 
Already in'EMS + 1992', characterized by the combination 
of quasi-fixed exchange rates with perfect capital mobility, 
the autonomy of domestic monetary policy for countries 
inside the system is quite limited, except for Germany whose 
currency fulfils the anchor role in the EMS. In EMU, the 
conduct of monetary policy will become more symmetric 
with the ESCB paying some heed — subject to the observ-
ance of the paramount goal of price stability — to the anti-
cyclical policy needs of the Community economy in its 
entirety rather than those of the erstwhile monetary leader 
alone.2 While 'EMS + 1992' has existed for too short a 
period to draw a general conclusion, the case for establishing 
a mechanism at EC level to compensate for the fact that in 
EMU the internal monetary policy instrument cannot be 
resorted to for country-specific anti-cyclical purposes has 
not been demonstrated by practical experience. 
An analogous remark can be made with respect to national 
fiscal policy, the other traditional lever of stabilization pol-
icy. The use of domestic budgetary policy may be constrained 
in EMU by the necessity to avoid 'excessive' deficits which 
could imperil the union's monetary stability. These con-
straints have been stated in the Maastricht Treaty on Euro-
pean Union in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio (Member 
State debt levels exceeding 60% of GDP must decline to 
that reference value 'at a satisfactory pace'), the deficit-to-
GDP ratio (with a 3% reference value) and, in a subordinate 
fashion, the relationship between the deficit and public in-
vestment expenditure. Although the Treaty provisions on 
'excessive deficits' do exhibit prima facie a potential to 
impose a pro-cyclical bias on national budgetary policy, 
their actual effect may be considerably mitigated for two 
reasons. 
First, they will only turn out to be a real limit to a country's 
fiscal policy activism inasmuch as that country's public fin-
ance position was already bordering on the danger zone 
prior to the advent of the cyclical negative shock. At present, 
few Member States enjoy sound public finances but the 
problem countries are expected to take the necessary 
measures ahead of their accession to the final stage of EMU.3 
Offsetting minor slumps through fiscal policy, for example 
by way of the national automatic stabilizers, should thus 
remain possible upon the introduction of a single currency. 
Second, the violation of these constraints will not automati-
cally trigger cuts in national spending or increases in taxes, 
but will prompt an examination by the EC Commission and 
Council of the causes of the trespass and of the remedial 
action that should be undertaken. As temporary disturb-
ances disappear by definition after some time, the responsible 
EC bodies can be presumed to express a rather mild judg-
ment on 'excessive' deficits due to purely cyclical expan-
sionary fiscal policies. 
Substituting mutual insurance for the lost exchange-rate 
instrument 
Whilst monetary union eliminates the explicit external bal-
ance constraint at the national level at the same time as it 
suspends the devaluation instrument, it is important to note 
that it obviously does not remove a country's need to stabil-
ize the economy upon the occurrence of shocks.4 
It may be noted that also after the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty, macroeconomic 'burden-sharing' will continue to take place on 
a purely voluntary basis. 
The strains in the EMS since September 1992 were largely rooted in the 
fact that Germany's monetary policy of high short-term interest rates 
in a period of shock was considered by other EMS countries to be at 
variance with their own economic needs. 
As an important consequence, the Member States having to implement 
a public finance adjustment programme, implying the running of strong 
primary surpluses, will be basically unable to pursue a countercyclical 
policy in the transition phase. 
Nor does it eliminate a country's fundamental budget constraint, i.e. 
that in the longer term national income be equal to absorption. The 
pressure on a region in a monetary union to balance income and 
absorption will not appear in the guise of exhausted foreign reserves 
but through an increasing unwillingness of lenders to provide loans to 
borrowers in the indebted area. See Goodhart (1989), and Majocchi 
and Rey (1993). 
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The usefulness of the devaluation instrument in the face of 
negative, durable, disturbances derives from the fact that it 
permits authorities to 'frontload' the terms of trade adjust­
ment as it brings about a temporary real exchange-rate 
depreciation when nominal wages and prices are down­
wardly rigid.' Its advantages ought not, though, to be over­
rated. For one thing, the ability to 'frontload' comes at a 
price in that longer-term adjustment is slowed down because 
the initial boost in output made possible by devaluation 
reduces the necessary pressure on real wages. For another, 
devaluation forms a crude adjustment instrument: it changes 
a wide-ranging set of relative goods and asset prices, many 
of which may not be necessary to tackle the imbalance 
problem at hand, possibly generating thereby undesirable 
side-effects. 
For an economy's response to adverse permanent shocks to 
be successful in the long run, it needs to operate through 
structural channels like real wage changes, migration and 
occupational mobility. Cross-border migration in the EC of 
macroeconomic significance is not supported politically and 
neither is it likely owing to Europe's linguistic and cultural 
diversity which proves a strong impediment once income 
levels in the areas of potential emigration are well above 
subsistence.2 Real wage flexibility and occupational mobility 
are in principle potent mechanisms which need to be en­
hanced in the transition to monetary union and beyond.3 
More specifically, it is particularly important that the intro­
duction of a single currency should not set the stage for 
wage demonstration effects, as have occurred in the former 
GDR following German unification, engendering excessive 
unit labour costs in the Community's lagging regions. 
However, even if factor market flexibility were reinforced 
and wage demonstration effects averted, it is obvious that 
in the face of serious economic shocks these structural chan­
nels are likely to produce a limited outcome in the short to 
medium term. It follows that, given the loss of the devalu­
ation instrument, other ways to provide short-term relief 
need to be devised. If not, the Community economic system 
could come under increasing strains, as Member States hit 
by exogenous disturbances would show very serious difficult­
ies in reattaining internal balance. 
In existing federal and unitary EMUs regional economic 
disturbances are to a significant extent absorbed automati­
cally by way of interregional budgetary flows associated 
chiefly with the functioning of the national social security 
and direct tax system (see Section 3.2). Fresh empirical 
analysis to this effect, undertaken in the preparation of this 
report, suggests that the regional stabilization capacity of 
federal public finance mechanisms amounts to between 
roughly 20 and 30%. Using regression techniques, Goodhart 
and Smith (1993) state that close to 20% of a loss of primary 
income in a US state is offset through automatic federal 
stabilizers. The regional shock 'offset' through federal chan­
nels is estimated to equal around 25% in Canada, whereas 
in the UK the tax side alone achieves a regional stabilization 
effect of about 20%. On the other hand, detailed simulations 
by Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure (1993) arrive at 17% 
for the USA.4 By contrast, in countries like France and 
Germany where interpersonal solidarity mechanisms are 
more pronounced and unemployment transfers an exclusive 
national competence, the strength of automatic regional 
stabilization is found to rise to about 35%, climbing in 
Germany to over 40% when the depressed Land is in a 
position to benefit maximally from the horizontal fiscal 
equalization grants under the 'Finanzausgleich'. 
Pointing to the existence of such mechanisms in federal 
countries, the MacDougall report advocated the establish­
ment of a Community unemployment fund under which part 
of the social security contributions would be paid to, and 
part of the unemployment benefits received from, the Com­
munity. Since then, this idea or variants to it — like a 
European federal transfer scheme syphoning income from 
regions with overemployment to regions with unemployment 
in a budget-neutral fashion at the Community level5 — have 
been advanced recurrently as being the first-best instrument 
to ensure a regional stabilization capacity at EC level. The 
major advantage of such schemes is that they constitute a 
cushion providing direct and immediate household income 
support, and hence demand, for regions going through a 
slump and that they spread part of the economic risk arising 
from EMU membership over the whole of the union.6 
However, besides the fact that such schemes, if they were to 
operate along national social security lines, would need to 
have at their disposal contributions worth several per cent 
of EC GDP to generate a meaningful automatic stabilization 
See Commission (1990), Chapter 6 and Annex D. 
Besides, intra-national migration in Europe does not appear strong 
either. As reported in Eichengreen (1990), mobility in the USA is around 
two or three times as high as mobility within European countries. 
Especially in view of the sluggishness in adjustment to unemployment 
of EC labour markets, in comparison to labour markets in the EFTA 
countries, Japan and North America. See Bean (1992). 
One half of this 17% stems from the effect of social contributions. The 
other half is accounted for by the federal tax system, which corresponds 
with the finding reported in von Hagen (1991). The latter study shows 
that unemployment benefits do not play any cross-border stabilization 
role in the USA because, notwithstanding the management by the federal 
government, they operate at state level. 
See Van der Ploeg (1990). 
See Goodhart and Smith (1993). 
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effect, and that the time seems not politically ripe yet for an 
interpersonal redistribution function at Community level, 
their implementation would be fraught with serious microe-
conomic and managerial difficulties. 
To start with, since traditional automatic stabilizers give 
unconditional aid which continues after a region's economic 
situation has stopped worsening, they are liable to create 
perverse incentives, delaying instead of accelerating the 
necessary real adjustment in factor markets.' In this way 
undisciplined behaviour in one Member State would be 
bailed out by the other Community partners, a classical 
example of a negative externality. Indeed, moral hazard 
problems of this kind also exist within the national frame-
work, but there the pressure to tackle them is arguably much 
greater since with cross-border relief one is dealing with 
other people's money. In this context, it should also be 
recalled that national social security systems have emanated 
first and foremost from a basic equity concern and that 
macroeconomic stabilization is largely a valuable by-
product. The idiosyncrasies of national regimes, reflecting 
differences in needs, labour law, and institutional set-up are 
huge,2 such that supranational initiatives to make national 
systems foolproof against perverse incentives would move 
the Community into deep waters. 
In addition, uniform levels of Community support for the 
unemployed may lead to very different second-round effects 
depending on the local labour market situation in general 
and wage levels in particular. Finally, managerial difficulties 
could be tremendous, given the already considerable prob-
lems at the national level to counter abuses and the sobering 
experiences at Community level with open-ended expendi-
ture in favour of a very large number of beneficiaries, such 
as the CAP. National unemployment rules and their enforce-
ment diverge widely and an effective EC control on national 
unemployment figures would be very hard to impose. 
But there is a more fundamental problem from the viewpoint 
of the balanced development of the Community's economic 
system. If the aim of a regional adjustment lever is to 
compensate for the loss of the devaluation instrument, the 
introduction at EC level of traditional automatic stabilizers 
may amount to what one could call 'systemic overshooting', 
especially since, as argued earlier, monetary union alters 
little to the availability of domestic monetary and fiscal 
policy for stabilization purposes. Devaluation is not resorted 
to for each and every cyclical slump or minor shock, and 
should therefore be substituted for something less powerful 
in the stabilization policy arsenal. 
Together, the foregoing arguments militate in favour of 
another type of cross-border support: a financial assistance 
mechanism offering Member States a limited, possibly dis-
cretionary, mutual insurance against the occurrence of ad-
verse country-specific shocks that are macroeconomically 
significant. This proposition does not break completely new 
ground as it is, at least in spirit, not unlike the idea of a 
'conjunctural convergence facility aimed at preventing acute 
cyclical problems' espoused in the MacDougall report. 
A concrete modus operandi of a mutual insurance scheme 
explicitly and exclusively geared to stabilization support is 
outlined in Chapter 6 of this report. There it will also be 
shown that, contrary to prevailing beliefs on this matter, 
such an insurance scheme does not require considerable 
funds to generate a degree of stabilization 'offset' that is 
significant and not altogether dissimilar from what is observ-
able in mature federal countries. The main reason for the 
proposed scheme's relatively strong stabilization power is 
that it would operate on the basis of uni-directional block 
grants from the Community to the depressed Member 
State(s), contrasting with the usual 'automatic' transfer 
mechanisms with an interregional incidence that are charac-
terized by large two-way payments.3 
4.3. Cohesion and equity in EMU 
Following the accession of relatively less developed Member 
States, the regional dimension has been given increasing 
attention. This has led to the inclusion by way of the 1987 
Single European Act of 'cohesion' as a Treaty objective 
(Article 130a). At the same time, the Structural Funds, the 
main vehicle of EC regional policy, were reformed and 
doubled in real terms over a five-year period, reaching about 
ECU 15 billion in 1991 or 25% of the total budget. The 
reinforcement of the Structural Funds was widely considered 
at the time as a safety net against possible dangers for the 
relatively less developed regions arising from the completion 
of the internal market. The importance of cohesion as a 
Community goal was reinforced in the Maastricht Treaty 
(Articles 2 and 3) and during the period 1993-99 the budget-
ary means for structural operations will be raised by another 
67%. Moreover, their use will be more concentrated, such 
that the four poorest Member States will enjoy a renewed 
doubling of support. 
The aim of the budgetary interventions under cohesion goes 
beyond a simple income transfer from rich to poor Member 
1 The Canadian experience offers a good case in point. See Courchene 
(1993). 
2 See Deleeck (1991). 
3 This finding can thus be seen as the 'stabilization variant' to stylized 
fact (v) of Section 3.2 that explicit grants have stronger interregional 
equalization power. 
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States, which is reflected in the fact that (pursuant to Article 
130b) cohesion has a non-budgetary dimension as well. It is 
to provide instruments to level the competitive playing field 
as far as structural endowments are concerned through in­
vestment programmes to upgrade infrastructure and human 
skills. Given its close links with efficiency, cohesion is there­
fore distinct from the broader concept of equity, which 
relates to the narrowing through taxes and transfers of the 
primary income gap. In brief, cohesion may be said to be 
about equality of opportunities, while equity is about equal­
ity of results. 
4.3.1. The evolution of regional disparities in the 1990s 
and the effect of EMU 
Table 11 
Disparities in GDP per inhabitant between the regions' of the Com­
munity, 1980-90 
(in PPS. EUR 12 » 100) 
1980 1985 1990 
Average 25 weakest regions 55,0 
Average 25 strongest regions 136,6 
Disparity2 27,6 
52,6 
139,5 
29,1 
52,3 
137,9 
27,7 
NUTS. 174 regions. 
Weighted standard deviation. 
The issues to be addressed with regard to the link between 
the budgetary efforts in favour of cohesion and EMU con­
cern, first, the longer-term course of income disparities be­
tween regions and between Member States under the as­
sumption of unchanged Community policies, and, second, 
the influence the establishment of EMU is likely to exert on 
the income gap. If there are no clear indications that dispari­
ties between the richer and poorer parts of the Community 
are set to widen and, a fortiori, if EMU is judged not to 
provoke a divergence of regional performances, the econ­
omic case for complementing the creation of EMU with 
another strong increase in the cohesion budget is weak. 
A discussion of these issues should begin with the caveat 
that the determinants of long-term growth and regional 
income disparities and their evolution are complex and not 
yet well-understood. Different theories of international trade 
offer conflicting views on the effect of opening goods and 
factor markets on the distribution of the gains from trade 
among trade partners.' Conclusions on the likely develop­
ment of regional disparities in the wake of the completed 
internal market are therefore bound to contain a large el­
ement of agnosticism. 
Unlike the convergence tendency registered during most of 
the two preceding decades, the regional income gap has 
basically remained constant throughout the 1980s, as shown 
in Table 11, where the measure of disparity, covering 174 
Community regions (NUTS 2), exhibits a slight increase.As 
argued in Prud'homme (1993), the combined effects of 
changes in the pattern of migration, the location determi­
nants of investment, and the size and composition of national 
governments' budgets are largely responsible for the renewed 
widening of the regional gap within Member States since the 
end of the 1970s, such as in Italy, France or the UK. 
Although it can by no means be excluded that such structural 
factors may seriously frustrate the catch-up endeavours of 
lagging countries in the future, they have clearly not been 
powerful enough to abort the recent real convergence process 
between Member States, portrayed in Graph 3. As can be 
gauged from Table 12, growth in three of the four lagging 
Member States since the middle of the 1980s has significantly 
outpaced that of the Community on average. This different 
experience among the economically less developed Member 
States points to the key importance of national policies 
geared at reducing locational handicaps, strengthening mar­
ket efficiency and macroeconomically sustainable growth. 
Also noteworthy is that, following German unification, real 
income dispersion between Member States has come down 
appreciably, with the average German living standard now 
lying much closer to the European one, and France taking 
over the lead in terms of prosperity among the larger Mem­
ber States. 
The literature on this question can by and large be grouped into two 
rival schools of thought. The first, the 'convergence' school, building 
on classical and neo-classical analysis, contends that spatial disparities 
will tend to disappear as a result of international trade. The second, 
stressing the existence of imperfect competition, economies of scale, 
and externality factors, asserts that the reinforcement of integration 
is susceptible to exacerbate regional disparities owing to 'cumulative 
causation' processes. See Commission (1990) and Prud'homme (1993). 
As a corollary to the observed real convergence at country-
level, the lack of progress over the last decade in the re­
duction of regional disparities throughout the Community 
is almost completely attributable to developments within 
Member States, for which, in the light of subsidiarity and 
other reasons spelt out in the next section, supranational 
policy responsibility is obviously minor. 
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GRAPH 3 : Relative GDP per capita of four least favoured countries' 
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Table 12 
GDP per inhabitant' in the Member States, 1980-90 
(in PPS, EUR 12 = 100) 
1980 1985 1990 1992' 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Disparity2 
106,1 
105,6 
118,6 
52,2 
71,6 
113.6 
60,1 
102,3 
115,3 
108,9 
52,6 
97,6 
104,0 
113,7 
119,2 
51,0 
70,2 
112,6 
61,8 
102,2 
119,9 
105,4 
50,0 
101,1 
104,6 
106,5 
117,2 
47,6 
75,3 
110,8 
68,9 
102,5 
126,9 
102,2 
53,6 
105,6 
108,0 
110,9 
106,6 
48,8 
80,1 
114,7 
73,6 
106,2 
132,7 
104,2 
61,5 
96,9 
19,0 19,3 17,5 13,9 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per head indicates the income generated in Member Sates 
and regions by the resident producer units. An alternative measure is gross national product 
(GNP) per head which measures the resources available after the transfer of factor incomes 
such as interest payments and dividend. At regional level, data are only available for GDP 
per head. Net flows of transfers out of or into a country or region lead to differences between 
both measures which may be substantial in the case of smaller countries such as Ireland or 
Luxembourg. 
Weighted standard deviation. 
The figures for 1992 include unified Germany. 
Spatial distribution of EMU effects 
Much as for the Community in its entirety, a precise assess-
ment of the net national benefits from EMU is very difficult, 
inter alia because chiefly microeconomic gains need to be 
weighed against the loss of a macroeconomic adjustment 
instrument. The as yet sparse analytical literature on this 
issue (Commission (1990), Santos (1993)) suggests that, 
whilst the stakes are highest for the relatively less developed 
Member States, overall they stand to gain more than average 
from EMU. The abandonment of the devaluation instru-
ment, which may be relatively more important for the poorer 
countries as their economies are going through a profound 
structural transformation process unsettling their 'equilib-
rium' real exchange rate, is very likely to be more than 
compensated by a number of advantages, of which these 
countries will be the prime beneficiaries: 
(i) transaction cost savings and the suppression of ex-
change-rate variability by virtue of the introduction of 
a single currency are far more significant for small 
economies whose currencies are only marginally used 
as means of international payments and whose financial 
services sector is poorly developed; 
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(ii) the loss of seigniorage revenue, which anyway will de­
cline considerably because of the completion of the 
internal market, will be offset by reductions in interest 
rates and thus in the financing burden of public debt; 
(iii) Community policies linked to economic union, es­
pecially greater support for international infrastructure 
works, will reduce further the geographical peripherality 
of the lagging countries in the EC. This should give a 
long­term boost to growth prospects since, most of 
them being small economies, increases in prosperity will 
have to come chiefly through the gains from inter­
national trade. 
national mobility of individuals. The stronger the feeling of 
common citizenship, the more acceptable will be the idea 
that each individual is entitled to a minimum income level 
throughout the union. On the other hand, national differ­
ences in redistributive schemes and direct taxes will give rise 
to serious externality problems if households are mobile and 
well­informed, inducing a bias toward less income redistri­
bution. 
Even at the final stage of EMU, the EC is likely to differ 
markedly from mature federations as regards both these 
determinants. 
All in all, the introduction of a single currency would not 
seem to call a priori on economic grounds for a strong 
expansion of the cohesion budget as structural handicaps 
appear, if anything, reduced. Instead the effectiveness of the 
Community's structural operations could be improved and 
some ideas are developed to this end in Section 5.2. 
4.3.2. Equity concerns in the pre­federal stage 
The economic discussion on cohesion is quite distinct from 
the political claim that, for the sake of a balanced develop­
ment of the Community, the advances toward EMU, ad­
ditional competences in external affairs, and more powers 
for the European Parliament ought to be paralleled by steps 
toward greater equity. More specifically, according to this 
view disposable­income per capita levels of the poorer Mem­
ber States need to be brought much closer to the Community 
average by way of public finance channels. 
As the matter is one about political preferences, economic 
analysis has little to offer on this question, but the debate 
may become more focused by putting it in a 'fiscal federal­
ism' perspective. 
Indeed, in mature federations, solidarity is a key part of the 
federal contract, in the sense that states are prepared to 
abide by the constraints to their policy room for manœuvre 
in exchange for the availability of redistributive mechanisms. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, regional GDP per capita differ­
entials are bridged by close to 40% through central taxes 
and transfers, leaving none the less differences in per capita 
income that are not smaller than, for instance, those between 
the eight richest EC Member States, comprising well over 
80% of total EC population. 
The need for explicit interregional transfers and/or for cross­
border social security or welfare schemes is essentially deter­
mined by the degree of political homogeneity and the inter­
With average income in the poorer Member States well 
above subsistence levels and high linguistic and cultural 
barriers, migration will stay limited to the upper and down­
most parts of the labour force, such that it will not take on 
any major proportions in relation to the resident labour 
force or population — with Ireland possibly forming an 
exception. National personal income taxes and social secur­
ity regimes, hence interpersonal redistribution, seem very 
unlikely to come under strong pressure from footloose 
people over the next 10 to 15 years. 
As to political homogeneity, it needs to be recalled that the 
current endeavours to deepen European integration do not 
concern social union or political union in the conventional 
sense of the term. This distinguishes the EC in a critical way 
from the German unification process where social union 
supplemented EMU. Support for the needy typically proves 
a positive function of geographical proximity ('charity begins 
at home') which is why interpersonal redistribution should 
rather be seen as a 'local' public good to be taken care of at 
regional or national level (Pauly (1973)). As pointed out 
in Forte (1977), in policy matters related to homogeneity 
considerations, the 'broadest' level of government is not 
necessarily also the 'highest' level of government as perceived 
by citizens. In the pre­federal stage, where its competences 
still derive much more from the Member States than directly 
from the people, the Community lacks the political legit­
imacy to become more than marginally involved in social 
justice questions. Put differently, countries may have 
strongly divergent views on the proper degree of interper­
sonal redistribution, such that the supranational level may 
be argued — on the basis of subsidiarity — to have a 
responsibility only in interregional redistribution matters 
(Tresch (1981)). 
As will be pointed out in Section 5.2, the Community engages 
in a fair amount of interregional redistribution already at 
present, mobilizing flows that in terms of recipients' GDP are 
well­comparable to those between the Länder in Germany 
(before unification) by way of the 'Finanzausgleich' and 
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other explicit regional transfer mechanisms. The implemen-
tation of the Edinburgh agreement will considerably aug-
ment these flows. The degree of interregional redistribution 
is, obviously, in the end a matter of evolving political prefer-
ences, which should be revealed by a clearer establishment 
of 'social union' as an explicit aim of the Community. But 
whatever the development of these preferences, the fiscal 
federalism case (see Section 3.2(iii)) for a high degree of 
interregional redistribution is rather weak, in particular if a 
mutual insurance mechanism were deployed for stabilization 
purposes. Although the prospective 'excessive deficit' rules 
will limit Member States' room for manœuvre as regards 
borrowing, the step from 'EMS + 1992' to EMU does not 
encroach greatly upon national fiscal autonomy, with the 
virtually immobile tax bases yielding more than two thirds 
of present government revenue and the mobile tax categories 
becoming subject to minimum level restrictions. 
4.3.3. Juste retour and the EC budget 
The fact that a significant increase of cross-border income 
redistribution does not seem indispensable for the success of 
EMU by no means implies that EC public finances as such 
should not display basic fairness, signifying that Member 
States' net benefits are in line with relative real income per 
capita levels. 
The budgetary fairness debate, especially the quarrels about 
the UK contribution, has consumed a great deal of political 
energy in the past. In addition, it produced two important 
negative side-effects: first, it tended to lead to a blinkered 
national assessment of Community proposals on the basis 
of net budgetary implications rather than on the proper 
merits of the proposals; and second, consideration of the 
costs and benefits of membership was often unduly narrowed 
to an assessment of the net budgetary position. 
There are basically two options to tackle this problem. The 
first is to try to prevent it from occurring by modifying EC 
revenue towards progressivity or at least proportionality, 
and by shifts of emphasis on the expenditure side. Given its 
preponderance in the budget, this shift should definitely 
concern the CAP: reform away from product to producer 
support would be instrumental in achieving this effect. The 
second option is more systemic and would consist of a 'below 
the line' balancing operation of national payments and re-
ceipts to correct inequities once they have surpassed a certain 
threshold. Such a scheme, which was advocated in 1987 by 
the Padoa-Schioppa report, has the advantage of trans-
parency but suffers also from several serious drawbacks. 
Our views will be spelt out in Chapter 8 of this report. 
51 

PartC 
Perspectives for 
Community public finance 
53 

The aim of Part C is to identify concrete operational implications for EC public f inance with the 
establishment of EMU based on the foregoing economic assessment. 
Whereas in the last chapter the analysis was structured according to the economic functions of 
government, this part is organized in conventional bookkeeping fashion. In Chapter 5, the 
Community's expenditure needs of a recurrent nature are roughly quantified and added up. Chapter 
6 outlines the main features of a financial assistance mechanism providing Member States with a 
Community insurance against country-specific shocks, and estimates the budgetary cost of a 
possible stabilization support scheme. In Chapter 7, the question of which revenue sources are 
most appropriate to cover these various expenditures is addressed. Chapter 8 deals with the 
question of inequitable budgetary positions of Member States and assesses the pros and cons of 
different approaches to ensure budgetary fairness. Chapter 9 discusses the changed role of EC 
borrowing and lending operations in EMU. Part C is brought to a close by looking at ways to 
streamline the adoption, execution and control of the budget. 
The highlights of the policy recommendations ensuing from the analysis developed in Part C are 
as follows: 
(i) The expansion of supranational competences in the allocative and redistributive domain, 
required for the proper functioning of EMU, and an enhanced role for the Community in 
external affairs, necessitates a growth of the EC budget to between approximately 1,55 and 
1,85% of EC GDP. A large part of this rise does not stem from minimum EMU conditions, 
but from the need to step up development assistance to LDCs and Eastern Europe, and from 
the inclusion of the European Development Fund in the budget proper. 
(ii) To this must be added the expected annual outlays from a reserve fund for regional 
stabilization purposes, which would be activated in the event of a Member State's level of 
economic activity diverging substantially from the performance of the Community as a whole. 
A Community financial assistance mechanism explicitly designed to this end could be highly 
efficient, providing a degree of regional stabilization comparable to what has been observed 
for the USA and Canada at an average annual budgetary cost of about 0,2% of EC GDP. 
(Hi) In sum, it is recommended that overall EC expenditure should rise to between 1,75 and 2,1%> 
of GDP over the next 15 years, implying an increase of between 45 and 75% relative to the 
1992 situation. 
(iv) In the run-up to EMU, a country's contribution to EC revenue should become proportional 
to its prosperity per capita. Proportionality should be ensured by means of the current 'fourth 
resource' based on GNP. Once it will have entered the final stage of EMU, the Community 
should be given access to new sources of finance. Appropriate candidates are seigniorage, 
carbon dioxide taxes and corporate taxes, in particular on cashflow. 
(v) Recurrent debates on budgetary 'fairness' are unavoidable. The principle that resources 
should flow from richer to poorer Member States can reasonably be said to have been 
accepted by now as a fairness benchmark. The Community's past approach to budgetary 
inequity claims has been pragmatic, searching for specific solutions as the need arose. 
Proposals have been made to replace this case-by-case approach with a generally applicable 
net equity safeguard mechanism. Such a mechanism exhibits undisputed advantages, but also 
poses several fundamental problems. It is therefore recommended to pursue a strategy based 
on the flexible application of the 'resource flow ' principle. The evolution of the budget, as 
mapped out in this report, would go a long way towards redressing and preventing the 
occurrence of pronounced budgetary inequities. 
55 
(vi) EMU looks set to diminish strongly the relevance of EC loan instruments inside the 
Community. They should therefore be overhauled and reoriented towards greater risk finance 
and placing more emphasis on interventions in third countries. 
(vii) The procedure of mul t ¡annual programming by means of a 'financial perspectives' plan 
offers, on balance, clear advantages provided sufficient reserves are created to respond to 
contingencies. The involvement of national and regional authorities in the execution of the 
EC budget can be improved by better control and incentive mechanisms, as well as by 
rationalizing budgetary management rules. 
56 
Chapter 5 — Expenditure 
Chapter 5 
Expenditure 
5.1. Enhanced Community role in resource 
allocation 
It was stated in the previous chapter that there exists a 
general case for stepping up the Community's involvement 
in a number of microeconomic policy areas, notably the 
environment, infrastructure, R&D, and higher education. It 
turns out, however, that through a systematic application of 
the subsidiarity principle, the role of the EC is largely a 
coordination and regulatory one, and that this dimension of 
economic union should not entail a considerable rise in 
supranational spending as a percentage of EC GDP. 
5.1.1. Environmental protection 
As can be seen from Table 13, current Community outlays 
for environmental purposes total about ECU 1 billion per 
year, or some 2% of the Community budget. Extrapolating 
from the available national data presented in Table 14, this 
ECU 1 billion amounts to approximately 2% of the sum of 
national public expenditure, mounting to 10% if EIB loans 
are included.1 Current outlays can be split into basically 
three categories: demonstration projects, environmental re-
search, and environmental programmes within the frame-
work of the Structural Funds. Abstracting from the latter 
two, which will be dealt with presently and in Section 5.2, 
annual spending on the environment falls short of ECU 100 
million. 
Although currently minor, it is not obvious that there is a 
need for a massive rise in EC environmental spending. It is 
worth stressing once again that the Community's role with 
respect to environmental policy resides first and foremost in 
the adoption of common maximum norms of pollution and 
the concerted introduction of ecological taxes so as to rec-
oncile the rational application of the 'polluter pays' principle 
with the integrity of the internal market. Community spend-
ing should, in the first place, be auxiliary to the elaboration 
of supranational regulatory norms, i.e. ensuring the technical 
Table 13 
EC budget spending on environment actions 
Research 
Environment programmes 
Joint Research Centre 
Third framework programme 
ECSC 
Demonstration projects 
Medspa 
Norspa 
ACE technology/ACNAT 
Coal 
Structural Funds 
ERDF (old) 
ERDF (Objective 1) 
ERDF (Objective 2) 
Envireg 
EAGGF 5a 
EAGGF 5b 
EAGGF forests 
Third countries 
Ecology in LDCs 
Total 
Duration 
1989-92 
1987-90 
1991-94 
1985-90 
1986-93 
1991-92 
1987-91 
1987-89 
1985-89 
1989-93 
1989-91 
1990-93 
1989-93 
1989-93 
1987-90 
1988-90 
(MiUion ECU) 
Total 
162 
137 
518 
13 
63 
14 
60 
74 
260 
1 966 
537 
500 
39 
310 
58 
21 
4 732 
Source: COM(91)28. 
' Given that the Figures on EC environment spending include R&D and 
Structural Funds expenditure whereas national expenditure concerns 
environmental protection proper, this 3% may be somewhat of an 
overestimate. 
inputs — regarding, for example, the origin and ambience 
of pollutants, the nature and size of negative effects or the 
state of product and process technology — necessary for 
sound policy formulation. The creation of a well-equipped 
European Environmental Agency would go a long way 
towards meeting this concern. The only apparent rationale 
for significant EC expenditure on environmental protection 
arises if EC legislation imposes binding standards and obli-
gations, the respect of which (as indicated in some studies 
carried out for the Commission) would impose a consider-
able strain on the public finances of fiscally weak Member 
States. 
Evidently, however, if in the future — as would be desirable 
— the Community as a whole rather than the Member 
States individually were to participate in the international 
undertakings to respond to global environmental challenges, 
and funds were to be set up by the developed world to 
assist LDCs in their pursuit of worldwide environmental 
objectives, the Community's unilateral transfers to the rest 
of the world may have to increase by a significant sum. 
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Table 14 
Expenditure on protection of the environment in the Community in 1990 
Total 
(billion ECU) 
As % of GDP As % of EC total % average 
growth 1980-90 
% by public 
sector 
As'/ , of GDP 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 
1,13 
1,16 
18,65 
0,27 
2,93 
9,48 
0,30 
6,17 
2,91 
0,44 
9,38 
0,7 
1,1 
1,6 
0,5 
0,8 
1,0 
0,9 
0,7 
1,3 
0,9 
1,2 
2,1 
2,2 
35,3 
0,5 
5,5 
17,9 
0,6 
11,7 
5,5 
0,8 
17,8 
2,2 
3,9 
3,3 
0,5 
6,5 
3,0 
4,7 
2,2 
2,7 
3,5 
2,5 
63,7 
90,0 
52,0 
72,1 
81,5 
66,4 
70,6 
79,9 
72,4 
86,5 
24,7 
0,4 
1,0 
0,8 
0,4 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
0,6 
0.9 
0,8 
0,3 
1,1 1,1 100,0 3,0 57,0 0,6 
Sounc. ERECO. 
5.1.2. Research and development 
Standing at ECU 1,9 billion, expenditure on research and 
development represents about 3% of the Community budget 
in 1992. A fourth framework programme is currently under 
discussion taking into account the implications of the Maas-
tricht Treaty and Delors II package agreed in the Edinburgh 
Council. These proposals envisage a gradual increase in EC 
R&D appropriations to ECU 4.2 billion per annum by 1997. 
Table 15, reporting 1990 data, shows that Community efforts 
amount to around 5% of what is spent by Member State 
governments on civil R&D.1 The relative scale of EC spend-
ing compared with that of Member States, however, is much 
larger in three research fields, namely production, distri-
bution and rational utilization of energy (20% of national 
spending), infrastructure and general planning of land use 
(13%) and industrial production and technology (12%). 
The question of how Community spending on R&D ought 
to evolve can only be answered properly on the basis of a 
detailed examination of Europe's needs in specific research 
areas and the role of government in this respect. Such analy-
sis does not lie within the remit of the present report and is 
in any event very difficult given the complexity of the causal 
link from research to the competitive strength of an 
economy. 
1 Germany, France, Italy and the UK together account for 84% of civil 
R&D financed by Member State governments. 
Tables 16 and 17 shed some indicative empirical light on 
this matter by providing a comparison with the USA and 
Japan. It turns out that the EC trails significantly behind 
both competitors but this appears attributable only to a 
minor extent to a relative lack of R&D efforts on the part 
of Europe's public sector. As supranational competences in 
fields like energy, transport, telecommunications, the en-
vironment, etc. expand, the justification for greater Com-
munity involvement in R&D activities related to these fields 
will become stronger. This could signify that spending on 
R&D could reach over time perhaps 0,1% of EC GDP. 
However, relatively small public expenditure is not synony-
mous with lack of policy competence. As stated in Costello 
(1993b), the main role of the EC is to coordinate national 
research efforts and to create a properly functioning single 
market, an essential requirement for large scale industrial 
research. 
5.1.3. Public investment in infrastructure 
The provision of infrastructures from a purely national 
perspective in the EC has resulted in insufficient cross-border 
connections, technical incompatibilities among national net-
works and the failure to exploit system economies. With a 
single market, the volume of cross-border transport and 
information flows is bound to increase considerably. The EC 
must avoid the situation whereby infrastructure bottlenecks 
substitute for trade barriers eliminated under the 1992 pro-
gramme. National networks need therefore to be properly 
interconnected. This requires in the first place concerted 
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Table 15 
Public expenditure on civil R&D, 1991 
Member States' spending 
As % of GDP 
of which on industrial technology 
of which on utilization of energy 
of which on infrastructure and general planning 
of land-use 
of which on control of environmental pollution 
EC budget 
As % of GDP 
As % of total EC budget 
of which on industrial technology 
of which on utilization of energy 
of which on infrastructure and general planning 
of land-use 
of which on control of environmental pollution 
EC budget on R&D as % of Member States' 
spending 
EC budget on R&D as % of Member States' spend-
ing, but on industrial technology only 
EC budget on R&D on utilization of energy as % 
of Member States' spending 
EC budget on R&D on infrastructure and general 
planning of land-use as % of Member States' 
spending 
EC budget on R&D on control of environmental 
pollution as % of Member States' spending 
¡million ECU) 
37 267' 
0,72 
6351' 
1 946 
696 
1 113 
1 632 
0,03 
3,1 
753 
392 
89 
86 
4,4 
11,9 
20,1 
12,8 
7,7 
Table 16 
Gross domestic expenditure (public and private) on R&D (including 
defence) as a percentage of GDP (1991 data unless indicated) 
EC 
Japan 
USA 
1 Estimated. 
; 1988 figure. 
Source: OECD. Main science and technology 
Total 
1,99 
3,04 
2,78 
indicators (1993). 
Civil1 
1,8 
2,82 
2,1 
1 Projected. 
Source: Eurostat. The Community budget: the facts and figures. 
planning and the removal of technical incompatibilities, as 
well as the construction of 'missing links', usually in border 
regions. A number of factors render it difficult to agree upon 
a common infrastructure policy, namely the presence of 
strong regional and social objectives with infrastructure pro-
vision, the close link that sometimes exists between network 
provision and service provision (e.g. telecommunications), 
and the moves in some Member States towards privatizing 
some infrastructures. 
The presence of distribution as well as efficiency consider-
ations with respect to infrastructure provision is reflected 
in current EC involvement. At present, EC public finance 
contributes to the development of infrastructure (telecom-
munications, transport and energy networks) through a 
number instruments: grants from the Structural Funds (and 
from the Cohesion Fund as of 1993), EIB loans, and (since 
1990) subsidies in support of the so-called trans-European 
networks (TENs). 
Table 17 
Percentage distribution of R&D expenditure by source of financing and sector of performance, 1990 
EC 
Japan 
USA 
Public 
41,2 
18,0 
47,1 
By source 
Private 
51,7 
73,1 
50,6 
of financing 
1 Note that total does not add up to 100% due to additional 
Source: OECD, Main science and technology indicators. 
Total1 
92,9 
91,1 
97,7 
sources of Financing 
% of public 
financing 
spent on 
defence 
23,8 
5,4 
62,6 
Higher 
education 
16,5 
17,6 
16,0 
By 
Government 
17,4 
7,5 
11,0 
sector of performance 
Enterprises 
64,5 
70,9 
69,9 
Non-profit 
organizations 
1,6 
4,1 
3,1 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
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Following the 1990 Dublin Summit, ECU 328 million, 
spread over three years, was earmarked for support in the 
framework of the trans-European network initiative to a 
first list of transport network projects where clear cross-
frontier gaps exist.1 Article 129 of the Maastricht Treaty 
formally recognizes the EC's role with respect to the TENs, 
and spending is likely to increase (to at least ECU 1 billion 
per annum) in line with the Delors II package. 
Investment in infrastructure, in particular as regards trans-
port, is the most important spending item of the Structural 
Funds, and indeed is the largest source of EC spending on 
infrastructure. Such spending will increase in coming years 
with the commitment to increase transfers from the Struc-
tural Funds to Objective 1 regions. Furthermore, the Co-
hesion Fund will allocate ECU 15,15 billion for spending on 
transport infrastructures and environmental projects be-
tween 1993 and 1999 to the four cohesion countries (Spain, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal). None the less, the infrastruc-
ture endowment gap between core and lagging regions is so 
great that even these increased levels of transfers will not 
eliminate such differences except over the very long term. 
Financing infrastructure networks is also the EIB's principal 
field of activity, lending more than ECU 12 billion in 1992 
to this end.2 The role of loans as supranational financial 
instruments in EMU will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
The federal governments of several federations finance infra-
structures of national interest through specific-purpose 
grants to sub-central governments. Nevertheless, several 
considerations suggest that Community aid to underpin in-
frastructure projects outside regions eligible under the Struc-
tural Funds need not undergo a steep rise. First, as already 
noted in Section 4.1.1, an increasing share of infrastructure 
is provided by private sector utilities whose investments are 
recouped by user fees. A case in point is the Channel tunnel 
which despite the size of the undertaking will be realized 
without public grants. Second, the Community interest in 
principle is confined to the cross-border sections of the 
networks, and thus fall under the scope of the TENs initia-
tive. Finally, although their scale may be hard to determine 
precisely, the country-incidence of spill-overs should be rela-
tively straightforward to ascertain, which should facilitate 
the reaching of agreements among the interested Member 
States without a financial input from the supranational level. 
This list includes the interconnection of high-speed rail networks, Alpine 
transit routes, trans-Pyrenean road links, road links with Ireland, and 
'Scanlink'. 
The large part of Community support occupied by debt finance on 
advantageous terms deriving from the Community institutions' credit-
worthiness, accords with the well-established notion reflected in the 
'golden' rule of public finance that for the sake of fair burden-sharing 
among generations public infrastructure should be funded by borrowing. 
5.1.4. Education 
Much the same can be said about the budgetary implications 
of the Community role in the field of higher education. 
Here the main task is to contribute to the lowering of 
professional and cultural barriers to the movement of human 
capital by promoting cross-border mobility of students and 
teaching staff, cooperation between universities, and the 
learning of foreign languages. Already, EC measures have 
been taken laying down minimum requirements permitting 
the mutual recognition of diplomas and other professional 
qualifications. But it is also economically justifiable for the 
Community to bear the specific costs of mobility. 
The Community currently spends some ECU 150 million 
per year on higher education by means of the Erasmus, 
Comett, and Lingua programmes.3 The most important in 
budgetary terms is Erasmus, which has proved a remarkable 
success testifying to the vivid mutual interest of the Com-
munity's young intellectual elite. It confers mobility grants to 
4% of the EC's student population, but looks underfunded if 
the aim is to cover a larger share of mobility costs than at 
present and to reach a 10% level of beneficiaries, a level 
often put forward as some sort of critical threshold to 
engender a palpable 'Europeanization' of national academic 
curricula. 
These observations would suggest that another ECU 500 
million per annum or thereabout, in 1991 prices, should be 
enough to cater for the Community's financial needs to 
foster the cross-border dimension of higher education in the 
period under consideration. 
5.1.5. Financing CAP reform 
The CAP is the Community's largest budgetary item, still 
absorbing nearly 60% of total annual expenditure. Since its 
inception in the early 1960s, its emphasis has gradually come 
to lie overwhelmingly on 'ensuring a fair standard of living 
for farmers' (pursuant to Article 39 EEC). The CAP has 
essentially become an instrument providing assistance to a 
declining sector. 
Like in many other developed economies in the past, this 
assistance has until now primarily taken the form of price 
support, as distinct from direct income support unrelated to 
production. 
Erasmus fosters the mobility of students in the Community and greater 
cooperation between universities. Comett supports the cooperation be-
tween universities and industry regarding advanced technology training. 
Lingua is designed to improve foreign language training and teaching. 
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Although it displays a number of attractive features from a 
management point of view, price support has a more damag-
ing impact on economic welfare than direct income assist-
ance because it induces larger resource allocation distortions 
on account of the fact that it influences the consumption 
side as well.1 As set out in Munk (1993), this negative welfare 
effect will grow worse, inter alia as the economy becomes a 
net exporter and the price elasticity of farmers' supply grows 
higher. Besides, as it is linked to production, the income 
transfer arising from the CAP is inequitably spread, with 
the largest farms absorbing the lion's share of transfers: 
roughly 20% of farmers obtain about 80% of support. 
However, for a given level of help to the agricultural sector, 
the visible budgetary cost of a price support scheme, even 
including storage expenses and export subsidies, will be 
smaller than direct income assistance because price inter-
ventions transfer income chiefly from consumers to pro-
ducers instead of directly from taxpayers. This is well-illus-
trated by the OECD finding that, of the total support re-
ceived in 1990 by the agricultural sector through the CAP, 
only 25% came from taxpayers.2 The remaining 75% was 
borne by consumers. 
The combined effect of rapid increases in agricultural pro-
ductivity (imposing a heavy burden on the environment), the 
low elasticity of demand, and pressure from third countries 
which often possess a comparative advantage over EC farm-
ing, renders the strong reliance on price support increasingly 
untenable.3 For the sake of economic efficiency, inter-
national trade, and the environment, the CAP has to be 
drastically reformed towards direct income assistance, even 
though the political and administrative challenge this raises 
ought not to be underestimated. 
A shift from price to income support would have far-reach-
ing implications for the role of the EC in agriculture. Direct 
assistance would make a 'common' internal policy redundant 
as it is not dependent on border or analogous measures. In 
the short to medium term, direct income support would need 
to come from the Community budget in order to ensure 
the reform's political acceptability in the countries strongly 
benefiting from the CAP at present. Community assistance, 
which evidently would not discriminate on the basis of 
nationality, could be topped up by the Member States them-
selves. However, given the arguments set out in Section 5.2 
below, that the supranational level of government should 
play a limited role in redistribution, Community assistance 
should decline over time, at least in relative terms. 
In the long run, the position of agriculture in the internal 
market should become similar to that of other sectors en-
joying government support such as shipbuilding, 'textiles 
or coal. There, the EC's task, apart from determining the 
common external trade regime and removing market access 
barriers, is basically confined to imposing boundaries on 
national State aids in order to safeguard fair competition. 
As previously remarked, direct income support occasions, 
ceteris paribus, a larger budgetary cost. However, over time 
circumstances will change, in particular because of the age 
profile in the sector which is strongly skewed towards old 
farmers. Moreover, support should grow increasingly tar-
geted with direct income assistance becoming inversely re-
lated to agricultural households' comprehensive income and 
wealth. 
Last year's CAP reform measures centred on a revision of 
the price support scheme through cuts in intervention prices, 
the introduction of new production quotas and the tighten-
ing of existing ones. Nevertheless, they also make a bold 
attempt to widen the role of direct income support linked 
to 'set-aside' programmes which leave fields uncultivated, 
or to specific environment-friendly uses of the land. They 
therefore constitute a first step in the recommended direction 
of reform, paving the way for further initiatives. The latter 
will no doubt need to be forthcoming should the Uruguay 
Round negotiations be successfully concluded in December 
1993. 
The budgetary cost of price support schemes is difficult to 
, predict with a reliable degree of accuracy because it depends 
strongly on volatile, exogenous factors, such as the price 
level on world markets or the dollar/ecu exchange rate. 
Bearing in mind this caveat, and assuming the reform 
measures of 1992 to be fully implemented, the CAP has been 
estimated to cost in 1997 ECU 39 billion at 1992 prices, or 
roughly 25% up in real terms from expenditure in the latter 
year. If this estimate is correct, there is potential for a crisis 
with regard to the CAP in the second half of this decade, 
since the Edinburgh agreement, apart from bringing ad-
ditional expenditure items under the agricultural budget line, 
has foreseen ECU 37 billion only.4·5 
Price support policies are associated with lower administrative costs 
since they do not require controls at the level of the individual farmer. 
This analysis is based on the so-called 'producer subsidy/ consumer 
subsidy equivalents'. See OECD (1991). 
In addition, as argued in Chapter 11, the accession of Eastern European 
countries to the EC would cause agricultural spending to soar under 
current CAP rules. 
The likelihood of overruns for the agricultural budget raises an im-
portant question of budgetary discipline and the adequacy of existing 
rules to this effect. See Section 10.1. 
The underlying assumptions as regards economic growth rates, ex-
change-rate movements and coverage of the eastern Länder differ be-
tween the two estimates, such that the divergence is not as great as 
appears at first sight. In any event, the European Council has agreed 
to provide extra financial resources for the CAP as a result of exchange-
rate turbulence and to cover unforeseen expenditure resulting from CAP 
reform. 
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The view of this report is that by gradually decreasing the 
role of the Community relative to the Member States 
through more focused assistance measures, and by virtue of 
the greying of the farming population, it should be possible 
to proceed with a more pronounced switch to direct income 
support with a broadly constant real volume of CAP spend-
ing. Assuming GDP will grow at 2,5% per annum, this 
should enable the weight of CAP spending in terms of 
Community GDP to be brought down to 0,4 to 0,5% in 
2000 and the following years, compared to the 0,6% share 
in 1999 allowed for in the Edinburgh agreement. 
5.2. The future size and functioning of the 
Structural Funds 
It was stated in Section 4.3 that, although the relative ignor-
ance about the determinants of long-term growth call for 
caution, a slide of the real economic performance of the 
lagging Member States compared to the rest of the Com-
munity purely as a consequence of the establishment of 
EMU appears rather unlikely. From an economic point of 
view, there cannot be an automatic linkage between EMU 
and the size of transfers, the more so if they become macro-
economically important, since they would then carry the risk 
of inducing dependency. 
A case can be made for stepping up the degree of redistri-
bution between Member States for the sake of a better 
political balance in the deepening of the Community's inte-
gration process. However, so long as the objectives of social 
union are not more clearly defined and agreed and national 
public spending and taxing powers are not much more 
constrained than currently is likely, the Community ought 
not to get seriously involved in unconditional fiscal equaliza-
tion schemes, let alone systems of cross-frontier interper-
sonal redistribution. As a corollary, the reinforcement of 
solidarity should preferably be manifested through an in-
crease of the budget line for structural operations. 
All the same, for the EC Structural Funds to contribute 
better than at present to the aim of cohesion, expanding their 
size may not be sufficient. An overhaul of their functioning is 
equally necessary. If not, the Structural Funds, which are 
meant as conditional specific-purpose grants, risk remaining 
what they have largely been hitherto: a set of disguised block 
grants, which on account of the rather complex nature of 
implementation procedures may not always have produced 
an efficient outcome. 
The Edinburgh provisions and the reform of the Structural 
Funds adopted in 1993 already go some way in the right 
direction, e.g. with regard to a higher regional concentration 
of support and a stronger emphasis on ex ante evaluation. 
But further improvements are needed and possible, centring 
on a shift from input to performance conditionality, includ-
ing the deployment of economic measures that are not di-
rectly related to the Structural Fund programmes proper. 
5.2.1. Present characteristics and redistributive effect 
In accordance with the Brussels budgetary agreement of 
1988, the Structural Funds, consisting of the European Re-
gional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and 
the Guidance Section of the EAGGF, were doubled in real 
terms and will attain ECU 20,5 billion, i.e. around 0,3% of 
GDP or between 25 and 30% of the budget in 1993. More-
over, pursuant to the cohesion protocol in the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Cohesion Fund has come on stream in 1993 
with a budget of ECU 1,5 billion, such that, on the whole, 
structural outlays currently claim one third of the budget. 
Following the Edinburgh agreement, this share is due to 
increase further to between 35 and 40% by 1999, being 
equivalent to almost half a per cent of EC GDP on present 
forecasts. 
The reforms of 1988 and 1993 
As a consequence of the Single European Act, the Structural 
Funds also were reformed so as to enhance their effectiveness 
in the realization of five broadly defined objectives, whose 
budgetary weight is laid out in Table 18. Three of the 
objectives have a regional profile, the other two being geared 
to the labour market. The regions of Objective 1 are charac-
terized by a purchasing power per capita below 75% of the 
Community average and currently comprise about 21% of 
the EC population.' In the 1989-93 period they will have 
received over 60% of Structural Fund outlays. Aid to Objec-
tive 2 regions, areas confronted with industrial reconversion 
problems and covering another 16% of the population scat-
tered over all Member States,2 represents 10% of Structural 
Funds spending, as does support to agricultural and rural 
areas. Efforts in favour of the long-term unemployed and 
the insertion of youngsters in the labour market account for 
another 10%. 
The main operational novelty of the 1988 reform has been 
the introduction of the so-called Community support frame-
works, elaborated on the basis of recipients' development 
The Objective 1 zone is currently formed by the whole of Ireland, Greece 
and Portugal, large parts of the Spanish south and north-west as well 
as the Canary Islands, the Mezzogiorno, the French overseas depart-
ments and Corsica, and Northern Ireland. It will undergo some minor 
changes for the period 1994-99. 
Except, of course, the three Member States that fall in their entirety 
under Objective 1. 
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programmes. These frameworks reflect a 'partnership' ap-
proach attempting to incorporate Community, national and 
regional initiatives. In addition, they provide for a multi-
annual planning of expenditure, thereby assuring Member 
States of the stability and predictability of EC interventions. 
The changes introduced in 1993 with regard to the Funds' 
modus operandi for the period 1994-99 are relatively minor. 
The debate on them was overshadowed by Member States' 
discussions with the Commission to secure themselves a 'fair' 
share of the ECU 155 billion to be transferred through 
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund during that 
period. ' Apart from providing for some managerial improve-
ments and simplification in the decision-making procedures 
on development plans and operational programmes, as well 
as stressing the need for a better ex ante and ex post appraisal 
of structural interventions, the new regulations merge the 
former Objectives 3 and 4 and create a new Objective 4 
aimed at facilitating the adjustment of workers to industrial 
change and the evolution of production systems. 
Table 18 
Structural Funds breakdown by Objective 
Objective1 
Objective 1 
Objective 2 
Objectives 3 and 4 
Objective 5 
Other 
Total 
1989-93 
(billion ECU 
at 1988 
prices) 
37,0 
6,4 
7,2 
6,0 
1,7 
58,3 
% 
63 
11 
12 
10 
3 
100 
1994-99 
(billion ECU 
at 1993 
prices) 
96 
45 
141 
% 
68 
32 
100 
1 Objectives under the 1989 reform: 
1 Promotion of development and structural adjustment in less developed regions, defined 
as those with a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the Community average. 
2 Rehabilitation of regions affected by industrial decline, defined as regions with above 
average unemployment plus industrial employment which is above average but declining. 
3 Reduction of long-term unemployment. 
4 Occupational integration of the young. 
Sa Speed-up of agricultural adjustment. 
5b Promotion of rural development. 
Under the 1993 reform the existing Objectives 3 and 4 are amalgamated and a new Objective 
4 is created for the adjustment of workers to industrial change. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1989b), conclusions of Edinburgh Summit 
and own calculations. 
Unlike most federations where the distribution of grants to recipient 
regions is a function of predetermined and objectively applicable for-
mulas, the Commission has some room for manoeuvre with regard to 
the indicative breakdown by country of Structural Fund commitments. 
More specifically, the Council Regulation mentions the variables to be 
taken into account, but their eventual relative weight is largely at the 
discretion of the Commission. 
Economic attributes 
The current shape of the Structural Funds displays several 
salient features. First, the degree of concentration is not very 
pronounced, as can be inferred from Table 19, with the 
four lagging Member States obtaining only around 52% of 
transfers.2 However, by virtue of the Edinburgh agreement, 
and more specifically the decision to double aid to the four 
cohesion countries, this degree is due to rise by 1999 to 
nearly 60%. 
Second, the Funds intervene by way of matching grants 
which, given the predetermined ceilings in the EC budget's 
financial perspectives, are of a closed kind. As will be set 
out in Section 5.2.3, the lack of open-endedness of matching 
grants may pose so-called additionality problems. The pro-
portion of financing depends on the type of investment and 
whether the beneficiary is the local government or a private 
enterprise. Support to the private sector, taking primarily 
the form of direct investment aid or the improvement of the 
financial conditions of starting firms and the self-employed, 
accounts for respectively 15 and 35% of interventions in 
favour of Objective 1 and 2 regions. 
Third, Funds' interventions are to a very large extent subject 
to national quotas by objective, with indicative allocations 
adopted by the Commission in 1989 and again in 1993 for the 
period 1994-99. The captive nature of the money available is 
liable to weaken the eligible regions' efforts to act in con-
formity with the specific purposes of Structural Fund inter-
ventions. 
Fourth, conditions attached to Structural Fund inter-
ventions are microeconomic. They have broadened following 
the shift from project to programme support. However, they 
are still exclusively linked to the specific regional develop-
ment plan, and do not concern other microeconomic areas 
or the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Yet, the general 
economic context is crucial for investment in physical and 
human capital to achieve an optimal return. The Cohesion 
Fund, accounting for 7% of total structural expenditure 
in 1993, is distinct in this regard as it will be subject to 
macroeconomic conditionality. The macroeconomic proviso 
relates to the public finance situation of the recipient country 
and stipulates that the Cohesion Fund transfers will cease if 
the Member State in question is found by the Council to 
have an excessive deficit and has taken insufficient measures 
to eliminate the latter within a specified period. 
The limited redistributive focus until now is largely explained by the 
regional, as distinct from the national, approach of the Funds, in 
conjunction with the political strategy to secure sufficient support in the 
Council by serving all Member States. 
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Table 19 
Member States' receipts from the Structural Funds under the 
Community support framework 1989-93, and relative prosperity levels 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 
Percentage 
distribution 
of financial 
allocations 
1,4 
0,6 
5,4 
11,7 
22,5 
10,6 
6,4 
17,5 
0,1 
1,3 
12,3 
10,25 
100,0 
Percentage 
share 
in EC 
population 
3,0 
1,6 
19,4 
3,1 
11,9 
17,2 
1,1 
17,6 
0,1 
4,6 
1,4 
17,5 
— 
GDP per 
capita 
expressed 
in PPS. 
1990 data 
102,8 
105,1 
112,4 
53,4 
76,7 
108,5 
68,8 
104,0 
124,2 
103,8 
56,2 
105,4 
100,0 
Source: Commission: Annual report on the implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds; 
Commission statistics. 
Redistributive effect 
Explicit grants form only part of the redistributive dimension 
of intergovernmental financial relations and may convey a 
misleading picture when looked at in isolation.1 Bearing this 
caveat in mind, it is none the less useful to shed light on the 
redistributive effect of the Structural Funds once their re-
form and doubling will have been fully implemented, and 
compare this effect to that generated by the German 'Finan-
zausgleich', which is often referred to as a model for the 
Community's future pattern of solidarity, or to the wider 
set of interregional equalization mechanisms in Germany 
involving the Finanzausgleich, the regional bias in the shar-
ing of VAT proceeds among Länder, the 'Ergänzungszuwei-
sungen' (vertical general purpose grants) and the 'Struktur-
hilfen' (vertical specific purpose grants for infrastructure). 
Concentrating on the five principal recipient Länder and 
Member States, Table 20, based on calculations in Costello 
(1993c) presents the results of this comparison. The German 
data relate to 1990 and thus concern the former Federal 
Republic; obviously, the picture deriving from Table 20 is 
likely to undergo drastic changes in the wake of unification. 
If one considers the four explicit interregional mechanisms 
combined — the last two columns for Germany — net 
transfers as a percentage of GDP of the beneficiary Länder 
are quite similar to those measured for the Community 
through the Structural Funds: the four poorest Länder ob-
tain between 0,83 and 2,92%, whereas their counterparts 
among the Member States enjoy a transfer ranging from 
0,46 to 2,81%. However, the difference between the Com-
munity and Germany is striking in terms of the redistributive 
effect, i.e. the percentage by which the initial per capita 
income disparity of poorer regions relative to the average 
level is reduced.2 This is attributable to the strongly divergent 
scale of regions' primary income differentials. The relative 
homogeneity of income per capita in Germany implies that 
much larger redistributive effects can be realized with basi-
cally the same interregional flows in terms of GDP. Whereas 
the reduction of income disparities benefiting the four lag-
ging Member States lies between 1,89 and 5,29%, corre-
sponding figures for Germany amount to 6,03 and 16,79%. 
5.2.2. Yardsticks for the further growth of the 
Structural Funds 
The decision to double the real volume of the Structural 
Funds for the period 1989-93 in parallel with the completion 
of the internal market was the outcome of an intense political 
negotiation process. By the same token, the accord to in-
crease the overall budgetary means for structural operations 
by another 51% in real terms between what was agreed in 
1989 to be the level for 1993 and the figure for 1999, was 
also the result of 'North-South' bargaining between the 
Member States. This bargaining is quite legitimate as the 
shape and size of cross-border redistribution mirrors the 
degree of political and social unity within the Community. 
By assessing the budgetary implications of the pursuit of 
predetermined, quantified, cohesion policy objectives, nor-
mative orders of magnitude can be advanced that allow an 
empirically meaningful light to be shed on this inherently 
political question. In what follows, two alternative routes 
will be briefly explored. Given that the Community has not 
yet fixed its cohesion policy objectives in a precise manner, 
the results obtained from them serve only an illustrative 
purpose. 
The overall redistributive effect of EC public finance is, aside from the 
Structural Funds, determined essentially by the country incidence of 
the CAP and VAT. As far as Germany is concerned, the powerful 
redistributive impact of federally based personal income taxes and the 
social security system ought not to be overlooked. 
The redistributive power of transfers is strongly influenced by the 
degree of initial income disparities. If, for example, per capita income is 
increased from 98 to 99%, the redistributive effect equals 50% (100 * 
( 2 - l)/2); in contrast, the redistributive effect of a transfer raising per 
capita income by one percentage point from 50 to 51 % is a mere 2%. 
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Table 20 
Net redistribution impact of explicit interregional flows in Germany' and the European Community2 
Bremen 
Niedersachsen 
Rheinland Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig Holstein 
GDP per 
capita in 
terms of 
national 
average 
125,7 
83,9 
88,0 
85,2 
82,7 
Net 
receipts 
as a % of 
GDP ' 
1,96 
0,82 
0,39 
1,05 
0,73 
Finanz-
ausgleicl 
Germany 
1 
Rcdis-
tributive 
effect4 
-9,60 
4,25 
2,85 
6,01 
3,33 
All explicit 
interregional 
mechanisms 
Net 
receipts 
as a % of 
GDP5 
2,63 
1,77 
0,83 
2,92 
1,71 
Rcdis-
tributive 
eiTect4 
-12,89 
9,20 
6,03 
16,79 
7,75 
Greece 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
European 
GDP per 
capita in 
terms of 
EC average 
52,2 
80,5 
69,0 
104,0 
57,1 
Community 
Net receipts 
as a % 
of GDP ' 
2,81 
0,46 
2,38 
0,00 
2,72 
Redistri-
butivc 
effect4 
3,06 
1,89 
5,29 
0,07 
3,62 
German data relate to 1990. 
EC data are forecast for 1992. 
Net receipts are Structural Funds' disbursements minus beneficiaries' contributions to the financing of the redistribulivc flows. 
The redistributive effect measures the percentage by which initial income disparities are reduced. 
'Top-down ' approach 
The first, already employed in the Padoa-Schioppa report 
and, more recently, in Begg and Mayes (1991), draws on a 
very simple growth model and considers how much ad­
ditional investment in the lagging countries/regions is re­
quired to generate the extra growth necessary to close part 
of the real income gap with the Community average over a 
certain number of years.' The underlying computational 
method offers an interesting and simple perspective on long-
term growth, but it should be remarked that it is obviously 
much too crude to shed any light on the weight of infrastruc­
ture or human capital relative to directly productive equip­
ment, or on the share of the public relative to the private 
sector, or on the distribution between foreign and domestic 
capital, in the required increase in investment. 
Focusing on the four countries whose real income per capita 
trails behind the Community average by a wide margin, 
Table 21 indicates by how much annual gross investment 
needs to rise in 1991 prices for Greece and Portugal to reach, 
in 20 years' time, 75% of the Community average, Ireland 
80% and Spain 85%, it being assumed that EC GDP grows 
by 2,5% per annum.2 According to this simple growth 
model, the Greek economy, for example, has to expand by 
1,8% per annum in excess of the Community as a whole to 
attain the 75% goal by 2011. Depending on the height of 
the country-specific marginal efficiency of investment, which 
in the Greek case was taken to lie between 0,15 and 0,25, 
the investment ratio needs to go up by between 7 and 12 
points, translating into a requisite ECU 9 to 15 billion in­
crease of annual gross capital formation at 1991 prices. 
Padoa-Schioppa report. Annex E. If one posits the link between growth 
and investment to be in the form of the following relation: 
Q/Q = Q/I χ I/Q. 
GDP growth can be broken down in two parts: Q/I, or the marginal 
efficiency of investment; and I/Q, or the ratio of net investment to 
output. This relation, which rests on a number of simplifying assump­
tions relative inter alia to technological progress and capacity utilization, 
establishes a mechanical link between growth and the investment. As­
suming, for example, a marginal efficiency of investment of 0,25, an 
additional 1 % growth in GDP will necessitate a rise in the net investment 
ratio of 4 points (e.g. from 10 to 14%). Net investment needs were 
converted to gross fixed capital formation requirements on the basis of 
the relationship in the recent past between net and gross investment. 
These 'top down' calculations suggest that in order to achi­
eve the just mentioned catch-up objectives for the four 
countries under consideration, a supplementary yearly capi­
tal injection of around ECU 30 to 40 billion is called for. 
Obviously, the latter need is lessened if by virtue of, for 
In this computation both the slightly faster than average population 
growth in the less developed Member States and the likely worsening 
of the PPS exchange rate ow'ng to the rise of the price of non-traded 
relative to traded goods have been ignored. 
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example, policies to improve labour skills or microeconomic 
measures toward a better allocation of resources, govern-
ments succeed in raising the marginal efficiency of invest-
ment. At any rate, this numerical exercise points to the 
challenging task ahead, especially for the three poorest Mem-
ber States, to augment considerably their investment efforts 
if they are to stand any real chance of catching up. EMU 
should facilitate this task by loosening the link between 
domestic savings and investment with the disappearance of 
the explicit balance-of-payments constraint. Viewed from 
this angle, the lagging Member States have every interest in 
attempting to become full participants in the monetary union 
as soon as possible, despite the fact that the right to entry 
into the final stage has been made conditional on satisfactory 
'convergence' performance, especially with respect to in-
flation and government deficits, the achievement of which 
may entail some transitory deflationary problems subduing 
growth. 
In any event, the Structural Funds could make a vital contri-
bution to intensifying investment efforts, in particular as far 
as the public sector component is concerned, which the other 
approach takes a closer look at. 
Table 21 
Gross capital formation requirements for partial catch-up between 1991 and 2011 
Greece: from 53 to 75% 
Portugal: from 57 to 75% 
Ireland: from 69 to 80% 
Spain: from 79 to 85% 
Total 
Requisite growth 
excédent relative 
to Community average (%) 
1,8 
1,4 
0,76 
0,38 
Required increase 
of net investment ratio 
7,2 to 12,0 
5,6 to 8,3 
3,0 to 5,2 
1,5 
Increase in annual gross capital 
formation (billion ECU, 
1991 prices) 
9,1 to 15,0 
6,2 to 9,0 
1,9 to 3,2 
12,9 
29,7 to 40,0 
'Bottom-up ' approach 
A second path to come to economically sensible orders of 
magnitude for the further expansion of the Structural Funds 
is through a 'bottom-up' approach quantifying public invest-
ment requirements in the Community's backward areas to 
endow them with an infrastructure similar to that in the 
EC's most developed regions. There is a growing economic 
literature highlighting the link between public investment on 
infrastructure and the rate of economic growth.' 
Several expert reports, reviewed in Costello (1993b), have 
been written on various aspects of the infrastructure gap 
separating the lagging regions from the rest of the Com-
munity. In principle, the analysis ought to encompass the 
former GDR as well, on account of the high degree of 
obsolescence of the latter's infrastructure: however, the lack 
of comparable data precludes this. The studies only provide 
a rough, mechanical quantification of the volume of public 
investment necessary to bridge that gap. However, they do 
not offer an economic analysis of investment needs, which 
arguably would lead to lower estimates.2 
An early study on the infrastructure endowment gap in the 
Community was undertaken by Biehl (1986),3 and concluded 
that, even allowing for differences in population densities, 
transport infrastructure in lagging regions was only 50 to 
55% of the level in the rest of the Community. A more 
recent study carried out for the Directorate-General for 
Regional Policies estimated that telecommunications infra-
structures in Objective 1 regions will lag by ECU 40 billion 
For example Winston Clifford (1991), 'Efficient transportation infra-
structure policy'. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No 1, 
winter 1991. 
There is no economic justification for having identical levels of infra-
structure in all regions. The decision to invest in infrastructure should 
depend upon the net present value of expected returns. As this value 
will almost certainly lie higher in 'core' regions, one would therefore 
expect a higher level of investment endowment. 
Biehl D (1986), Study on infrastructure endowment, infrastructure finan-
cing and regional development, study carried out for DG XVI of the 
European Commission. 
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behind the rest of the Community by 1994.' A further study 
examined the investment required in Objective 1 regions 
on environmental infrastructures if EC and international 
environment standards are to be respected. According to 
this report, Objective 1 regions will need to invest some 
ECU 18.5 billion over the period 1993 to 2005 to fulfil 
commitments with respect to urban water waste, industrial 
water waste, urban solid waste and industrial solid waste. 
Other studies also indicate a substantial infrastructure en-
dowment gap between Objective 1 regions and the rest of 
the Community with respect to energy and education infra-
structures. 
The consequences of this observed scale of the infrastructure 
endowment gap between lagging and core regions for annual 
Community structural expenditure to the benefit of Objec-
tive 1 regions should depend, first, on the desired time-frame 
to bridge the gap. A gradual approach may be advisable to 
avert serious absorption capacity problems, which would 
conflict with nominal convergence aims. A second factor is 
the intensity of support. In line with the arguments set out 
in Section 5.1, the Community's participation rate would 
clearly be higher for human resource development and trans-
port than for energy or telecommunications where invest-
ment can be more easily recuperated through user charges. 
5.2.3. Additionally and functional improvements 
Apart from assuring a better coherence and predictability 
by means of the Community support frameworks, a second 
major aim of the 1988 reform was to reinforce the real impact 
of Community grants on national and regional spending on 
public investment or training, i.e. to improve the Funds' 
additionality. 
An intergovernmental grant that is meant to promote spend-
ing on specific purposes is additional if the grantee would 
not have made the expenditure in the absence of the grant. 
If not, it will have basically the same effect as a general-
purpose grant and merely bolster the recipient government's 
revenue. Such transfers fulfil a redistributive function but 
the resource allocation role is lost. As discussed in Spahn 
(1993a) and Costello (1993a), economic theory states that the 
best, though not foolproof, manner to ensure additionality is 
by way of conditional matching grants with variable rates 
for different jurisdictions, because by lowering the marginal 
price of the favoured goods they induce a substitution effect 
on top of the income effect.2 However, the achievement of 
additionality is virtually impossible to ascertain in practice 
as it is bound to rest on a counterfactual reasoning. 
The additionality principle was given an operational content 
in the 1993 revision of the 1988 regulations, stipulating that 
Structural Funds may not replace public expenditure on 
structural or comparable expenditure undertaken by a Mem-
ber State.3 More specifically, a Member State is held in 
principle to maintain its expenditure at least at the same 
level as in the previous programming period, i.e. 1989-93. 
Operational pitfalls of additionality objective 
Despite this provision, there exist several reasons why the 
Structural Funds in their present shape are unlikely to gener-
ate much additionality. First, the shift from project to pro-
gramme support inspired by well-founded managerial con-
siderations and concerns about the coherence of Fund inter-
ventions, in conjunction with the wish to avert regional 
absorption capacity problems or sectoral overheating, have 
led to rather broad definitions of eligible support. Together 
with the closed-ended nature of the Funds, this tends to 
render assistance rather easily fungible with other types of 
spending. This holds in particular when EC aid is relatively 
minor compared to national budgetary outlays on the sup-
ported items. 
Second, notwithstanding the ultimate regional destination, 
Structural Funds are transferred through the national 
governments which may wish to substitute EC money for 
their own grants to regional authorities, at least as far as 
increments are concerned. 
Third, experience has shown that the ex ante establishment 
of national shares, which is de facto the current practice, 
creates a presumption of automatic entitlements, undermin-
ing strongly the purpose-specificity of grants.4 
If Structural Fund transfers are rather easily fungible, it 
implies not only that they do not have much of an allocative 
1 Ewbank Preece (1991), Telecommunications investment requirements of 
Objective I regions, 1991-2000, study carried out for the EC Commission, 
Directorate-General for Regional Policies. 
It should be noted that matching grants are not necessarily optimal 
from a grantee's point of view. A block grant may permit the attainment 
by the recipient of a higher indifference curve, but then with a smaller 
consumption of the goods favoured by the grantor. Since the interests 
of the higher and lower levels of government may thus conflict, the net 
effect of conditional matching grants in terms of welfare theory is 
indeterminate. 
Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93. 
In addition to these three reasons, additionality is hard to enforce 
operationally. The data for the verification of compliance with ad-
ditionality are submitted by the interested country itself. No sanctions 
have been foreseen, at least not explicitly, in the event of non-respect. 
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role, but also that the use of criteria of regional need may 
cause an improper distribution of funds. ' For instance, inas-
much as aid to the Mezzogiorno is fungible, it benefits the 
whole of Italy, whose GDP per capita exceeds that of the 
Community average. As a corollary, a case could be made 
for taking into account as well the overall national position 
in setting eligibility norms, in lieu of regional backwardness 
only. 
Recommendations for further reform 
The Edinburgh decisions, along with the 1993 revision of 
the Structural Fund regulations, have addressed a number 
of weaknesses in the Funds' past functioning. Support will 
be more concentrated on the poorest Member States. The 
rules with regard to national programming have been made 
more flexible and, as a counterpart to this greater national 
autonomy, the role of ex ante appraisal and ex post evalu-
ation of Community assistance has been strengthened. Qual-
ity control, preferably by independent expert bodies that use 
scientifically sound methodologies for programme assess-
ment form an indispensable building-block for enhancing 
the effectiveness of cohesion efforts. Yet, essential as it is, it 
will also be a major challenge in that hitherto the absorption 
of favourable Structural Fund support was often considered 
a sufficient indicator of success. 
Two supplementary recommendations for improving the 
Structural Funds' modus operandi follow from our earlier 
analysis. 
First, as securing project-related or programme-related ad-
ditionality turns out elusive, it would seem appropriate to 
subject transfers to broader micro- or macroeconomic con-
ditions, at least with regard to those countries whose revenue 
from the Structural Funds is significant relative to national 
GDP. Such conditions could include measures to promote 
greater goods and factor market flexibility, tax reform, or 
changes in the conduct of budgetary policy. Cast in more 
general wording, the Funds should become more perform-
ance-related rather than expenditure-related.2 
Secondly, and complementary to the latter proposal, ways 
should be found to ensure that the Funds are not fully 
exhausted by national quota allocations, such that there are 
positive incentives for potential beneficiaries to compete on 
the basis of the merits of submitted programmes, or on the 
basis of efforts to keep their macroeconomic house in order. 
Evaluation of programmes is rather pointless if it is incon-
sequential. 
5.3. Aid to third countries 
The recommendations formulated so far on the budgetary 
consequences of 'economic union' policies amount largely 
to incremental changes. In contrast, the case for assigning a 
more important role to the Community level of government, 
argued in Section 4.1.1, along with the widely felt need — 
partly based on economic self-interest — for the Twelve to 
step up their assistance to the rest of the world, militate in 
favour of a quantum jump in the external tier of Community 
expenditure. A strong expansion of the foreign aid envelope 
would permit the Community to grow into a key donor on 
the world scene, which would be instrumental in shaping the 
nascent common foreign policy, the legal basis of which will 
be reinforced with the Treaty on European Union. 
As can be seen from Table 22, Community aid to third 
countries equals some ECU 6 billion in 1993 or 0,18% of 
EC GDP. It consists of outlays contained in the EC budget 
proper and of the European Development Fund, which is 
fed through direct national contributions and serves to fin-
ance the EC's commitment in the framework of the Lomé 
Conventions with the ACP countries.3 
Table 22 
EC aid to third countries in 1993 (grant commitments) 
1. EC budget intervention 
of which to LDCs 
of which to Eastern Europe 
and ex-Soviet Union 
2. Reserves 
3. EDF 
1+2 + 3 
1 Including the former East Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
Million ECU 
4 110 
2 537 
1 573 
209 
1 900 
6 219 
•/.of EC GDP1 
0,120 
0,074 
0,046 
0,006 
0,055 
0,18 
See Gordon (1991), pp. 19 and 20. 
In this context, the link in the framework of the Cohesion Fund between 
Community transfers and recipient Member States' undertakings to 
achieve a better 'convergence' performance with regard to public finance 
in preparation of their accession to the final stage of EMU is to be 
welcomed. 
With the collapse of the communist regimes, a rapidly in-
creasing share of total assistance (currently about 25%) goes 
to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Table 23 
There are no clear economic reasons why the EDF is kept outside the 
ordinary budget; this anomaly should thus be rectified. 
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shows that as far as development cooperation with the 
Third World is concerned, the Community accounts only for 
around 10% of aid by the Twelve. This contrasts with the 
prominent role taken by the Community level of government 
with regard to economic support to the East where the need 
for speedy action and a unified stance, in conjunction with 
the attribution by G7 of the task to coordinate donors' 
initiatives, pushed the Community to the fore. As indicated 
in Table 24, roughly one third of total EC grants to Eastern 
Europe is provided through Community channels. 
Table 23 
National and Community aid to LDCs, 1992 
Million ECU %ofGDPJ 
1. Member States' offical devel-
opment assistance 
2. EC 
1+2 
USA 
Japan 
20 979 
2 529 
22 508 
8 979 
8 589 
0,43 
0,057 
0,48 
0,20 
0,30 
1 Excluding Greece. 
2 Excluding the former East Germany. 
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee. 
Adopting a number of plausible working hypotheses, one 
can map out the budgetary upshot of the desirable larger 
role of the Community in development assistance. 
As regards aid to LDCs, it would appear acceptable to 
assume that over time the Community as a whole would 
respect the UN norm of 0,7% of donors' GDP, given that 
the economic predicament of many Third World countries 
shows little sign of abating. Currently, its efforts, which 
compare favourably to those of the US or Japan, stand at 
0,48% of GDP (see Table 23). If the remaining gap were 
closed by raising the Community's development assistance 
— such that the ratio of supranational to national aid 
evolved from the present one eighth to more than one half 
— the EC budget would have to grow by 0,22% of EC 
GDP, or about ECU 12 billion per annum at 1992 prices. 
Because the situation is not yet sufficiently stable and trans-
parent for a reliable, comprehensive, 'bottom-up' assessment 
of capital needs, a parallel is often drawn in the discussion 
on aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with 
the assistance provided by the USA to Western Europe 
under the Marshall Plan. As it is perceived to have been an 
important catalyst in the process of post-war recovery, the 
latter has positive connotations with Community public 
opinion, which should render an analogous intervention for 
the former communist countries politically more palatable. 
Although one should guard against too simplistic assess-
Table 24 
Distribution of assistance committed to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 
1992 inclusive 
(Million ECU) 
Economic 
restructuring 
assistance 
(projects) 
Macro 
financial 
assistance 
Emergency 
assistance 
Official 
export 
credits 
Off icial 
support for 
private 
investment 
Other Tota l In form of 
grants 
% o f total in 
fo rm o f 
grants 
EC Member States 
total 
EC 
EIB 
ECSC 
Community total 
Japan 
USA 
G24 total 
2 554,45 
1 749,50 
887,00 
25,00 
5 215,95 
786,51 
397,01 
7 354,97 
3 747,08 
2 500,00 
— 
— 
6 247,08 
1 175,08 
2 280,10 
12 381,38 
454,81 
644,80 
— 
— 
1 099,61 
26,19 
364,19 
1 631,98 
5 834,14 
81,00 
— 
— 
5915,14 
543,50 
1 859,23 
10 428,76 
1 373,26 
25,00 
— 
— 
1 398,26 
0,78 
285,87 
1 975,60 
448,32 
25,85 
2 553,00 
1 750,00 
3 202,17 
0 
359,88 
4014,16 
14 412,07 
5 026,15 
3 440,00 
200,00 
23 078,22 
2 532,06 
5 546,28 
37 786,82 
4 635,57 
2 463,65 
— 
— 
7 099,22 
556,26 
3 581,75 
14 146,28 
32,2 
49,0 
0 
0 
30,08 
22,0 
64,6 
37,4 
Source: Commission services. 
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ments of the effect of the Marshall Plan,1 it is useful to 
pursue this parallel in some depth and advance a rough 
estimate of the ensuing budgetary implications.2 
Collins and Rodrik (1991) calculated Marshall-Plan-based 
estimates of aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. The various alternatives they present are reported in 
Table 25. 
Table 25 
Marshall-Plan-based estimates of aid for Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union 
Alternative method 
Real per capita 
adjustment 
2% of recipient 
GDP 
1 % of donor 
(OECD) GNP 
NB: First three columns 
Source: Collins and Rod 
Eastern 
Europe 
(1) 
4,8 
14,0 
refer to billions of dollars 
rik (1991). 
Soviet 
Union 
(2) 
11,9 
34,0 
per year. 
Total 
(3) 
16,7 
48,0 
136,0 
Total over 
whole period 
(4 χ (3)) 
66,8 
192 
544 
to about 1% of the then US GNP. One per cent of the 1989 
GDP of the OECD (G24) amounts to some 136 billion, 
signifying a global envelope of USD 544 billion, according 
to this updating method. 
Whilst the eventual volume of aid from the OECD countries, 
its distribution among donors and its time-spread, will de­
pend on a host of political and economic factors which 
cannot be anticipated fully, the Collins and Rodrik data give 
a fair picture of the potential impact on the EC budget. 
Taking the average of the three alternative methods and 
assuming, on grounds of geographical proximity and cul­
tural kinship, the Community were prepared to put up half 
of the G24 effort, aggregate transfers from the Twelve would 
amount to some ECU 130 billion at 1991 prices. If the 
current distribution of aid to Eastern Europe between the 
Community and the Member States were maintained, an 
assistance 'stock' of nearly 100 billion would need to be 
dispensed through the Community budget. Given that the 
deployment of a functioning market economy is proving 
more complex and time-consuming than expected, it would 
appear advisable to spread the Community's 'Marshall aid' 
over a longer period, perhaps extending to a decade. 
Under those assumptions, aid to Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union would occasion another ECU 10 billion 
per annum growth (0,2% of GDP) of the EC budget. 
The Marshall Plan transferred over a four-year period (1948-
51) USD 12,4 billion to 16 Western European countries, 
mostly in the form of grants. There are several possible ways 
to update this transfer to the current situation. The first 
listed, translating into USD 66,8 billion at 1989 prices, en­
sures the constancy of real per capita support. The other 
two methods relate to GNP as the basis for scaling. The 
Marshall Plan transfer amounted to around 2% of the 
recipient countries' combined GNP per annum over the 
four years. Collins and Rodrik 'guestimate' 2% of Eastern 
European and former Soviet GNP to equal USD 48 billion. 
Finally, the annual average of the transfer was equivalent 
5.4. Summary picture of global budgetary 
implications 
This chapter has sought to offer a rough quantitative ap­
praisal of the budgetary impact which the desirable develop­
ment of supranational competences in the perspective of 
EMU and the EC's strengthened external role is liable to 
entail. By way of conclusion, the various expenditure catego­
ries that have been reviewed are assembled in Table 26 so 
as to arrive at a picture of the appropriate total size of the 
EC budget at the start of the following century. 
The actual role the Marshall Plan played in reviving economic growth 
is not clear: see Eichengreen and Uzan (1992). Moreover, the aid was 
not tied to investment, but served primarily to meet the 'dollar shortage' 
problem and facilitate external debt redemption. 
The launching of a Marshall-type plan could go hand in hand with the 
setting up of a 'payments union' among the beneficiary countries to 
stimulate trade. 
As most of the underlying estimates are approximate, the 
magnitude of some budgetary items is as much, if not more, 
governed by political as by economic considerations, and 
the long-term growth rate of the denominator, EC GDP, is 
hard to predict, this table must obviously be seen as indica­
tive, which explains why in some cases ranges are employed. 
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Table 26 
Desirable aggregate volume of EC expenditure in the fields of allocation and redistribution at start of the final stage of EMU' 
Expenditure categories Indicative % % share % share in 1992 
of EC GDP budget2 
CAP 0,4-0,5 26 56 
R&D, environment, trans-European networks 0,15-0,2 11 5 
Structural Funds (including Cohesion Fund) 0,4-0,5 26 27 
Aid to LDCs (including EDF) 0,3 \ 30 6 
Aid to Eastern and Central Europe 0,2-0,25 1 
Other 0,1 6 6 
Total 1,55-1,9 100 100 
1 On present outlook. 1999 and thereafter. 
2 Figures differ from those given in Table 3 because of inclusion of the European Development Fund. 
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Chapter 6 
Stabilization support 
It was argued in Section 4.2 that the move from a narrow 
band 'EMS + 1992' to EMU will not modify profoundly, 
at least not de facto, individual Member States' capacity to 
conduct stabilization policies with a view to offsetting minor 
deviations from trend output and employment growth. This 
ought not, however, to be interpreted as meaning that Mem-
ber States should be left entirely to their own devices in 
adjusting to shocks. More specifically, it was argued that in 
the face of serious, country-specific, negative disturbances, 
a Community assistance instrument should be created to 
compensate for the loss of the exchange-rate realignment 
possibility. 
The traditional 'automatic stabilizers' in mature federations 
and unitary countries were judged inappropriate as a model 
for the Community on a number of grounds. First, they 
are rather inefficient in that the stabilization impact they 
engender is the outcome of massive financial flows through 
the central tax and social security systems, typically involving 
tens of percents of GDP. Second, their prime objective is 
to provide for interpersonal, hence interregional, income 
redistribution, and not to ensure regional stabilization sup-
port. Finally, the operation of a Community-wide social 
security system, or parts thereof, such as a European unem-
ployment scheme, would face tremendous microeconomic 
and managerial difficulties. It was therefore concluded that 
in seeking to assist Member States in their efforts to stabilize 
their economy upon the advent of shocks, the Community 
should tread new paths and devise a mutual insurance instru-
ment generating country-specific stabilization in an efficient 
and thereby inexpensive way. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore in some depth a 
practical proposal for such a mutual insurance scheme and 
its costs, based mainly on Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993), 
which takes the previous decade as a benchmark. In order to 
keep in mind the correct theoretical perspective, the desirable 
properties of a stabilization instrument are recapitulated 
first. 
6.1. Normative characteristics of a regional 
stabilization instrument 
As pointed out in Goodhart and Smith ( 1993), for a stabiliza-
tion instrument to be pure and effective, it needs to respect 
the following three general principles: 
(i) The instrument should be triggered following changes 
in economic activity but its intervention should be 
halted as soon as no further changes occur, irrespective 
of the level at which the economy has again become 
stable. Otherwise, the instrument would perform not 
only a stabilization function, but also play a redistribu-
tive role. Such an 'impurity' is typical for traditional 
fiscal policy measures, but should be avoided in the 
Community context as it may perpetuate adjustment 
problems and induce transfer dependency. 
(ii) The instrument should make its impact during the de-
cline in real economic activity, and not afterwards, when 
the economy has stabilized or is already recovering. If 
the intervention affects the economy too late, undesir-
able fluctuations around trend growth will be amplified 
by government action. As stressed in Friedman (1953), 
timing is critical to the success of stabilization policy, 
as well as hard to get right because downturns can be 
sharp yet relatively short-lived and any discretionary 
instrument is subject to the problem of recognition and 
policy implementation lags which can easily amount to 
more than half a year. Given the need for speed, the 
activation of the instrument should therefore be prefer-
ably linked to an indicator, whose fluctuations form a 
close proxy for variations in real output, and whose 
measurement is accurate and quick. 
(iii) Stabilization is usually seen as arising through the effect 
of public financial transfers on private agents' incomes, 
and hence consumption. Ideally, a Community stabiliz-
ation instrument should therefore, directly or indirectly, 
make a significant contribution on the margin to the 
income of individuals in the Member State(s) going 
through a recession. 
Community-specific principles 
On top of these requirements, a Community instrument to 
assist regional stabilization should reflect two additional 
considerations. 
First, the instrument should only provide support inasmuch 
as the registered economic decline displays a clear country-
specific dimension. As argued in Section 4.2, shocks affecting 
the whole of the Community should be responded to by 
fiscal policy coordination among the Twelve, the automatic 
stabilizers at national level, and, if the aim of price stability 
permits, the exchange rate and monetary policy stance of 
the ESCB. Only when a country's slump distances it from 
the rest can EC assistance be forthcoming. 
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Second, in keeping with the reasoning that the abandonment 
of the exchange-rate instrument should be compensated for 
and recognizing that devaluation is not resorted to for each 
and every dip of real activity below trend, Community help 
should act as an insurance against grave economic difficult-
ies. Accordingly, support should take place only in the event 
of major negative developments. The shock may be of a 
regional or sectoral nature but it should have clearly measur-
able significant macroeconomic repercussions. Moreover, in 
view of the objective of stabilization, neither the relative 
magnitude nor the likelihood of support should in any way 
be influenced by the relative prosperity of Member States. 
Each Member State should stand, in principle, an equal 
chance of being eligible for Community assistance. 
As a final general remark, regional stabilization support 
should preferably take the form of Community grants rather 
than loans. For one thing, Community loans are scarcely 
appealing for Member States enjoying a strong credit rating 
on international capital markets. For another, Member 
States which, in EMU, need to offer a significant interest 
premium will in all likelihood be characterized by a high 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Community loans will raise the country's 
level of indebtedness, pushing it further into the 'excessive 
deficit' zone. Loans may thereby undermine the credibility 
of the latter concept, which is central to the Community's 
strategy in EMU to combat the public finance sources of 
inflation. Conversely, the existence of Community stabiliza-
tion support would facilitate Member States' observance of 
the 'excessive deficit' constraint by tiding over economic 
downswings. 
the EC Statistical Office, which have the advantage of being 
available within a few months and possess a high degree of 
uniformity.' A rough idea of the development of real activity 
may then be obtained by way of the parameter estimates of 
a so-called 'Okun's Law' equation, relating changes in the 
unemployment rate to deviations of GDP from trend 
growth. In any case, given its central role, the indicator of 
real economic activity should be chosen with great care, 
perhaps even be devised from scratch, so as to conform 
well with the needs of accuracy, speed of availability, and 
international comparability. 
Application 
The financial assistance mechanism would be based on a 
monitoring of the monthly year-on-year changes of a Mem-
ber State's indicator relative to the Community average 
(excluding the Member State itself). If the indicator pointed 
to a fall of real activity below trend which was significantly 
worse than the performance of the weighted average of the 11 
other countries, the Member State in question, in principle, 
would be eligible for support under the mechanism. 
The design of the mechanism necessitates answers to three 
further questions: whether its activation should be triggered 
automatically or on a discretionary basis; how to interpret in 
operational terms a 'significant' deviation from EC average; 
and, finally, whether the ultimate destination of the Com-
munity transfer within recipient countries should be speci-
fied. 
6.2. Design of a financial assistance mechanism 
Against this backdrop, the present section maps out the 
possible concrete functioning of a Community financial 
mechanism for regional stabilization. 
Measurement 
A first important issue to be addressed concerns the measure-
ment of changes in real activity. Data on GDP are, at best, 
available on a quarterly basis and subject to considerable 
errors, especially initially, which would be when the mechan-
ism should be activated. Partial indicators of real activity 
that are sometimes mooted in the literature for this purpose, 
like electricity or energy consumption or telephone usage, 
are defective because of random seasonal factors or problems 
of international comparability, even in terms of rates of 
change resulting from the modernizing of industry or the 
catch-up in living standards. Italianer and Vanheukelen 
(1993) use the survey data on unemployment collected by 
This report so far has come out strongly in favour of sub-
jecting Community transfers to clear conditions. A similar 
view could be taken here. For the sake of its credibility, the 
mechanism should be protected against accusations that it 
would amount to a disguised bail-out channel for undisci-
plined national governments. One could thus require the 
potential beneficiary country to provide evidence that the 
problem at hand was of an 'exogenous' nature, i.e. resulting 
from shocks whose origin could be reasonably considered 
to lie beyond past and present domestic governments' re-
sponsibility. By the same token, one could advocate at-
taching national policy conditions to disbursements under 
the mechanism, pursuant to the notion that a devaluation 
— which the mechanism is meant to substitute for — can 
only produce satisfactory effects if it is accompanied by 
structural measures. 
Unemployment is often argued to be a lagged indicator of the evolution 
of real activity on account of phenomena such as labour hoarding, 
thereby perhaps exhibiting a pro-cyclical profile. This alleged character-
istic does not, however, seem to be borne out econometrically. See 
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993). 
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Nevertheless, there are also powerful arguments militating 
in favour of automaticity, which, on balance, would seem 
to prevail. 
First of all, activation predicated on a discretionary judg-
ment of the Community authorities is inevitably time-con-
suming and may therefore be at variance with the crucial 
requirement of prompt intervention. Second, moral hazard 
problems, often connected with unconditional support, ap-
pear rather small under the proposed mechanism. Whilst the 
necessary should be done to make the indicator foolproof, 
the incentive to try to manipulate it or to deliberately effectu-
ate a decline in national economic activity is weak. On the 
one hand, a one-time deterioration of the indicator will only 
lead to a one-time transfer, since the mechanism is built on 
changes in the indicator. On the other, 'engineered' changes 
in the national indicator may well be frustrated by the 
evolution elsewhere in the Community: a worsening of the 
economic situation in a Member State which is paralleled 
by negative developments in the rest of the Community will 
not give rise to a transfer under the financial assistance 
mechanism. 
Moral hazard problems will be further reduced by estab-
lishing a threshold below which a decrease in real economic 
activity relative to the EC average would not be compen-
sated. Setting a minimum norm for deviations also would 
be in line with common insurance practice according to 
which minor damages are not covered. The precise fixing of 
the threshold would, of course, be a matter of political 
judgment and would depend on how ambitious and costly 
one would wish this financial mechanism to be. Ceteris 
paribus, the lower the threshold, the more frequently will the 
mechanism be activated and the larger will be the associated 
budgetary outlays. 
As to the third question, the support under the mechanism 
is to take the form of a block grant from the Community 
to the government concerned. However, such a grant will 
not exert any stabilization influence in its own right as it 
does not impinge on private agents' expected income in the 
immediate future. It therefore would be desirable to explore 
feasible ways to pass on the grants as quickly as possible to 
households. Community guidelines could be elaborated to 
this end, but, in the light of subsidiarity, it would seem wise 
to leave it to the individual Member States how to put the 
transfer to best use. 
More specifically, it would be contingent on the existence of 
a threshold, the size of the transfer per 'unit' of deviation 
from the Community average, and on whether or not a 
ceiling is set on the annual volume of support a Member 
State possibly can receive. The choice with respect to these 
three parameters, in conjunction with the selected method 
of measuring 'shocks', then determines the mechanism's 
stabilization power.' 
The stabilization power one would wish the mechanism 
to achieve is ultimately a matter of political preferences, 
reflecting attitudes towards risk aversion. However, more 
important from the viewpoint of the present report is the 
finding that the proposed mechanism is highly efficient, i.e. 
it is capable of generating, at relatively low budgetary cost, 
a degree of stabilization that is not dissimilar from what has 
been observed for the federations of North America. 
This conclusion is reached in Italianer and Vanheukelen 
(1993), where two variants of the mechanism have been 
simulated for the 1984-91 period. Both centre on changes in 
unemployment rates relative to the Community average. 
Their distinction is portrayed in Graph 4. Under the first 
variant ('full' stabilization), there is no threshold. Every 
percentage point difference in the monthly year-on-year in-
crease in unemployment vis-à-vis the Community average 
(excluding the country concerned) gives rise to a monthly 
payment of 1 % of one twelfth of the previous year's GDP 
of the Member State concerned. Relative unemployment 
increases above 2 percentage points receive no additional 
compensation. As a corollary, the maximum monthly pay-
ment to a country is equal to 2% of one twelfth of its annual 
GDP. The other variant ('limited' stabilization) contains a 
threshold at 0,3% relative unemployment change, is twice 
as generous at the margin, with a transfer 'slope' of 2% 
rather than 1 % (see Graph 4), and is truncated at a payment 
of 1,5% instead of 2%, implying that the part of any devi-
ation in excess of 1,5 percentage points does not receive 
support. 
Evidently, the choice of parameter values is largely arbitrary, 
which is why these simulations should be seen as purely 
illustrative. 
6.3. Costing and financing 
The budgetary cost of the proposed financial assistance 
mechanism would, obviously, be a function of its generosity. 
The magnitude of a country-specific shock can be conceived of in 
absolute terms, or in terms of the difference from the shock experienced 
by the average of the 11 other Member States. In Italianer and Vanheu-
kelen (1993) the latter measurement has been opted for, on the ground 
that the aim of a Community stabilization instrument is to offer relief 
for the country-specific portion of the shock. 
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GRAPH 4: Transfer payments with full and limited stabilization scheme 
2,5 r 
Transfer 
payment 
(% of GDP) 
Change in unemployment rate compared to 
other EC countries (% point) 
However, as shown in Graph 5, both variants are capable 
of engendering a significant degree of stabilization.' During 
the sample period, it amounted for each of them to around 
18 to 19% on average, which compares well with the 17 to 
28% and 17 to 24% range reported in the literature (see 
Table 9) for the USA and Canada respectively. In both 
cases, this stabilization offset is generated inexpensively, with 
an annual average cost of about ECU 10 to 11 billion at 
1990 prices, or slightly more than 0,2% of EC GDP. The 
basic reason for this high level of efficiency is that, unlike the 
'automatic stabilizers' in existing federations, the proposed 
mechanism is explicitly designed for regional stabilization 
purposes, rather than being a by-product of redistributing 
programmes. 
Focusing on the second variant, Table 27 indicates, by 
Member State, the times at which the mechanism would 
have been activated, as well as the transfer sums involved/ 
For example, in 1991, the UK and Ireland would have 
qualified during the entire year, and Denmark in the first 
four months. Over the sample period, the mechanism would 
have intervened during 210 out of 1 034 months, or in some 
20% of possible cases. The last column shows that, equalling 
0,22% of EC GDP on average, the burden for the Com-
munity budget would have peaked in 1984 at close to 0,4%, 
reaching a low in 1990 at 0,07%. 
Budgetary form and financing 
As it is designed to respond to often unforeseeable economic 
developments, the mechanism's budgetary shape should be 
The degree of stabilization is non-linear on account of the existence of 
a maximum level of entitlements, along with the presence of a threshold 
in the case of the 'limited' variant. 
Monthly unemployment data are not available for Greece. Repeating 
the analysis with annual data demonstrates that the inclusion of Greece 
in the mechanism does not alter average annual budgetary costs in terms 
of GDP in any substantial way. 
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GRAPH 5 : Degree of stabilization with full and limited stabilization scheme 
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Table 27 
Limited stabilization scheme using monthly data (months of activation and amount of payments) 
Total 
billion ECU 
(1990) 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Months 
— — — 
4-12 
1-12 
1-1? 
1-1?. 
1-4 
— — — 
11-12 
1+5 
— — — 
1-12 
1-9 
— — — — — — 
1-12 
1-4 
10-12 
1-9 
— — — — 
1-1? 
1-12 
1 
— — — 
11 + 12 
1-12 
— 
9-12 
1-12 
1-3 
1-1? 
1-7 
— ­
49 
January 1984 to October 1991: 
Total (billion ECU (1990)) 0,010 4.569 4,046 
% G D P 0,007 4.429 0,321 
Annual average (billion ECU (1990)) 0,001 0.583 0.517 
% G D P 0,001 0.565 0.041 
9,698 18.914 1.298 
2,506 2.018 3.881 
1,238 2,415 0.166 
0,320 0,258 0,495 
1-3 
4 + 6-12 
1+2 
— 
5 
9 
— — 
9­12 
1­12 
■«I 
30 
18 
31 
24 
19 
20 
28 
18,576 
8,728 
12.030 
7,741 
13,990 
9,061 
3.466 
10.268 
0,384 
0,180 
0,248 
0,160 
0,289 
0.187 
0,072 
0,212 
32.823 
3.822 
4,190 
0.488 
0,031 
0.448 
0,004 
0.057 
0.275 
0,125 
0,035 
0.016 
0.059 
0,125 
0.008 
0,016 
12.138 
1,549 
1,549 
0,198 
83,860 
10.706 
1.731 
0,221 
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that of a reserve.' In order for this reserve to respect the 
prohibition on incurring deficits in the EC budget at the 
same time as being in a position to honour all commitments 
in a worst-case scenario, its global size should correspond 
to the theoretical maximum of payments. This maximum 
can be calculated so long as there is an upper ceiling on 
individual Member States' potential entitlements. Obviously, 
the lower the ceiling, the smaller the maximum amount 
payable.2 
able share of the volume of ordinary outlays, would seriously 
constrain the budgetary room for manoeuvre with regard to 
other Community responsibilities. 
As all Member States are, in principle, equally eligible for 
support under the mechanism, as shown by the historical 
simulation, initial contributions to the reserve, as well as its 
replenishment upon disbursements, should be fiscally neutral 
and thus be based on national shares in Community GDP.3 
Although it would mark a move away from the precept of 
budgetary unity, it would be preferable for the reserve to 
operate outside the general budget so long as there are 
predetermined ceilings on aggregate expenditure. Incorpor-
ated in the general budget, a reserve representing a consider-
A contingency fund would not be an innovation for the Community 
budget structure. The current ECU 1 billion agricultural reserve to 
absorb unfavourable developments in the dollar/ecu exchange rate fulfils 
such a role already. 
In the case of the 'full' stabilization variant discussed earlier, the 
maximum would equal about 1 % of EC GDP, declining to 0,75% under 
the 'limited' variant. These maxima correspond to the cases where 
countries representing half the economic weight of the Community each 
would receive the maximum payment during one year. 
The reserve's capital does not need to be paid up for more 
than is required to meet the average annual payments under 
the mechanism, provided all countries are capable of making 
supplementary transfers at short notice to the reserve if the 
need were to arise. Alternatively, one could include the 
mechanism's average annual cost in the ordinary budget, 
placing the remainder of the observed maximum annual 
payment in a reserve. 
Table 27 suggests that the mechanism would respect a stabilization 
instrument's desirable property that the probability of receiving support 
be independent of the country's relative prosperity per capita. The 
five largest beneficiaries, in national GDP terms, would have been, in 
descending order, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and France, with 
Belgium bringing up the rear. 
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Chapter 7 7.1. Main features of current own resources 
Own resources 
The right to levy taxes is the exclusive preserve of the 
Member States, and the Treaty on European Union agreed 
at Maastricht will not depart from this principle. As a 
consequence, the Community budget is subject to a public 
finance logic that is clearly distinct from that governing 
national budgets. Besides the constraint of a predetermined 
aggregate expenditure ceiling, present budgetary provisions 
define the different sources of finance (own resources) that 
need to be drawn on consecutively to match total revenues 
and outlays. 
Assuming this regulatory regime to remain essentially un­
altered, this chapter addresses the question of how, in the 
perspective of EMU, the Community's own resources should 
evolve as regards their composition and relative importance. 
Taxes fundamentally perform two distinct economic func­
tions. On the one hand, they generate revenue covering the 
public sector's expenditure needs. On the other, they can act 
as instruments to further economic efficiency, stability or 
equity objectives. 
Although in practice most taxes serve a mixture of both 
aspects, the revenue and instrumental dimensions are separ­
able and can in a context of multi-layer government be 
assigned to different levels of government. This is borne out 
by the stylized fact, documented in Section 3.2, that in 
federations tax competences are typically more centralized 
than expenditure competences. This separability also allows 
the revenue needs of one level of government to be met by 
grants from another. 
The Community budget was financed in the main by national 
contributions during the initial stages of integration. This 
historical trait, in conjunction with the absence of own tax 
powers at the supranational level, explains why the debate 
on the financing of the Community budget has hitherto been 
strongly dominated by pure revenue arguments. However, 
as the move to EMU proceeds and the Community becomes 
more federal in nature, there are sound economic and politi­
cal grounds why Community revenue should start reflecting 
more closely and systematically basic concerns of economic 
efficiency and fairness. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that, following the 1988 
agreement on the first 'Delors package',' the Community is 
entitled to the integral revenue from the so-called traditional 
own resources, to a levy of maximum 1,4% on a harmonized 
VAT base and, finally, to national contributions on the basis 
of GNP to make budgetary ends meet. The maximum rate 
on the harmonized VAT base will be lowered in equal steps 
from 1995 onward to 1% in 1999. The traditional own 
resources consist principally of customs duties, the remain­
der being generated by agricultural levies and sugar contri­
butions.2 
Graph 6 portrays the evolution of the structure of Com­
munity revenue since 1971. It shows the steady decline of 
the role of the traditional own resources as a percentage of 
total revenue, which currently amount to somewhat less than 
25%, down from more than 60% in 1977. With a further 
expansion of the budget beyond the 1,2% of GDP ceiling, 
their relative weight can be expected to continue to decline 
with unchanged commercial policies. This trend is likely to 
be reinforced by the prospective tariff concessions in the 
aftermath of the Uruguay Round and the CAP reform, 
which should boost prices on world agricultural markets.3 
Graph 6 also shows the buffer function of the GNP resource. 
The latter had not been resorted to up to 1990 by virtue of 
higher than expected economic growth. However, the most 
recent increments in EC expenditure could no longer be 
covered by the first three own resources. As a result, the 
GNP resource financed 13% of the budget in 1991 and 1992 
climbing, on current forecasts, to over 20% in 1993. 
About half of Community revenue comes from the so-called 
VAT resource. The latter term is largely a misnomer, because 
in spite of the original idea back in the early 1970s to confer 
to the Community an indirect tax shared with Member 
States, a goal which played a valuable role in the harmoniza­
tion of national VAT bases, the link between this resource 
and the taxpaying consumers of the Community is very 
tenuous. The VAT resource is collected from the Member 
States by means of a notional harmonized base, and not as 
part of the VAT paid on each purchase. It is therefore 
As formalized in the Council Decision οΓ24 June 1988 (1988/376/EEC). 
Levies on agricultural imports take the form of equalizing tariffs in the 
framework of the CAP. Their proceeds are strongly influenced by 
exchange-rate fluctuations and world market prices. Sugar contributions 
arise from the need to fund the costs of storage and export restitutions 
under the sugar scheme. 
According to the survey of the literature by Goldstein and Khan (1985) 
long-term price elasticities of import demand for industrial countries lie 
in the -0,5 to - 1,0 range. 
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tantamount to a national contribution calculated following 
an accounting definition of the VAT base.' The latter is 
relatively larger in countries with a high consumption ratio, 
which tend to be the poorer Member States, as can be seen 
from column 1 in Table 28, expressing the notional VAT 
base for 1991 as a percentage of national GNP. In order to 
redress this imbalance, it was decided in the 1988 agreement 
to cap any country's notional VAT base at 55% of its GNP 
(column 2 of Table 28). This severs the indirect tax link 
altogether in the case of five countries, as capping implies a 
shift from VAT to GNP. It was decided at the Edinburgh 
summit of December 1992 to take a further step in the same 
direction. 
Community revenue can therefore increasingly be said to 
result from customs duties, agricultural levies, and two types 
of 'block grants', i.e. national contributions, from Member 
States, one of which is of a hybrid nature. 
A salient feature of the current revenue regime is that it has 
a specific set of rules for one Member State. After intense 
political debates on the net British contribution to the 
budget, an 'abatement' settlement was reached in 1984 and 
renewed in both 1988 and at Edinburgh, so hence it will 
remain effective until 2000. Although its source is primarily 
on the expenditure side, the British budgetary problem is 
alleviated by providing for a cut in the UK's VAT contri-
butions amounting to two thirds of the difference between 
its share of VAT payments and its percentage share in EC 
expenditure.2 This agreement has given rise to a supplemen-
tary country-specific deal in that Germany's share in the 
correction of the UK position has been restricted. 
1 This definition is not devoid of anomalies, as exemplified by the abnor-
mally low figure for Italy as reported in Table 28. 
The UK abatement procedure heightens the complexity of the VAT 
resource further. 
GRAPH 6: General budget, revenue sources from 1971 to 1994 
100% 
1 1993 budget. 
1 1994 preliminary draft budget. 
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Table 28 
VAT bases as a percentage of GNP (data relating to 1991) 
Uncapped Capped 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 
46,6 
42,8 
48,6 
56,5 
52,3 
52,6 
67,2 
40,6 
66,0 
50,3 
67,6 
60,8 
46,6 
42,8 
48,6 
55,0 
52,3 
52,6 
55,0 
40,6 
55,0 
50,3 
55,0 
55,0 
50,5 49,3 
7.2. Securing proportionality in the run-up to 
EMU 
Notwithstanding the wish of a number of Member States to 
introduce a fifth resource, it was decided at Edinburgh to 
leave the current composition of the EC's own resources 
unaltered for the period to 1999, and to ask the Commission 
in the intervening period to conduct an in-depth analysis of 
other possible resources. This decision is appropriate as long 
as full monetary union has not been achieved and the acquis 
communautaire as regards taxation remains unchanged, since 
the EC will not be in a position to use other own-resource 
candidates which are identified later in Section 7.3. 
An unavoidable issue in a system where supranational rev-
enues are collected through the national administrations or 
generated by direct national contributions, such that funding 
flows are easily traceable, is whether the sharing of the 
burden exhibits basic fairness. A minimum notion of fairness 
is proportionality, i.e. that a country's share in Community 
revenue be equal to its prosperity per capita. 
The case for proportionality 
It is the opinion of the expert group that the main objective 
on the revenue side to be pursued prior to the final phase 
of EMU is the achievement of proportionality for each 
and every Member State, implying the removal of existing 
country-specific arrangements. However, so long as the 
Community does not move more clearly in the direction of 
social and political union than it is poised to do after the 
coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, the 
quest for revenue fairness should not be carried further 
than that. From this normative perspective, the Edinburgh 
decision to shrink the role of the VAT-based own resource 
should be judged positively, whereas the continuation of the 
specific regime in favour of the UK cannot be upheld. 
The case for proportionality rests on a dual argument. First, 
redistribution by way of advantageous revenue arrange-
ments has the same effect as unconditional block grants. It 
was argued in Chapter 5 that at the present stage of inte-
gration unconditional aid is by no means the most appropri-
ate instrument. Redistribution at the supranational level 
should desirably operate at the spending side through expen-
diture-related or, preferably, performance-related inter-
governmental grants. The validity of this reasoning is cor-
roborated in the case of the British budgetary problem which 
is primarily associated with the national distribution of EC 
outlays arising from the CAP. 
Secondly, it should be noted that the issue of public finance 
fairness can eventually be approached in a sensible way only 
by a simultaneous assessment of the two sides of the budget; 
from this perspective, proportionality at the revenue side 
would be a good position to start from. 
Implementation issues 
The pursuit of proportionality raises several questions of 
implementation. To start with, there is the issue of how to 
measure prosperity. A first choice needs to be made between 
gross domestic product and gross national product, which 
differ because of net factor payments (interest, dividends, 
and labour income) from abroad. As the concern here is 
about equity and therefore disposable income, GNP should 
be opted for. Second, there is the question of comparing 
national GNPs in simple money terms or on the basis of 
purchasing power standards (PPS). The income disparity 
between Member States is typically smaller in PPS on ac-
count of the higher price level in richer countries for non-
tradable goods and services, like housing. In principle, PPS 
forms a superior yardstick in a context of equity. However, 
expressing GNP in PPS involves complex calculations of 
conversion rates on which there is in practice no methodolog-
ical consensus. To minimize political friction, it would ap-
pear advisable to stick to GNP expressed in ecus, bearing 
in mind, though, that a tax arrangement delivering pro-
portionality in ecu terms is likely to have a progressive 
incidence in economic reality. Third, the measurement of 
prosperity depends on the production by Member States' 
administrations of national accounts. This may be a serious 
source of distortions as countries characterized by an im-
portant volume of unreported economic activity underesti-
mate their actual level of income. Finally, and although 
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various initiatives are under way to make up for this loss of 
information, there may arise a GNP (and GDP) measure-
ment problem following the elimination of border controls, 
upon which the collection of trade statistics have partly 
relied until now. If national GNP figures were to grow 
seriously inaccurate, one would have to look for a new 
statistical indicator of prosperity. ' 
The simplest and most transparent fashion to achieve overall 
proportionality would be to abolish the VAT resource and 
replace it with an increased reliance on national contri-
butions on the basis of GNP. Apart from guaranteeing 
proportionality, a further consideration for dropping the 
VAT resource is that it has outlived its role of promoting 
VAT-base harmonization among the Member States. More-
over, as will be argued in Section 7.3.1, even if Community 
revenue were directly related to actual tax payments by 
consumers, VAT would not seem on economic grounds to 
form the best candidate as an own resource. 
Short of an outright abolition of the third resource, pro-
portionality could be ensured by a further capping of the 
VAT base, a reduction of the present 1,4% call-up rate, or 
by attaching a 'proportionality ensuring' key to national 
GNP contributions. Capping the VAT base down to 40% 
would amount to a silent termination of the third resource 
and its de facto substitution by the fourth. The practical 
problem with the use of the GNP key to offset the regressivity 
of the VAT base would be that as the relative weights of the 
third and fourth resource shift every year, any key deter-
mined ex ante may turn out to actually over- or undershoot 
the neutrality objective, necessitating a further ex post cor-
rection procedure.2 
In any event, as can be gauged from Table 29, the own 
resources decisions of Edinburgh will have gone a long way 
by 1999 towards the attainment of proportionality. 
The first row of Table 29, traditional own resources (agricul-
tural levies and customs duties), can basically be ignored in 
the proportionality discussion since (as will be argued in the 
next chapter) it is virtually impossible to apportion them by 
country in a meaningful way. Of the revenue from the two 
remaining resources (VAT and GNP), the GNP resource 
will amount to almost 58% in 1999. Moreover, the inequity 
of the VAT resource will have been mitigated by the re-
duction of the capping point to 50% of GNP. 
Table 29 
The effects of the Edinburgh agreement on the shares of own resources 
in 1999 
A possible candidate would be a country's measure of value-added for 
fiscal purposes, which would reinvigorate the role of VAT in EC revenue. 
Such a procedure would not be entirely new. At present, a country's 
fourth resource obligation in a given year is based on forecasts from 
April of the previous year and corrected ex post for forecast errors in 
October of the following year. 
Traditional own resources 
VAT 
GNP 
Total 
No change 
17,72 
52,14 
30,14 
100 
Edinburgh agreement 
17,72 
34,38 
47,90 
100 
7.3. New own resources 
From a strict revenue point of view, the Community would 
be able to rely completely on unconditional block grants 
from the Member States to cover the future rise in expendi-
ture as mapped out in Chapters 5 and 6. 
However, as the Community enters the final stage of monet-
ary union and new tax initiatives in the pursuit of the 
economic union goal become necessary, it would be prefer-
able for the EC to go beyond its current own resources and 
have direct access to other tax bases. 
A situation in which the budget is overwhelmingly funded 
by national contributions is politically unsatisfactory in the 
longer term as it makes the Community's financial depen-
dence on national governments very apparent. The EC 
budget threatens then to be much more a function of national 
budgetary priorities than the concern of the Community and 
its citizens. Because national contributions are not always 
perceived by Member State governments and parliaments as 
genuine EC own resources, there is great reluctance to raise 
the budget even if overall size constraints are respected.3 This 
has been illustrated repeatedly since 1988 by the difficulty in 
obtaining the consent of the Council to expand EC spending 
notwithstanding the fact that proposed increases fell well 
short of the global ceiling on own resources. The view that 
over time Community public finance should rest more on 
individual economic agents rather than on Member States 
seems to be endorsed by a recent public opinion survey in 
which about 60% of respondents declared themselves in 
favour of EC taxes.4 
3 In national budgetary rules and procedures, traditional own resources 
are often treated differently from the VAT or GNP resource. 
4 Eurobarometer survey. May 1991. 
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New own resources directly related to tax bases proper 
could, but need not necessarily, go hand in hand with the 
assignment to the EC level of government of the power to 
introduce Community taxes autonomously. The latter re-
form would clearly be politically more radical and would 
mark an important further step towards a 'federal' Europe, 
as a genuine EC tax would clearly call for greater European 
Parliament responsibility as regards both its level and its 
uses (see Section 11.4). 
A useful starting point to tackle the question of new own 
resources is to review the theory of fiscal federalism relative 
to the vertical assignment of tax competences and to note 
any lessons that are derivable from the current practice in 
federal States. 
7.3.1. Vertical tax assignment in theory and practice 
The theory of fiscal federalism identifies essentially four 
distinct potential grounds for conferring tax powers to the 
central level of government. These grounds are associated 
respectively with economic, social, political and management 
considerations. 
(i) The economic rationale for centralizing tax com-
petences can be subdivided in two aspects: on the one 
hand there is the case for central taxes as a response to 
cross-border tax externalities and as a 'federal' micro-
economic instrument; on the other, there is the issue of 
handing over to the central level of government revenue 
from taxes whose base cannot be defined reasonably 
at the State level. This regional arbitrariness problem 
formed the main reason why, upon the establishment 
of the customs union, customs duties' proceeds were 
earmarked as EC revenue. 
As to the first aspect, it will be recalled (see Section 
4.1.2) that complete State autonomy over tax bases that 
are internationally mobile will tend to occasion too low 
levels of taxation than would otherwise be the case. Tax 
harmonization or approximation to correct for this 
externality requires at least that the tax base be 
(broadly) harmonized and a minimum rate observed.' 
The attribution to the central government of a share of 
revenue or its entitlement to a surcharge could strongly 
promote the attainment of the desired tax base harmoni-
zation or approximation. The economic argument for 
a federal tax appears very powerful in those cases where 
the instrumental dimension of taxes is stressed and the 
federal level is seen — for instance on internal market 
grounds — as the best level of government to steer 
economic agents' behaviour through changes in effec-
tive tax rates. 
(ii) Traditional welfare theory holds that economic agents 
be taxed in accordance with the advantages they derive 
from public goods and services provided below cost (the 
benefit-pricing principle), or, alternatively, according to 
their ability to pay. The latter criterion reflects a basic 
equity concern. Inasmuch as there is a desire to use the 
tax channel to reduce interregional primary income 
differentials or to operate a federation-wide interper-
sonal redistribution system, the central level of govern-
ment needs to possess competences over taxes displaying 
a progressive incidence on regional and/or personal 
income. 
(iii) The power to introduce taxes and to determine the 
destination of their proceeds lies at the heart of sover-
eignty and representative government. The distribution 
of tax competences is therefore inevitably an eminently 
political issue as well, since it mirrors the relative legit-
imacy of the various layers of government. Greater 
fiscal autonomy tends to go hand in hand with stronger 
political influence. 
(iv) Lastly, the assignment of tax functions should also pay 
attention to the administrative aspects of tax collection. 
Centralization of taxes, or at least their collection, may 
permit economies of scale and offer a better guarantee 
for an equal treatment de facto of individual taxpayers 
regardless of where in the federation they happen to 
reside. This holds in particular for those tax categories 
where, due to the intricacies or ambiguities of the defi-
nition of the taxable base, there is a high degree of 
discretion in applying and enforcing uniform pro-
visions. 
These four politico-economic factors have all contributed to 
shaping the evolution and current state of the distribution 
of tax powers in existing mature federations. However, as 
their relative importance has unavoidably varied from coun-
try to country — for instance on account of the specific 
historical context,2 divergent attitudes toward social equity 
A converse sort of externality, possibly calling for maximum rates, may 
arise when the price elasticity of export demand from other jurisdictions 
in the federation is low, which may for example be the case for some 
raw materials. Under such circumstances, the State in question may 
engage in 'tax exporting', allowing it to raise part of its revenue from 
taxes that are effectively paid by residents of other jurisdictions. 
For example, the Federal Republic of Germany, where the balance of 
powers between Bund and Länder could be built up from scratch in 
1948, contrasts with the Swiss case where the distribution of competences 
is the outcome of a much more gradual process. 
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and differences in the degree of interdependence — the 
picture emerging from a comparison between federations is 
not clear-cut, as demonstrated by the observation that, bar-
ring a few notable exceptions, virtually every sort of tax 
is used by each sphere of government somewhere (Walsh 
(1993)). 
The stylized facts from federal practice are therefore bound 
to be limited in number. Table 30 provides an overview on 
the distribution of powers, according to the terminology 
employed in Section 3.1.2, between the central and state 
levels of government for the main tax categories. It indicates 
that customs duties belong invariably to the exclusive com-
petence of the federal government, whilst the latter is vir-
tually absent in the domains of property, wealth and heritage 
taxes. No uniform pattern is discernible, however, with re-
spect to the categories that generate the lion's share of 
revenue, i.e. income and consumption taxes. In Australia 
and Germany, the role of the federal government is para-
mount, with states having no direct access to any of the tax 
bases involved (except for selective sales taxes in Australia). 
By contrast, states in North America and especially Switzer-
land enjoy a high degree of tax autonomy. This applies in 
particular to personal income and corporate taxes where 
neither the base nor the rates have been the object of any 
formal harmonization. In Canada, all provinces except Que-
bec have opted, on grounds of managerial convenience, for 
a shared personal income tax system where the provinces 
use the federal government's definition of the tax base and 
collection procedures. The diversity of arrangements is most 
pronounced in the indirect tax field, with exclusive com-
petences sometimes being located at the federal (Switzerland) 
and sometimes at the state level (general sales tax in the 
USA). 
Table 30 
Assignment of tax competences in selected federal competences, 1988 
Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
Switzerland 
USA 
Customs duties 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
7%/100% 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
4%/100% 
Exclusive 
at EC level 
Exclusive at con-
federation level 
5%/100% 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
2%/100% 
Personal income 
taxes 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
57%/100% 
Federal tax with 
provincial 
surcharge2 
55%/62% 
Shared 
37%/50% 
Competing 
28%/38% 
Competing 
72%/83% 
Corporate taxes 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
13%/100% 
Competing3 
13%/66% 
Shared 
6%/50% 
Competing 
7%/42% 
Competing 
17%/82% 
VAT or general 
sales tax 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
11%/100% 
Competing 
17%/49% 
Shared 
33%/60% 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
3%/100% 
Exclusive 
at state level 
Excises or selective 
sales, lax on oil, 
tobacco, liquor 
Exclusive 
at state level' 
Competing4 
6%/26% 
Exclusive 
at federal level5 
23%/10O% 
Exclusive 
at federal level 
20%/100% 
Competing 
7%/50% 
Wealth and 
property taxes 
Exclusively ap-
plied at state level 
Exclusive 
at provincial level 
Exclusive 
at Land level 
Competing 
8%/39% 
Exclusive 
at state level6 
N.B.: Employed terminology as defined in Section 3.1.2. The First ligure in the cells of the matrix refers to the percentage share of the specific tax in total tax revenue of the federal government; 
the second figure pertains to the percentage share of the federal government in the total proceeds (excluding the part accruing to the municipal level) of a specific tax category. 
1 Payroll and vehicle registration taxes are other important financial sources of state government.Excises per se are exclusive at federal level level. 
2 Personal income taxes are of competing kind in Quebec. 
3 For the seven smallest provinces, corporate tax is federal with provincial surcharge. 
4 Liquor taxes are overwhelmingly federal, petrol taxes largely provincial. 
5 With the exception of some minor levies on beer. 
6 Inheritance and donations taxes are ofa competing nature in the US, with about 75% of total proceeds accruing to the federal government. 
Source: OECD revenue statistics (1990), Spahn (1993). Van Rompuy and Heylen (1984). 
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7.3.2. Supranational tax assignment criteria 
Federal practice offering little clear guidance, the selection 
of candidates for new own resources has to be predicated 
on an application to the EC of the theoretical arguments 
reviewed earlier. This is done in Table 31, where the various 
criteria against which the suitability of specific taxes as 
sources of EC finance should be evaluated have been as­
sembled in rows. As far as management aspects are con­
cerned, they depart somewhat from the motives advanced 
in Section 7.3.1, in view of the specific institutional and 
limited staff constraints the EC level of government operates 
under. 
The two principal criteria, the existence of a cross-border 
externality or of a regional arbitrariness problem, refer to 
the economic motives for shifting tax competences upward. 
The first of the secondary criteria relates to the progressivity 
of tax candidates. It would be helpful if supplementary EC 
own resources would exhibit a neutral or progressive profile. 
Admittedly, any unwanted properties to this effect can be 
offset by differentiating per country the share of the tax 
proceeds accruing to the Community or by applying a dis­
criminatory key to national contributions under the current 
fourth resource, but such compensatory measures are rather 
delicate from a political point of view. 
The two subsequent criteria, visibility and lack of political 
friction, are more political in nature. Greater visibility of 
EC revenue by virtue of a direct link to individual taxpayers 
is desirable as it enhances the democratic accountability of 
Community public finance. Visibility is highest in the case 
of taxes that noticeably affect a large number of economic 
agents. Lack of political friction relates to the likely reaction 
of national authorities to the idea of the Community sharing 
the proceeds or the base of a certain tax. One would expect 
Member States' opposition to be less when the proposed 
own resource concerns a levy on a base that is not (yet) 
tapped by the national fisc, as it does not imperil, at least 
not directly, national public revenue. Friction is also likely 
to be minor in the event of a transfer to the supranational 
level of public sector income that is not perceived by the 
electorate as resulting from a tax. 
The final two tax assignment yardsticks, ease of collection 
and size of revenue, are of a more narrow public finance 
concern, but are of clear relevance for the EC budget given 
the institutional and regulatory constraints which the latter 
is subject to. ' As the Community does not have its own tax 
1 It may be noted that the list of criteria does not include any reference 
to the stabilization properties of possible EC taxes. However, so long 
as EC deficits or surpluses are ruled out, these properties or lack thereof 
are basically immaterial. 
Table 31 
Suitability of tax categories as EC own resources 
Labour in­
come taxes 
Capital 
income 
Wealth 
taxes 
Corporate taxes Excises 
on profits on cash-flow 
Seigniorage Carbon dioxide 
taxes 
Principal criteria 
Cross-border 
externality 
Regional 
arbitrariness 
Secondary criteria 
Progressivity 
Political visibility 
Lack of political 
friction 
Ease of collection 
Size of revenue 
Overall appreciation 
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
+ -Ι­
Ο 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ + 
70 
-
-
+ 
0/ + 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
o/-
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
70 
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ /+ + 
Legend: + + Very suitable as an EC own resource. 
+ Suitable as an EC own resource. 
0 Neutral, not applicable or no information. 
- Not suitable. 
Not at all suitable. 
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services, it is dependent for the collection of its revenue 
on national or lower levels of administration, entailing a 
standard principal/agent problem. The easier it is to monitor 
and control the collection activity, the more this problem is 
reduced. As the acquiring of new own resources is unavoid-
ably a laborious political process, which ought therefore to 
be infrequent, it is desirable that any additional source of 
finance be of significant size relative to EC budgetary needs 
and that, unlike the traditional own resources, its proceeds 
in real terms do not exhibit a long-term erosion trend. ' 
7.3.3. Suitability of specific tax categories 
The present section examines to what extent the most im-
portant tax categories or those that are frequently mentioned 
as being suitable as sources of EC finance conform to the 
criteria just listed. A summary picture is provided in Table 
31, which offers a qualitative assessment of the relative 
merits of the taxes represented in the columns. For the sake 
of brevity, this examination will not be exhaustive: if a 
certain tax is found to fail to meet several criteria, its fulfil-
ment of other criteria will not be discussed. 
As indicated in the first column of the table, the economic 
case for entitling the Community to a part of labour income 
taxes is weak. As long as the Community workforce does 
not grow strongly mobile internationally, the scope for a 
downward spiral of tax pressure owing to fiscal competition 
is minor. Tax base apportionment problems related to bor-
der workers can be settled by a systemic application of 
the residence principle of taxation and bilateral agreements 
between the countries concerned. Although a Community 
share in direct taxes on individuals' earnings would sharpen 
citizens' awareness of the EC budget, it is very likely to meet 
with resentment on the side of national authorities as income 
taxes will become increasingly the 'hard core' of Member 
States' fiscal autonomy, given that the elbow-room in the 
indirect tax field has been circumscribed by supranational 
rules.2 Income tax rules vary widely between countries as 
regards the definition of the base, mirroring divergent value 
judgments on social, educational, family, environmental 
matters, etc. In the absence of a harmonized base, EC tax 
Moreover, on account of the balanced budget rule and the current 
reliance on multiannual expenditure planning through the so-called 
'financial perspectives', an additional commendable trait of any EC tax 
is that its revenue be more or less stable and predictable with a fair 
degree of accuracy at least one year in advance. The recourse to a 
residual own resource, constituted at present by national GNP contri-
butions, will fluctuate accordingly unless two unexpected outcomes 
cancel out. Gyrations in the reliance on GNP contributions could upset 
the pursuit of national budgetary objectives, possibly linked to the 
compliance with excessive deficit rules. 
See Spahn (1993b). 
sharing or surcharges in a uniform fashion throughout the 
Community is bound to give rise to serious inequities on the 
basis of nationality, which would be amplified by national 
discrepancies in the administrative room for manoeuvre 
relative to the delineation of taxable and non-taxable in-
come. In sum, and despite recommendations by other writers 
on EC public finance, labour income taxes appear inappro-
priate as an EC own resource.3 
It was pointed out in Section 4.1.2 that because of the very 
high degree of international mobility of the base, the proper 
taxation of income from financial assets necessitates Com-
munity, arguably even OECD or worldwide, measures. Capi-
tal income taxes form the area par excellence for beggar-thy-
neighbour competition through the favourable treatment of 
non-residents, driving effective tax pressure down to nil and 
causing cross-border derealizations in the financial services 
sector as well as substitution effects between financial prod-
ucts. It should, however, be stressed that for an economic 
union to function well, taxes on income from financial assets, 
just like on income from labour, need not be identical nor 
even be closely approximated. What is crucial instead is that 
Member States dispose of all the necessary information to 
tax residents' income correctly, irrespective of where in the 
Community or the world it is collected. Community 
measures should therefore ideally take the form of an obli-
gation for EC banks to report income collected by non-
residents to the latter's national tax administrations. With a 
reporting requirement, the arguments just raised against 
labour income taxes as an EC own resource carry over to 
the capital income tax field. 
A common minimum withholding tax at source on EC non-
residents was proposed by the Commission as a second-best 
measure, in view of the impossibility of obtaining unanimous 
agreement on the reporting requirement rule. As this pro-
posal brings out the notion of EC resident for capital income 
tax purposes, it might be advocated assigning the proceeds 
of this withholding tax on non-residents to the Community. 
Although such transfer would probably not meet with major 
political obstacles since it would be directly linked to a 
supranational measure and be a welcome substitute for the 
rather unconventional situation of personal income taxes 
accruing to the source country, it would be ill-suited as a 
Community own resource. For one reason, the revenue from 
this withholding tax threatens to be very small, with non-
residents' financial assets either being repatriated or shifted 
to tax havens outside the Community upon its introduction. 
Second, its year-on-year fluctuations could be highly unpre-
3 For example the proposal put forward in Biehl (1990) towards the 
introduction of an EC surcharge on national personal income taxes. 
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dictable because of the very speed and ease with which assets 
can be moved across borders, setting the stage for rapid 
shifts in the location of capital income collection following 
changes in market sentiment about future tax legislation. 
distorted.3 The sparse empirical evidence available as well as 
the results of the survey conducted by the Ruding Committee 
suggest that multinational companies' decisions on where 
to locate an investment and how to finance it are indeed 
influenced by corporate tax considerations. 
The foregoing arguments suggest that the Community is not 
well-placed to draw on personal income as a source of 
revenue. This observation is also applicable to net wealth 
taxes, which are levied in several, principally northern, Mem­
ber States. Freedom of capital movements undermines the 
effectiveness of wealth taxes at the national level with wealth 
holders transferring their mobile assets to other countries or 
changing residence altogether. This is the standard exter­
nality case for centralizing tax competences. 
However, beside the fact that in federal practice wealth taxes 
are typically levied by subcentral levels of government, the 
administrative difficulties it involves are tremendous. ' A tax 
is imposed on a stock, instead of a flow, which must be 
assessed annually for the innumerable types of assets pos­
sessed by individuals. Aside from the significant collecting 
and recording costs this engenders, it poses very complex 
valuation problems since for many assets there are no market 
prices. A supranational wealth tax would only compound 
these difficulties. For one thing, the unavoidable adminis­
trative tangles will make the principal/agent problem keenly 
felt; for another, in order for the valuation to be fair, it 
would need to take place across countries in order to account 
for differences in the cost of living. 
Despite these sensitivities to differences in the fiscal burden, 
corporate tax competition between Member States has until 
now by no means been strong, as can be inferred from 
the fact that there has been a noticeably upward trend in 
corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP over the last two 
decades. Furthermore, there are good economic arguments 
to believe that unbridled competition in the company tax 
area is not likely to erupt in the future either.4 Even so, a 
competitive tax erosion process cannot be ruled out altog­
ether since, unlike wage earners, firms can be expected to 
step up considerably their cross-border mobility under the 
impetus of EMU. The externality criterion for centralizing 
tax competences can therefore be seen to be broadly appli­
cable. 
The second criterion, the existence of a regional arbitrariness 
problem, will also be increasingly fulfilled in the corporate 
tax area because of the ever larger number of firms displaying 
a multinational dimension and the rise in the complexity of 
intra-firm transactions. This evolution will expand the scope 
for artificially shifting profits across borders by internal 
over-or under-invoicing, or the judicious financing of foreign 
subsidiaries or allocation of overhead costs. Such abusive 
transfer pricing or thin capitalization practices can be com-
As documented in OECD (1991) and the recent Ruding 
report (1992), effective corporate tax rates vary significantly 
between Member States on account of differences in the 
definition of the tax base, statutory rates, the fiscal link 
between firm and shareholder (the so-called system of impu­
tation) and the rules on double taxation relief regarding 
income from cross-border activities.2 Furthermore, corpor­
ate tax pressure on outward and inward investment is, on 
average, considerably higher than that associated with dom­
estic investment, pointing to important internal market im­
perfections still existing in the corporate tax field. If the 
fiscal treatment of profits differs according to the location 
of the investment or the nationality of the investor, resource 
allocation in the Community as a whole is likely to be 
1 See Spahn (1993b). 
2 National differences in the effective rate on the marginal investment 
project have, however, tended to diminish in the recent past, chiefly as 
a result of the downward convergence of inflation rates. 
When two enterprises operating in the same Member State are subject 
to a different tax treatment because the parent company happens to be 
located in another Member State, so-called capital-import neutrality is 
violated: European resources may not be put to best use as a less efficient 
producer may carry out a project because an intrinsically more efficient 
company is taxed more heavily. So-called capital export neutrality is 
violated when the choice of Member State to invest in is influenced by 
company tax rules. If a firm would prefer to invest in Member State A 
rather than in Member State Β but after taking account of differences 
in corporate tax pressure it decided to invest in B, a Community welfare 
loss would result since production does not occur at the lowest cost 
prior to taxes. See Devereux and Pearson (1989). 
Basically two arguments can be advanced that make cut-throat compe­
tition unlikely even if firms displayed a high corporate tax sensitivity. 
First of all, the incentive to engage in tax cuts is not clear as their 
effectiveness depends largely on how other Member States treat foreign 
source income. For example, lowering the net fiscal burden with a 
view to obtaining more foreign direct investment is futile when foreign 
countries operate a residence-based tax regime. Second, even though 
corporate tax revenue is relatively unimportant — corporate taxes 
represent in the EC on average 2,8% of GDP and 7,1% of total tax 
revenue — such that a large reduction would not have large direct 
budgetary consequences, the indirect budgetary impact could be con­
siderable as it puts downward pressure on personal income tax rates in 
order to reduce incentives facing taxpayers to shelter personal income 
in the corporate sector. See Vanheukelen (1991), pp. 289-290. 
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bated through case-by-case arbitration panels1 but any of 
the responses that are systemically more satisfactory as they 
remove the fiscal incentive for firms to engage in transfer 
pricing,2 involve the adoption of largely arbitrary rules on 
how to partition among Member States multinational en-
terprises' taxable income. 
Economic conditions appear therefore united for rec-
ommending the establishment in the medium term of a single 
corporate tax regime characterized by a harmonized tax 
base, a minimum statutory rate and a common country-
apportionment formula relative to the profits of enterprises 
operating in more than one Member State. 
It is, however, worth emphasizing once more here that the 
case for centralizing tax competences is to be distinguished 
from that for the assignment of revenue to the central level 
of government. A major reason why Member States will 
probably strongly object to the idea of corporate taxes as 
an EC own resource is that the latter are connected with the 
national personal income tax regime through the rules on 
relief for double taxation at shareholder level. An EC tax 
on corporate profits would face tremendous administrative 
and fairness problems unless this link is severed, i.e. unless 
relief at the shareholder level is repealed.3 But the chances 
of this happening look minor as it would impinge pervasively 
on Member States' fiscal regime relative to capital income 
in general. 
have been dealt with at length in the public finance litera-
ture.5 However, its additional advantages in the present 
context should be underlined. To start with, the obstacle 
arising from the link with personal income taxes would be 
overcome as cash flow taxation does not allow for impu-
tation relief. Second, as the taxable base is much more 
straightforward to compute, collection of the tax and its 
monitoring should be relatively easy. Furthermore, cash flow 
taxes will display a progressive profile inasmuch as private 
investment activity is stronger in developing than in econ-
omically more mature regions. The most important draw-
back of cash flow taxes as an EC own resource is that the 
revenue they generate may be rather limited, with net tax 
receipts resulting purely from the realization of 'excess' pro-
fits. 
It will be recalled that about half of present Community 
revenue is associated with value-added taxes. However, as 
explained in Section 7.1, this revenue does not derive directly 
from an EC charge on consumer purchases but is collected 
from national authorities by means of a notional harmonized 
base, the nature of which is further removed from tax reality 
as a result of the capping procedure. Chiefly on account of 
its regressive characteristics it was recommended earlier to 
supplant the present VAT resource by national contributions 
on the basis of GNP. The question to be addressed here is 
whether a share of or a surcharge on actual national VAT 
would be a suitable candidate as a new own resource. 
In addition, company taxes may not do very well in terms 
of political visibility. It may notably reinforce the impression 
of public opinion that the Community is first and foremost 
a business matter. 
However, as demonstrated in Spahn (1993b), corporate taxes 
would become much more appealing as a Community own 
resource if they were levied on firms' net cash flow in lieu 
of their profits.4 The merits of cash flow taxation or expendi-
ture taxation in general need not be repeated here as they 
These arbitration panels have been provided for in the July 1990 Conven-
tion concluded by Member States on the elimination of double taxation 
in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises. 
Such as European unitary taxation, or the application of the 'pure' 
residence principle with a clearing mechanism. 
This repeal could take the form of either generalizing the classical system 
(no relief) or by uniform relief at the corporate level by levying a lower 
tax rate on distributed dividends. 
The cash flow tax base is measured as the difference between the receipts 
from sales of goods and services and the purchases of all real goods and 
services, including capital goods, required in the production process. 
The major difference with the profit taxation would be the granting of 
immediate exemptions for all forms of investment and interest payments 
would no longer qualify as a deduction. Dividends would be treated as 
under the classical system. 
From a political visibility point of view this would look 
an attractive option, as VAT permits a close link with 
Community citizens and the familiarity of the EC's involve-
ment in it will tend to reduce objections by national authori-
ties. 
However, once rules on VAT have reached their final phase 
as envisaged by the Commission, the economic case is rather 
weak. The permanent VAT regime, to be established before 
the end of the decade, will be characterized by minimum 
rates on a broadly harmonized base, as well as by the 
application of the origin principle for tax collection and the 
destination principle for eventual tax receipts. With VAT on 
intra-EC exports no longer zero-rated and revenue accruing 
to the country of final consumption, a clearing mechanism 
will be called for to undertake cross-border VAT transfers 
between national fiscs. Under such a regime, the absence of 
border controls should not give rise to any serious externality 
problems or regional arbitrariness difficulties. The remaining 
scope for microeconomic distortions arising from cross-bor-
der shopping will be confined geographically to border re-
5 See for example Meade (1978), Bradford (1980) or King in Padoa-
Schioppa (1987). 
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gions and to certain product ranges. On the other hand, the 
deployment of a central clearing house operating on the 
basis of actual transactions offers the technical means of 
apportioning accurately Member States' claims on VAT 
revenue, whilst closing loopholes of tax evasion. 
The management by an EC agency of the clearing house 
would make it possible to monitor part of EC taxes due, but 
for the collection of VAT on purely domestic goods and 
services one would have to rely totally on the effectiveness 
of national administrations. Finally, with EC revenue eman-
ating directly from consumption purchases, the regressive 
profile of VAT will be more pronounced than under the 
current third resource. 
Leaving aside levies on fossil fuels, which will be dealt 
with in the discussion of carbon dioxide taxes, most of the 
foregoing remarks on VAT are equally valid, if not more 
so, for excises. 
In the prospective final regime on excises, there will be 
minimum duties on all alcohol, tobacco and hydrocarbon 
products. Unlike the collection procedure envisaged for 
VAT, excisable goods destined for exports will be exempt 
from duties and handled through a system of bonded ware-
houses. Duties only become applicable once the goods leave 
the bonded warehouses in the country of destination. Pro-
vided that minima are fixed high enough that total price 
differentials do not trigger massive cross-frontier purchases 
of liquor and tobacco, this double-destination regime for 
excises should be able to absorb well the disappearance 
of border controls.1 Assigning excises to the supranational 
government is therefore hard to uphold on economic 
grounds. 
Furthermore, excises at EC level would have an even 
stronger regressive incidence than VAT, because their rev-
enue elasticity with regard to GNP is low, and high with 
respect to rate increases.2 Political sensitivities at Member 
State level are not to be underestimated either. Excises reflect 
closely a society's value judgments on the consumption of 
goods with health risks, which forms part of the explanation 
for the limited progress registered so far in the fixing of 
minimum levels. 
With the exception of the cash flow corporate tax, whose 
introduction is not on the political cards for now, all poten-
tial sources of finance reviewed hitherto fail to fulfil one or 
more important criteria contained in Table 31. The last two 
types of taxes to be examined do appear, however, highly 
suitable as future own resources of the Community. 
The first concerns the seigniorage of the future European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
The greater part of the revenue of a central bank stems from 
its monopoly position as issuer of liabilities carrying no 
remuneration (in the case of banknotes) or one below the 
market rate of interest (in the case of compulsory commercial 
bank deposits). These liabilities make up the monetary base. 
Seigniorage, or income of monetary origin, is the return 
on interest-bearing assets forming the counterpart to the 
monetary base. 
With the entry into Stage III of EMU, the Community's 
single monetary policy will be conducted by the ESCB, 
composed of the European Central Bank and the present 
national central banks (NCBs). A large part of currency will 
continue to be issued by NCBs and commercial bank reserves 
against deposits will be kept with NCBs, such that each 
NCB will have as a liability a certain share of the ESCB's 
aggregate monetary base. However, much like in the case 
of customs revenue, a 'correct' distribution of seigniorage 
among the Member States is very hard to make, the more 
so as part of it will derive from the holding of ecus by third-
country residents. 
The chief reason is that, because the EC's monetary base 
will have become an indissoluble whole, the part held by an 
individual NCB is unlikely to reflect accurately the volume 
of cash balances and reserves held by resident individuals 
and banks, as high powered money issued by any one NCB 
is legal tender in all other EMU members. More fundamen-
tally, any monetary policy operation and exchange market 
intervention affecting the EC money supply will have reper-
cussions in the interbank market and thus lead to a reallo-
cation of the monetary base among NCBs. As it results from 
a truly common policy, ESCB seigniorage forms, from an 
economic point of view, a first-best own resource for the 
Community, especially once the banknotes and coins of the 
12 national currencies have been taken out of circulation.3·4 
1 It should be remarked, though, that maintaining exemption for exports 
upon the removal of border controls, reinforces, céleris paribus, the 
incentives for smuggling and counterfeiting fiscal tags. 
2 See Spahn (1993b). 
It should be mentioned in this regard that central bank shareholders 
other than the union authorities should not necessarily receive their full 
share of central bank profits. Since the right to issue high-powered 
money is a privilege conferred by the state, the proceeds belong in 
principle to the State. This argument is well-reflected in the practice of 
federal countries, including the USA and Switzerland where, from a 
legal point of view, State monetary institutions issue currency or hold 
all shares in public hands. In the USA, where the federal government is 
not a shareholder of any of the 12 Federal reserves, virtually all of net 
earnings is transferred to the US Treasury. In Switzerland, compensation 
to the cantons for the loss of their issuance right was gradually phased 
out in real terms. 
ESCB seigniorage as an own resource could pose some problems in the 
event that the monetary union would not comprise the whole of the 
Community, i.e. if one or more Member States would not participate 
in the final stage of EMU. 
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Table 32 
Illustrative example of the evolution of seigniorage income to GDP 1989-98 
199« 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
0,64 
0,42 
0,68 
2,44 
2,02 
0,49 
0,52 
1,25 
0,10 
0,64 
3,42 
0,28 
0,75 
0,46 
0,86 
2,33 
1,88 
0,55 
0,58 
1,29 
0,11 
0,79 
3,57 
0,34 
0,72 
0,42 
0,78 
2,09 
1,66 
0,51 
0,56 
1,15 
0,13 
0,75 
3,04 
0,34 
0,68 
0,39 
0,71 
1,85 
1,46 
0,47 
0,54 
1,01 
0,15 
0,70 
2,54 
0,33 
0,65 
0,36 
0,64 
1,61 
1,26 
0,44 
0,51 
0,87 
0,16 
0,65 
2,07 
0,32 
0,60 
0,32 
0,57 
1,37 
1,07 
0,40 
0,47 
0,74 
0,16 
0,60 
1,63 
0,30 
0,56 
0,29 
0,51 
1,14 
0,88 
0,36 
0,43 
0,61 
0,17 
0,55 
1,22 
0,28 
0,51 
0,25 
0,45 
0,90 
0,71 
0,32 
0,39 
0,48 
0,17 
0,51 
0,85 
0,26 
0,46 
0,22 
0,39 
0,67 
0,54 
0,28 
0,34 
0,36 
0,16 
0,46 
0,50 
0,23 
0,46 
0,22 
0,39 
0,67 
0,54 
0,28 
0,34 
0,36 
0,16 
0,46 
0,50 
0,23 
Underlying working hypotheses: 
1. Steady state reached in 1997. 
2. Banknotes to GDP ratio held constant at 1989 value. 
3. Interest rate on money base proxied by capital market rate (short rate in Greece). Declines linearly to 5% in 1997. 
4. Reserves from banks in the EC converge to 2% in 1997 on a representative broad money aggregate. 
5. Interest rates on remunerated reserves converge to zero by 1997. 
6. Ratio of representative broad aggregate to GDP held constant at last known level. 
7. Exchange rates fixed at the ecu central rate following UK entry for 1990 and subsequent years (except for Greece and Portugal whose rates depreciate by Nominal GDP growth minus 6% 
until they join the ERM (assumed to take place in 1994 in Portugal and 1997 in Greece. 
8. Nominal GDP growth rates converge linearly to 5% by 1997. Thereafter constant. 
9. The May 1990 change to reserves in Spain was assumed counterfactually to have been in place throughout 1990. 
Being an implicit tax, seigniorage suffers from an almost 
complete lack of visibility (except in times of high inflation), 
but this very nature will make it presumably much less 
controversial for national politicians to transfer this type of 
revenue than an explicit levy. 
At least as far as the next 10 to 15 years are concerned, 
the order of magnitude of seigniorage would fit well the 
Community's prospective increase in finance needs as outli-
ned in the previous chapter. Total seigniorage amounted in 
1989 to about 0,65% of EC GDP. As obligatory bank 
deposits will have come down towards the levels in the 
countries without capital controls, nominal interest rates will 
be identical throughout the union and lower than today's 
average, and more efficient payment systems will have been 
installed in the less developed Member States. Hence, 
seigniorage in Stage III is likely to fall short of the present 
level. On plausible assumptions elaborated by the BIS — 
which do not account for the probable surge in ecu holdings 
by third-country, especially Eastern European, residents — 
Table 32 shows that total EC seigniorage can be expected 
to shrink by the end of the century to about 0,4% of EC 
GDP. 
Because of these probable developments during the tran-
sition period, moreover, the regressive characteristics of cur-
rent seigniorage can be expected to have vanished to a large 
extent at the time of the move to Stage III. 
Finally, seigniorage would also be a convenient own resource 
from the viewpoint of the management of revenue collection. 
Monitoring should be relatively swift, as only 13 agents are 
involved, the ECB and the 12 NCBs.1 
The search for new own resources is rounded off by assessing 
the suitability of environmental taxes, and more specifically 
of the revenue from taxes, or pollution permit auctions, to 
curb the emission of carbon dioxide (C02). As indicated in 
the final column of Table 31, it turns out that on virtually 
all counts this revenue would qualify very well as a source 
of Community finance. 
Concern for the protection of the environment has risen 
significantly over the last few years. One area that has 
increasingly become the focus of attention at the inter-
national level is the risk of drastic climatic change due to 
Incentives need to be sought that motivate NCBs to manage efficiently 
the assets forming the counterpart of their share of the common monet-
ary base and to keep their operating costs in check. A possibility could 
be to leave a certain percentage of the return on its assets. Care should 
be taken, however, to ensure that seigniorage considerations do not in 
any serious way influence the conduct of monetary policy. 
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the heightened concentration of greenhouse gases, more than 
half of which is caused by carbon dioxide.1 The overwhelm-
ing majority of carbon dioxide emissions stem from the 
combustion of fossil fuels: coal, oil and, to a lesser extent, 
natural gas. The Community has set itself the task of stabiliz-
ing C0 2 emission by 2000 at the 1990 level, representing a 
reduction of between 10 and 15% compared to the baseline 
scenario.2 
cated from an administrative point of view, would be to 
levy the C0 2 tax directly on primary energy producers or 
importers. But this would give rise to a serious regional 
arbitrariness and fairness problem if the proceeds from the 
tax — or the auctioned permits — remained with the source 
country. In analogy with the Rotterdam effect as regards 
customs duties, there would arise, so to speak, an Aberdeen 
or Groningen effect. 
There is a growing consensus that to achieve this goal, 
market-based instruments should play a central role, because 
of their economic efficiency. These instruments can basically 
take on a dual shape: on the one hand, taxes, which fix the 
price of emissions, leaving the volume of pollution to market 
decisions; on the other, tradable emission rights, fixing the 
total permissible volume of pollution and leaving the price 
per emission to the market. Given the fact that the Com-
munity has adopted a quantitative target, pollution rights' 
auctioning would seem quite an appealing option from a 
theoretical point of view.3 
It was pointed out previously (Section 4.1.2) that when 
the effects of polluting activities spill across borders, such 
market-based instruments need to be harmonized at Com-
munity level4 since otherwise they will be set at a suboptimal 
level of stringency. In fact, for this harmonization to yield 
an efficient outcome, it should result in total uniformity 
throughout the Community, because marginal costs of emis-
sion reduction ought to be identical in all Member States. 
However, not only are there sound reasons for putting in 
place uniform market-based instruments to internalize the 
externality, there exists also a clear economic case for as-
signing the ensuing revenue to the supranational level of 
government. Carbon fuel taxes could be incorporated in 
national excises but a serious drawback of this tax method 
could be that it would only affect final energy consumers 
and not, for example, electricity producers turning on non-
nuclear power stations. A better way, albeit more compli-
C0 2 levies or permits as a Community own resource would 
also score well on political grounds. In the wake of the 
'greening' of public opinion, they are likely to be accepted 
without difficulty by the electorate, in particular if they were 
compensated by cuts in other tax areas. Also, as a levy on 
the carbon content of fuels (on top of existing excises) would 
form in most countries a new source of income, Member 
States would probably not reject the idea of revenue sharing 
with the Community, although the likelihood of their object-
ing would increase if the compensatory tax reductions would 
fall upon them. 
Table 33 offers a picture of the current levels of C0 2 emis-
sions in the Community and of the tax revenue a USD 10 
per barrel carbon tax would yield. The revenue estimates 
exhibit an upward bias as they are static and therefore do 
not account for the decrease in carbon fuel consumption by 
firms and households following the rise in energy prices. 
However, in the short run this overstatement is probably 
minor with the price elasticity of energy consumption esti-
mated to be around -0,2. The mechanical computations 
underlying Table 7.6 suggest a USD 10 carbon tax would 
generate about 1,1% of GDP. Obviously, with total EC 
expenditure mounting over the next 10 to 15 years to perhaps 
2% of EC GDP on the one hand, and an expansion of 
the current fourth resource as well as the attribution of 
seigniorage on the other, total C0 2 revenue would be likely 
to exceed Community financial needs by a wide margin. 
Excess revenue should then be handed over to the Member 
States on the basis of a tax-sharing arrangement. 
Besides, carbon dioxide is a 'key' pollutant as its emission is usually 
combined with the emission of other gases (CO, NOx, S02) with negative 
environmental consequences. 
In its October 1991 communication, the Commission proposed a combi-
nation of a CO2 tax with a general energy tax where the energy com-
ponent should not exceed 50%. 
The rationale for tradable permits is that each polluter buys the right 
to emit a certain amount of C02. With each permit holder comparing 
the cost of reducing emissions with the benefits of selling his permit, the 
market sees to it that emissions are reduced where this is least expensive. 
Additionally, the greenhouse effect is a classic example of literally 
global environmental risk. Reaching a world agreement on emission 
stabilization targets is likely to be attained more readily if the Com-
munity speaks with one voice at the international negotiations. 
As to equity, the carbon dioxide levy looks slightly regress-
ive, although the picture is by no means simple as the C0 2 
intensity of an economy is the outcome of a multitude of 
factors such as the share and technological level of the 
industrial sector in economic activity, climate, the price of 
energy, the input mix of electricity generation, etc. Spain 
would contribute less than average, Greece and Ireland 
clearly more. In order to correct for this imbalance, one 
could contemplate using carbon dioxide emissions per unit 
of GDP as the distribution key in the tax sharing arrange-
ment, or even a progressive key conditioned on local public 
finance measures — tax incentives or direct spending — to 
boost energy savings or C0 2 reductions, which would am-
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Table 33 
CO2 emissions and 'static" public finance effects of a USD 10 per barrel carbon tax 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 
C0 2 emissions2 
29,1 
13,8 
156,1 
18,6 
55,0 
97,5 
8,0 
102,8 
3,3 
38,7 
10,3 
154,0 
C0 2 emissions 
per unit of GDP 
0,21 
0,14 
0,17 
0,38 
0,16 
0,11 
0,26 
0,13 
0,52 
0,19 
0,25 
0,20 
CO, tax revenue as 
a percentage of GDPJ 
1,47 
1,25 
1,21 
2,45 
0,95 
0,79 
1,93 
0,89 
3,08 
1,38 
1,37 
1,53 
760,9 0,17 1,14 
1 Calculation in 'static' means that no reduction in CO, emissions is assumed upon introduction of the tax. 
2 In millions of tons of carbon. 
3 Production tax with exemption of non-energy use. 
Source: Commission services, data relate to 1989. 
ount to an implicit earmarking of the tax 
auction proceeds. 
or permit 
Lastly, as far as the managerial aspects are concerned, the 
collection of a levy on primary energy producers or importers 
would seem fairly straightforward given their limited num-
ber. Given the bulkiness of coal, oil and gas, the scope for 
unreported transactions does not appear substantial either. 
Although it has never been experimented on a large inter-
national scale, auctioning emission permits through a Com-
munity agency might prove simpler still. However, it raises 
the additional question — unrelated to public finance con-
siderations — of controlling the compliance with the pol-
lution ceiling set by the permits. 
7.4. Summary of policy recommendations for 
the short and longer-term development of 
own resources 
Before the introduction of a single currency, own resources 
should seek to display overall proportionality, i.e. a coun-
try's share in Community revenue should be in line with its 
prosperity per capita. While the Edinburgh agreement will 
be conducive to this goal, full proportionality should be 
achieved by applying a 'proportionality ensuring' key to 
the current so-called fourth resource, consisting of national 
contributions on the basis of GNP. 
The timing of recourse to additional sources of finance 
will be contingent on the speed of progress towards the 
accomplishment of economic and monetary union. In order 
to achieve a union-wide uniform tax regime, to forestall an 
unfair regional distribution of proceeds, and to establish a 
more visible fiscal link between the Community and its 
citizens, the Community should from the start be conferred 
with at least part of the revenue from the prospective carbon 
dioxide taxes or pollution certificate sales. Seigniorage as-
sociated with the single currency should accrue virtually 
entirely to the supranational level of government as it stems 
from a truly common policy whose revenue is basically 
impossible to apportion to individual countries in an econ-
omically sensible way. Shared taxes or EC surcharges on 
corporate profits or, preferably, cash flow, could form a 
suitable candidate in the somewhat more remote future. 
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Chapter 8 
Budgetary fairness 
One of the main driving forces behind the political discussion 
on EC public finance over the last two decades has been the 
question oí juste retour, i.e. Member States' net budgetary 
positions and their perceived fairness relative to national 
income per capita. 
Not only have these issues profoundly marked the course of 
the budget debate, they may also risk exerting a negative 
influence on the formulation of EC policies in general, with 
Member States keeping a constant eye on the national inci-
dence of budgetary implications of Commission proposals, 
eclipsing consideration of their merits per se. 
8.1. The resource flow principle 
Intense debates on budgetary fairness are by no means the 
preserve of the EC. In fact, they recur in all federations, 
where the 'distribution of benefits' from union and compen-
sation of inequities have been a potent issue both during 
the union formation process and afterwards when initial 
budgetary flow settlements were called into question. The 
strained discussions about interregional redistribution 
among the German Länder following unification offers a 
striking recent example. 
In the case of the Community, however, problems are com-
pounded by three factors. First, as remarked in the previous 
chapter, the EC budget is financed through funds that are 
either directly transferred or collected by national govern-
ments, which heightens the visibility of imbalances and con-
centrates political conflict over them. Second, the strongly 
disparate economic position, and divergent preferences (see 
the 'frustration' costs alluded to in Section 3.1.1), of the 
Member States diminish the likelihood of the non-budgetary 
benefits of union being fairly shared. Third, and most funda-
mentally, the meaning of 'fairness' in the EC context has 
never been well-defined, let alone agreed, principally because 
the status of the Community as a 'political' or 'social' union, 
especially in comparison with the 'union' at the Member 
State level, is not sufficiently clear yet. ' 
Even so, the current depth of integration is such that the 
fairness concept has evolved well-beyond the literal juste 
retour notion that Member States should receive from the 
EC budget what they have contributed. It seems reasonable 
to state that the 'resource flow' principle,2 which is firmly 
established in all federations and stipulates that resources 
should flow from richer to poorer Member States, has be-
come generally accepted by now. 
However, given the lack of a more precise consensus and 
the fact that evidently the EC budget has to serve objectives 
other than equity, this report doubts whether it would be 
possible or desirable to give this principle a very detailed 
operational content or to apply it in a rigid manner. 
8.2. The budgetary fairness debate in the past 
Although the concern for budgetary fairness is shared by all 
countries, it has in the past been expressed most strongly by 
the UK, but also by Spain and Germany. From the time of 
its accession in 1973, the UK has claimed it suffered from a 
budgetary inequity problem, which set the stage for protrac-
ted periods of negotiation between 1975 and 1984. Spain 
voiced its dissatisfaction about the modest level of its net 
receipts and demanded, with the backing of the other three 
cohesion countries, Treaty modifications during the 1991 
intergovernmental conferences towards progressivity on the 
revenue side and the creation of a budgetary equalization 
scheme. These demands were to some extent obviated in the 
Treaty on European Union through the establishment of a 
Cohesion Fund (Article 130d) and the protocol on cohesion 
stating that greater account needs to be taken of the con-
tributive capacity of individual Member States in the system 
of own resources. Germany, on the other hand, which has 
long been the Community's main paymaster, has recently 
been pressing for changes in budgetary burden-sharing, 
given the large economic transformation costs in the ex-
GDR. 
The nettle of budgetary fairness was grasped for a first time 
in 1974, after the Wilson government had singled out the 
EC budget's inequitable outcome for the UK as the chief 
item for renegotiation of the British terms of entry. Ac-
cepting the British point of view in principle, the European 
Council asked for the elaboration of a corrective mechanism 
that would be generally applicable and avoid the emergence 
of 'unacceptable' situations for any individual Member 
State.3 The response to this request led to the adoption, in 
1976, of what became known as the 'financial mechanism'. 
Under this mechanism a country was entitled to a reimburse-
This important point is revisited in Chapter 11. 
2 See Reichenbach (1983). 
3 See Strasser (1990), p. 155. 
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ment of part of its excess contributions if a set of three 
conditions was met: 
(i) a country's GNP per capita had to be below 85% of 
Community average; 
(ii) the claimant's GNP growth rate should not be higher 
than 120% of Community average; 
(iii) the country's share in Community revenue should ex-
ceed its share in Community GDP by at least 10%. 
The financial mechanism thus displayed a number of note-
worthy traits. First, budgetary fairness considerations could 
only be invoked by relatively poor countries. Second, it was 
designed to deal with problems of excessive contributions, 
and not of insufficient receipts. Third, corrections were made 
by way of reimbursements rather than through supplemen-
tary expenditure in favour of the country in question. 
In the event, the mechanism was never activated because, of 
the three countries which had been expected to be eligible, 
Ireland and Italy continued to be net beneficiaries, whilst 
the strong appreciation of sterling pushed the UK over the 
85% threshold. 
As this mechanism did not bring any relief, a second compen-
sation scheme was deployed by the European Council in 
1979. It differed from the former mechanism in that it 
provided for special measures for the UK, in the form of 
increased Regional Fund outlays benefiting Britain. More-
over, the annual level of compensation was not fixed by a 
clear, predetermined set of parameters, but it became the 
result of frequently bitter negotiations in the Council of 
Ministers. 
In order to stop the annual recurrence of such a budgetary 
bargaining process, which consumed a disproportionate am-
ount of political energy, it was agreed at Fontainebleau in 
1984 to introduce a new UK-specific compensation mechan-
ism, this time operating a correction at source. The 1984 
accord was prolonged in 1988 and again in 1992, so that it 
will remain operative to 1999 inclusive. It provides for the 
refund to the UK, by way of a reduction in the UK VAT 
base, of 66% of the difference between the UK's percentage 
share of VAT payments and its percentage share of allocated 
Community expenditure, applied to total allocated expendi-
ture.1 
Given the emphasis on cohesion in the revised Treaty, it was 
natural that the Edinburgh agreement was strongly shaped 
by budgetary fairness considerations. Its execution will sig-
nificantly improve the four lagging countries' net budgetary 
position, which for Ireland and Greece, two clear benefici-
aries of CAP expenditure, could grow to more than 8% of 
local real income. However, in order to avoid a too abrupt 
adjustment for the others, especially Italy which looks set to 
become a net contributor, this quarter equity in the budget 
will emerge only gradually. 
8.3. Alternative approaches to ensuring budget-
ary fairness 
The Community's endeavours to date to cope with budgetary 
inequity situations have thus been pragmatic, searching for 
specific solutions as the need arose.2 
However, in some cases, such as the UK compensation 
settlements during the early 1980s, this pragmatism verged 
dangerously towards 'ad hocery' and horse-trading. In order 
to avert this danger, the idea has been regularly advanced 
that there should be a set of corrective, 'below the line' 
balancing operations that would be triggered automatically 
and applied uniformly in the event of an emerging equity 
problem. The most elegant elaboration, so far, of this idea 
can be found in the Padoa-Schioppa report,3 which rec-
ommended the creation of an equity safeguard mechanism 
assuring that for each individual country a certain predeter-
mined standard of net transfer fairness was attained. By 
means of a precise formula, whose parameters would need 
to be fixed in a political negotiation process, a fiscal pro-
gressivity curve would be established, mapping the agreed 
inverse relationship between net balances and real income 
per head. Around this curve there would be bands forming 
the edges of the safeguard mechanism. If a country's net 
budgetary position were to fall outside the bands, the mech-
anism would prompt balancing payments to or from the EC 
budget until that country's position was brought back to the 
edge of the band.4 
It is to be noted that although the formula governing the rebate remains 
unchanged under the Edinburgh accord, its value for the UK diminishes 
on account of the decreasing importance of the VAT resource in total 
EC revenue. 
As a matter of fact, this approach was also pursued relative to country-
specific claims in the context of enlargement, as exemplified by the 
integrated Mediterranean programmes (in favour of Greece, Italy, and 
France) on the eve of the Spanish and Portuguese accessions, and the 
industrial support programme (PEDIP) for Portugal. 
Padoa-Schioppa report, pp. 104-108, and Annex D. 
In a bid to introduce macroeconomic conditionality, the Padoa-Schi-
oppa report advocated exempting lagging countries enjoying a too 
generous budgetary treatment from the refunding obligation provided 
they committed themselves to the pursuit of national macroeconomic 
and public finance adjustment policies. 
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Once the Council had settled the vital and therefore politi-
cally highly sensitive technical details on the method of 
allocating for each country every revenue and expenditure 
item, the composition of the formula and the width of the 
band, such a balancing mechanism would, by virtue of its 
ex ante transparency, defuse any incipient row on budgetary 
burden-sharing and thereby remove a stumbling block to 
sound Community policy-making. 
Such an equity safeguard mechanism would possess the 
systemically attractive characteristics of clarity and uniform 
applicability. 
Although these advantages are undisputed, the serious prob-
lem with any sort of budgetary balancing procedure is that 
it begs several fundamental questions about the notion, the 
measurement and the method of correction of perceived 
budgetary inequity. 
(i) The notion of budgetary inequity 
apparently high contributions from Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Ireland, which often form the point of entry for 
goods consumed or processed elsewhere in the Community. 
For want of information on the eventual destination within 
the EC of extra-EC imports, the proceeds from' customs 
duties and other import levies cannot be attributed by Mem-
ber State. By the same token, as demonstrated in Ott (1987), 
export refunds, claiming about one third of CAP spending 
or some 20% of the total budget, display the mirror image 
of the 'Rotterdam effect': they are recorded as accruing to 
the country where the goods leave the Community, but that 
Member State is not necessarily where the agricultural goods 
were produced. Obviously, it is the country of the original 
producers that is to a large extent the ultimate beneficiary 
of the budgetary intervention. Here again, statistical infor-
mation is lacking, and the completion of the internal market 
can only add to this problem. Finally, allocating between 
Member States the benefits of aid to the rest of the world, 
whose importance — as recommended in this report — 
should increase to about 30% of the total budget, is also 
bound to be largely arbitrary. 
The juste retour question expressed in narrow budgetary 
terms is ill-conceived as it ignores the much wider, and 
arguably more important, costs and benefits of Community 
membership, which transcend the strict economic dimension. 
If net public finance transfers formed the overriding factor, 
the economic or political consequences of EC membership 
would, for most countries, be trivial. It should be underlined 
here that the Community delivers a broad variety of 'public 
goods' benefits for the Member States, ranging from the 
internal market and monetary union, over common policies 
in the areas of competition, energy, environment, etc. to an 
enhanced role in world affairs. Because of the joint benefits 
it allows, the Community budget can by no means be seen 
as a zero-sum-game for all 12 countries together. The value 
of these non-budgetary benefits is very difficult to estimate 
by country, but, as remarked earlier, they cannot be assumed 
a priori to be spread equitably. 
(ii) The measurement of budgetary inequity 
Any net budgetary balancing mechanism is predicated on 
the hypothesis that Community revenue and outlays can be 
allocated on a country-basis. It turns out, however, that 
even if one limits the analysis to the strictly budgetary 
incidence of Community taxes and transfers, apportionment 
is more complex than appears at first sight. 
In attempting to calculate net budgetary incidence, customs 
duties and agricultural levies are at present apportioned to 
the Member State collecting them. This gives rise to the so-
called 'Rotterdam' effect, explaining to a large extent the 
All in all, 25% of revenue and 40% of expenditure are hard 
to apportion on a national basis. 
(iii) Pitfalls of 'below the line' corrective flows 
The idea of a net equity safeguard scheme is that Member 
States deviating unduly from their 'fair' position would make 
or receive compensatory payments to or from the budget. 
Balancing operations of this kind may, however, create prob-
lems of their own. 
Unless a wide enough range of acceptable net budgetary 
outcomes for a given level of real income per capita relative 
to the EC average were permitted, a Member State's interest 
in the conduct of specific policies could strongly diminish, 
especially if, because of an inequitable position, it were 
entitled to refunds in the balancing operation. However, the 
wider the margins of acceptable outcomes, the less meaning-
ful an equity safeguard mechanism becomes. 
The reason for this likely decline in interest is that such 
refunds are tantamount to unconditional block grants. For 
a lagging Member State, the latter may look politically more 
attractive than, say, an expansion of the conditional and 
matching grants of the Structural Funds. More generally, 
an automatic equity safeguard mechanism would operate 
along much the same lines as an income-based horizontal 
fiscal equalization scheme, whose introduction was judged 
in the previous chapter to be premature at the current stage 
of integration. 
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Preventing pronounced imbalances 
An automatic corrective mechanism can at best come to 
grips only partially with the foregoing three questions. Fur-
thermore, given vested interests and the nature of decision-
making in the Council, one may doubt the political feasibility 
of a radical change in approach to the net equity safeguard 
mechanism. 
Formulating a satisfactory response to perceived budgetary 
inequity turns out to be an exercise in a second-best world 
characterized by strongly imperfect information and incen-
tive problems. It should therefore be realized that an ideal 
situation is very hard, if not impossible, to arrive at. 
These observations do, obviously, not remove budgetary 
fairness concerns. Accordingly, a strategy based on the flex-
ible application of the resource flow principle which would 
prevent the occurrence of pronounced inequitable positions 
but at the same time leave enough room for negotiations to 
determine the precise level of redistribution and the specific 
problems of Member States, would appear the 'least bad' 
approach. For such a strategy to be effective, a high level 
of union loyalty ('Bundestreue') is required on the side of 
all partners, as the dividing line between flexibility and 'ad 
hocery' or arbitrariness is often a fine one. At any rate, 
the long-term evolution of the budget as recommended in 
previous chapters, including proportionality on the revenue 
side, a shift from product to producer support under the 
CAP, expansion and further reform of the Structural Funds, 
and a rise in aid to third countries, would achieve the 
prevention of pronounced imbalances. Indeed some may 
argue that the Edinburgh agreement, with its clear redistribu-
tive profile, sufficiently accommodates reasonable equity 
concerns already. 
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Chapter 9 
Loan instruments in EMU 
Having charted the desirable course of EC expenditure and 
revenue over the next 15 years, attention is focused presently 
on an often overlooked dimension of Community public 
finance, namely borrowing for on-lending, and/or the pro-
vision of supranational loan guarantees. It merits separate 
treatment because these instruments, which require reforms 
on managerial grounds, also need to undergo profound 
changes with the advent of EMU. 
This chapter first summarizes the economic rationale of loan 
instruments. Second, it provides a bird's eye view of the 
Community's past and present loan activities as well as an 
appraisal of them. Subsequently, a brief assessment is offered 
as to how the relative efficiency of loan instruments will be 
affected by EMU. The ensuing policy recommendations are 
formulated by way of a conclusion. 
9.1. Loans versus grants 
The economic case for use of loan instruments hinges on 
capital market imperfections. If capital markets were ef-
ficient, i.e. if they evaluated on the basis of all available 
information the credit-worthiness of borrowers or the ex-
pected return of projects in a correct fashion, it would be 
pointless for the Community to resort to loan instruments. 
The correction for cross-border externalities, stabilization 
support, or the pursuit of redistributive goals should then 
take the form of outright grants or of present discounted 
value equivalent loan subsidies. It follows that Community 
intervention in this area should preferably be geared as a 
general rule to financial product innovation or risky ven-
tures, since this is where imperfections are likely to occur 
most frequently. 
The Community can circumvent the problem of unduly high 
borrowing costs or credit rationing owing to financial market 
inefficiencies by acting itself as an intermediary, passing on 
the benefits of its credit reputation through on-lending, or 
by guaranteeing debt, thereby lowering the primary lender's 
risk to virtually nil. The improvement of financial conditions 
for the eventual borrower does not come, however, without 
costs. As explained in Kuhlmann (1993), it entails a financial 
and administrative burden for the Community and may 
spawn distorting side-effects in capital markets. The financial 
burden arises from the fact that unless intergenerational 
equity concerns are ignored and future European taxpayers 
are left to settle any shortfalls, provisions need to be made 
against the risk of failure of redemption. The administrative 
onus, consisting chiefly of the human resources tied up 
in the necessary investment banking operations, cannot be 
totally overlooked either.1 
On the other hand, in view of the sizeable volume of loans 
taken up by Community institutions, placing them among 
the largest single issuers of debt on international capital 
markets, the influence exerted by direct Community bor-
rowing and lending, or loan subsidies for that matter, on 
competition in financial markets should also be recognized. 
A loan carrying a Community guarantee or interest subsidy 
is very attractive for banks as it permits them to expand 
their activities without incurring the degree of risk attached 
to other lending options. If the issuance of such loans or 
bonds is not disclosed ex ante such that the associated 
advantage can be auctioned, a discrimination emerges be-
tween banks. Similarly, and much in the same way as for 
public enterprises in any other sector that are not under 
pressure to realize the normal market return on assets, direct 
Community loans complicate the business of private banks, 
unless they are restricted to vacant financial product niches. 
In sum, the potential drawbacks of Community borrowing 
and lending subscribe well to the general notion advanced 
earlier that public intervention raises welfare only to the 
extent that the inevitable costs of government failure do not 
exceed benefits from correcting market failure. 
9.2. The past and present use of Community 
loan instruments 
9.2.1. Concise factual overview 
An extensive set of loan instruments has developed over the 
40 years since the creation of the Coal and Steel Community. 
The various instruments on offer differ as to their nature 
(loans, guarantees, interest subsidies), their purpose (micro-
or macroeconomic) and their institutional framework (legal 
basis, institution in charge). The following catalogue is or-
ganized around the micro-macro dichotomy and will ignore 
the EC's loan activities in third countries, although it should 
be remarked that their usefulness is often strongest there. 
Loan instruments with a microeconomic objective 
The aggregate evolution of the volume of outstanding loans 
and subsidies for microeconomic purposes since the second 
half of the 1970s is portrayed in Graphs 7 and 8. 
The EIB and Commission employ about 800 staff for borrowing and 
lending activities. The EIB charges a flat 0,2% mark up to cover 
operating costs. 
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GRAPH 7: Loans 1975­92 
Billion ECU 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 
ΓΤΤΙ ECSC E 2 Euratom H i NCI □ EIB ^ MTFA J 
The development of the Community loan activity (disbursed loans) can be seen from the graph above. The graph shows that overall Community loan activity 
has grown considerably over the last 27 years. EIB operations largely account for this. In 1990 the EIB accounted for nearly 93 % of all Community loan 
operations. The graph below gives an overview of the interest subsidies paid out. The different categories are described in the main text. 
In 1992, this volume stood at more than ECU 15 billion, of 
which roughly 95% was accounted for by EIB operations. 
Essentially four different intervention channels can be dis­
tinguished: 
(i) ECSC loans, guarantees and interest subsidies 
The Treaty of Paris empowers the Commission to undertake 
loans for on­lending with a view to supporting restructuring 
and reconversion in the coal and steel industries. Subject to 
some relatively general provisos, it also allows for loan 
guarantees, to which interest subsidies also may be attached. 
(ii) European Investment Bank loans 
Created in 1957, the EIB finances up to 50% of long­term 
investment projects. Its task, as laid down in the Treaty of 
Rome (Articles 130 and 130b), is basically twofold: the first 
runs parallel to the interventions of the Structural Funds 
and concerns support to projects in lagging and industrially 
declining regions; the second is to finance investments of 
interest to one Member State1 or to several, 'which are of 
such size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by 
the various means available in the individual Member 
States'. This last clause is usually interpreted as a precon­
dition pertaining to local financial market imperfection. 
The risk the EIB incurs in its lending operations is minimal 
because its loans are almost invariably guaranteed by na­
tional authorities or by another Community institution. As 
a result, it has since its establishment not yet been obliged 
to write off a debt. EIB loans do not in principle benefit 
from interest subsidies.2 Italy is traditionally the EIB's larg­
est client, absorbing close to ECU 4 billion or 30% of credits 
in 1990. Spain and the UK each accounted for 15%. 
(iii) Euratom loans 
Under the Euratom Treaty, the Community can borrow to 
finance research and investment in nuclear energy. The EIB 
administers the loans. 
'... undertakings called for by the progressive establishment of the com­
mon market' (Article 130). 
The reconstruction loans in the aftermath of earthquakes (Italy in 1980, 
Greece in 1981 and 1986) form an exception to this rule. Subsidies are 
paid out of the general EC budget. 
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GRAPH 8: Interest subsidies, 1977­92 
Million ECU 
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 
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Source: Commission services. 
(iv) New Community Instrument (NCI) loans 
Created for a first time in 1978, the NCI (also known as 
the Ortoli facility) was conceived as an anti­cyclical policy 
instrument in that it was designed chiefly to stimulate invest­
ment.1 However, under subsequent NCI tranches, the alloca­
tive aspects have become preponderant with support specifi­
cally geared to small and medium­sized enterprises. 
In all four cases, loans play an overwhelming role, with 
the requisite resources being borrowed directly on capital 
markets. They are mostly guaranteed by the general EC 
budget, for which no fee is charged, and no provisions 
made.2 
Loan instruments with a macroeconomic objective 
The current mechanism through which the Community of­
fers support in the form of conditional loans to Member 
States with balance of payments difficulties is the medium 
The subsidized loans in 1979 to Italy and Ireland connected with the 
launching of the EMS were provided through both the NCI and the 
EIB channel. 
This practice will continue during the period covered by the Edinburgh 
agreement since the foreseen loan reserve concerns lending to non­EC 
countries only. 
Table 34 
Overview of Community loans for balance of payments assistance 
Country Amount (million) 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1983 
1985 
1991 
1993 
Italy 
Italy (10/13) 
Ireland (3/13) 
Italy 
France 
Greece 
Greece 
Italy 
EUA 1 159,2' 
USD 1 100 
DM 500 
USD 5002 
ECU 4 000 
ECU 1 750 
ECU 2 2003 
ECU 8 000 
MTFAof 1971 
Community loan 
mechanism 
Community loan 
mechanism 
Community loan 
mechanism 
Community loan 
mechanism 
MTFAof 1988 
European units of account. 
Forms part of the loan agreement of 1974. 
In three tranches: the first tranche of ECU 1 000 million was disbursed in April 1991, 
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term financial assistance (MTFA). Established in 1988, it 
merges into a single mechanism the two previously existing 
facilities for balance of payments problems.1 Table 34, taken 
from Papaspyrou (1993), lists the seven cases so far for which 
this macroeconomic loan mechanism has been activated. 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, decides 
on the magnitude and the policy adjustment conditions of 
the loan. Being typically disbursed by way of two or three 
tranches, the release of consecutive instalments is subject to 
compliance with the agreed policy modifications. 
The macroeconomic loan instrument in its present form is 
due to disappear upon the entry into force of Stage III of 
EMU, as its legal base (the current Article 108 EEC) will 
have become defunct, i.e. there will be no further call for 
balance of payments adjustment assistance for the Member 
States in the currency union. 
On the other hand, following the declaration in December 
1992 of the Edinburgh Summit on promoting economic 
recovery in Europe, the European Investment Bank has been 
empowered to create the European Investment Fund, with 
an initial endowment of ECU 2 billion funded by the EIB 
itself, the Commission and national financial institutions. 
The EIF is designed to boost economic activity by facilitating 
the financing of so-called trans-European networks and 
small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular by provid-
ing loan guarantees, but also through equity participations. 
9.2.2. Appraisal 
The broad picture that emerges is one of diversity, but 
also one of lack of clarity and delimitation. Often, new 
mechanisms have been set up in response to specific political 
or institutional constraints, resulting in overlaps and a rather 
haphazard array of instruments.2 
This sprawling development is understandable from a politi-
cal vantage point, as loans offer strong visibility and leverage 
at low or zero budgetary costs, except when defaults occur, 
in which case the burden is passed to future taxpayers. 
However, lack of coherence is bound to weaken seriously 
both the effectiveness and the efficiency of loan instruments, 
This was the medium financial assistance set up in 1971, operating on 
credits from other Member States, and the Community loan mechanism 
created in 1975 in the wake of the first oil crisis. 
A number of examples may illustrate this. Both the EIB and the ECSC 
can finance industrial reconversion. Investment in power stations may 
attract support on different terms from the EIB, the ECSC and Euratom 
depending on the source of energy input. Both the EIB and the NCI 
can extend advantageous loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
the more so as their actual use does not appear to conform 
well to their economic raison d'être associated with capital 
market imperfections. The latter are, for instance, far from 
clear in the case of lending to the UK, which nevertheless 
absorbs 15% of EIB loans. Neither is it obvious that the 
EIB should be involved in private sector projects, such 
as the acquisition of commercial aircraft in relatively rich 
Member States. More generally, in the absence of a more 
precise specification of the required 'Community' content of 
investment projects or of the capital market inefficiency 
criterion, the EIB is largely unconstrained — apart from its 
working capital — in its interventions beyond its cohesion 
remit.3 
In relation to microeconomic interventions, it should also 
be noted that the serious additionality problems dealt with 
in Chapter 6 in the context of the specific purpose grants of 
the Structural Funds carry over to loans. The effectiveness 
of balance of payments loans is easier to verify and generally 
there has been a satisfactory degree of success in redressing 
the external disequilibrium and of compliance with the econ-
omic conditionality terms. Nevertheless, there were also in-
stances, as in the case of the 1985 loan to Greece, of'stabiliz-
ation without adjustment', characterized by a swift improve-
ment of the balance of payments, unaccompanied however 
by real progress in the fundamentals driving the external 
balance position such that the performance of the country 
in question relapsed after some time. 
9.3. The effect of EMU on financial market 
imperfections 
As argued in Chapter 6, the allocative, stabilization and 
redistributive tasks emanating from EMU call for a strength-
ening of the Community's financial capacity. Inasmuch as 
the supranational contribution to the fulfilment of these 
tasks includes EC loans for microeconomic or macro-
economic purposes, EMU should in principle bolster the 
role of Community borrowing and lending operations. 
But there are probably much more powerful factors at work 
in the opposite direction. By enabling a truly single capital 
market, EMU can be expected to reduce greatly the useful-
ness of Community loan instruments. Once the effects of the 
measures towards the elimination of national barriers to 
financial services' markets have made their full impact, pri-
vate agents as well as public authorities in all Member States 
should have access to the entire width and depth of the 
Community's banking market. The financial market imper-
fections that currently may still exist in one or more lagging 
Kuhlmann (1993), p. 15. 
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country therefore will be largely overcome. Accordingly, the 
Community will increasingly become only one of a variety 
of alternative providers of funds. 
Besides removing the explicit balance of payments con-
straint, the introduction of a single currency completes the 
single market for finance, with interest rates on assets of the 
same maturity and risk being fully equalized across the 
Community. This is a decided advantage as the experience 
in the EMS has shown that even if nominal exchange rates 
are fixed de facto, and capital free to move, (real) interest 
rates do not converge completely for a long time.1 
As a consequence, the traditional motivations for Com-
munity loans look set to evaporate over time, quite apart 
from the excessive deficit considerations which, it was sug-
gested in Section 6.1, raise doubts about the use of loans 
under the financial assistance mechanism for regional stabili-
zation. 
9.4. Recommended directions of reform 
The prospect of EMU, the disappearance of the need for 
the balance of payments assistance mechanism, the expiry 
of the ECSC Treaty in 2002 and the virtual depletion of the 
funds available under the latest NCI tranche are all factors 
inviting a sweeping overhaul of the Community's loan instru-
ments. Such an undertaking clearly lies outside the scope 
of the present report, but given the wider public finance 
perspective in which the use of loan instruments ought to 
This persistent interest differential appears chiefly due to expectational 
errors regarding the credibility of exchange rates, which is sometimes 
called in the literature the 'peso problem'. See European Economy No 
44, 'One market, one money', pp. 124-125. 
be discussed, it can offer a number of policy suggestions. 
They can be summarized in four points. 
First, managerial efficiency demands that the distribution of 
borrowing and lending competences between the various 
Community institutions be revised. Provided that the links 
between the Commission and EIB were strengthened, it 
might be advocated assigning all loan instruments to the 
EIB, as it enjoys a comparative advantage in investment 
banking expertise. 
Second, in the light of the reduced relevance of loan instru-
ments in EMU, the EIB should shift the focus of its activities 
and step up considerably its efforts in third countries. There, 
its credit reputation could play an invaluable role, against 
the backdrop of the huge capital needs for modernizing 
infrastructure and the reluctance of financial markets to lend 
in the aftermath of the Third World's debt crisis. This 
stronger presence in third countries may lower the quality 
of the guarantees the EIB receives, against which it should 
make provisions for non-performing loans. 
Third, EIB operations in the relatively rich Member States 
should be diminished accordingly. More specifically, they 
should be circumscribed by a very strict interpretation of 
the notion of cross-border externalities and capital market 
imperfections. 
Finally, the EIB's involvement in the Community's lagging 
regions ought to move in the direction of risk finance and 
financial engineering. The size of the EIB's reserves is large 
enough for even considerable risk exposure. Such risk lend-
ing should be of great help in the lagging regions where the 
private financial sector can be expected to remain rather 
reluctant to provide venture capital or similar assistance. At 
the same time, this move will tend to lower the EIB's poten-
tially harmful impact on competitive conditions in capital 
markets at large. 
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Chapter 10 stay unaltered. A few, inevitably somewhat political, rec-
ommendations regarding the evolution of this balance are 
advanced at the close of the report. 
Streamlining budgetary procedures 
and control 
The changes in supranational competences to accompany 
EMU not only entail a need for modifications in the overall 
size of the Community budget, the pattern of expenditure, 
financing arrangements, and borrowing and lending oper-
ations. It also calls for adjustment of the budget procedure 
and management methods. 
Due to the loss of, or constraints on, several micro- and 
macroeconomic instruments at the national level arising 
from EMU, and economic upheavals or political turmoil 
which presently characterize large parts of the rest of the 
world, the Community budget should become more flexible 
and able to respond swiftly to emergencies, and this without 
jeopardizing the pursuit of its normal policy priorities. At 
the same time, especially in view of the stress laid by an 
increasing number of Member States and the Maastricht 
Treaty on national public finance orthodoxy, budget flexi-
bility has to be reconciled with a meticulous observance of 
budgetary discipline. 
Of course, the gradual rise in EC spending and 'own re-
sources' as advocated in previous chapters may not go down 
very well with public opinion, stiffening national political 
resistance, if the Community is not seen to be making its 
best efforts to improve budget execution and control. Media 
stories of fraud, waste, and unchecked irregularities with 
respect to the CAP, aid to third countries, the Structural 
Funds, and so on, place the Community under fire from 
friend and foe alike. Such stories tarnish the EC's reputation 
and make any new integration proposals look premature. It 
is therefore important that the Community be given the 
instruments to put its financial house in order. 
Questions of budgetary procedure, execution and control 
are usually rather technical, displaying often more legal and 
administrative aspects than economic ones, and requiring a 
lot of specific expertise. As a detailed discussion was felt to 
transcend the remit of this report, the present chapter does 
not aim at providing an exhaustive treatment of these ques-
tions. Instead, it confines its attention to arguably the two 
most important issues from an economic point of view: 
reconciling budgetary flexibility and discipline, and improv-
ing the principal/agent relationship associated with the de-
centralized implementation of EC policy. Throughout this 
chapter the institutional balance of powers is assumed to 
10.1. Budgetary flexibility versus discipline 
Since the adoption in 1988 of the interinstitutional agree-
ment, whose renewal for the period up to 1999 is currently 
under discussion, the EC budget is subject to two sorts of 
discipline. Aside from the prohibition on running a deficit, 
effectively setting the ceiling on 'own resources' (as an overall 
spending constraint) which can only be altered upon the 
consent of national parliaments, there is the additional limi-
tation emanating from the multiannual 'financial perspec-
tives' plan, fixing the yearly real growth of the EC's chief 
expenditure items. 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the principal drawback of the 
current procedure is that it is rigid, with little or no possibility 
to react to any desired shift in priorities or major unforeseen 
events. 
The weakness of this procedure, which at the national level 
would be unduly onerous and restrictive, is, however, also its 
strength in the Community context. Given the unavoidably 
confrontational relationship between Council and Parlia-
ment vying for budgetary power, a five or seven-year consen-
sus on policy priorities translated at the outset into key 
financial parameters enables budgetary 'peace' and a steady 
evolution of Community spending, thereby promoting co-
herence between annual budgetary decisions and the 
medium-term outlook. The positive aspect of the 'financial 
perspectives' strait-jacket is its predictability, which is a 
valuable asset especially in the framework of ambitious 
longer-term projects like the internal market or EMU calling 
for accompanying 'positive integration' measures with a 
significant budgetary incidence. 
Furthermore, the rigidity and balanced-budget handicap 
should not be overplayed. Given that Community objectives 
in the allocative and redistributive domain have sufficiently 
crystalized to be cast in five-year programmes, the need for 
policy switches and deficit spending would essentially relate 
to the field of stabilization. But, as argued in Chapter 4, the 
EC budget is far too small to exert a meaningful anti-cyclical 
influence on the Community as a whole. 
The great difficulty for the EC budget to respond to contin-
gencies does need to be remedied, however. Events that are 
hard, if not impossible, to predict arise mainly in relation to 
short-term assistance to third countries, regional stabiliza-
tion support (see Chapter 6) and calls on loan guarantees. 
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As they are beyond the control of the budget authority, the 
outlays they occasion should be covered by one or several 
reserve funds for well-delineated purposes. Such reserves 
could be incorporated into the general budget so long as 
they do not correspond to a sizable portion of ordinary 
expenditure. If they do, they should be managed outside the 
budget, because, in line with usual accounting principles, the 
Council will consider the theoretical maximum and not the 
average or historically highest amount of spending from 
the reserve funds, when verifying the compatibility of total 
expenditure proposals with the own resources ceiling. In-
cluded in the general budget, large reserve funds thus would 
hamper the growth potential of ordinary expenditure items. 
By creating separate reserves for, on the one hand, emer-
gency relief outside the Community and loan guarantees 
to third country borrowers on the other, the Edinburgh 
agreement goes some way towards meeting the foregoing 
concerns. However, compared to the situation between 1988 
and 1992, the overall room for budgetary flexibility will 
actually diminish in the years ahead. Whereas in the previous 
period there was a 0,03% of EC GDP margin for responding 
to unspecified contingencies, in conjunction with an ECU 1 
billion reserve for covering the rise in agricultural expendi-
ture caused by unexpected dollar/ecu exchange-rate fluctu-
ations, the 1993-99 financial perspectives plan provides for 
a margin of increase of 0,01% only, while the global magni-
tude of reserves hardly expands. Anxious to keep the rise in 
the own resources ceiling to a minimum, Member States 
have opted for a future squeeze on the scope for flexibility. 
Under such tight circumstances, budgetary crises, and the 
costs of inefficiency that go with them, may prove difficult 
to avoid. 
Discipline should be the overriding concern of EC budget 
procedures. However, it is still too early to pronounce upon 
the effectiveness of the interinstitutional agreement as an 
instrument of budgetary control. 
ruled out. This holds especially in respect of the CAP where 
vested interests are well-organized, and spending is open-
ended and inherently difficult to control, notwithstanding 
the 'early warning system' designed to ensure the observance 
of the agricultural spending constraint.1·2 
10.2. Improving decentralized budget execution 
and control 
As it is neither possible nor desirable (see Chapter 3) for the 
Commission, the body responsible for the execution of the 
budget, to manage and control directly the various expendi-
ture, revenue and transfer systems in support of Community 
policies, the day-to-day implementation of the budget relies 
on varying forms of shared management between the supra-
national, national and regional tiers of government. 
As set out in the literature on the principal/agent problem,the 
success of the devolution of executive tasks hinges upon 
three factors: 
(i) the availability of instruments allowing the principal to 
verify the agent's compliance with the task entrusted to 
him; 
(ii) the transparency and simplicity of tasks involved; 
(iii) the presence of incentives, be they positive or negative, 
for the agent to fulfil his role properly. 
It turns out that in all three domains, the decentralized 
execution of the EC budget exhibits clear room for improve-
ment. 
Verification of compliance 
In the 1988-92 period, the 'financial perspectives' were re-
spected without great difficulty because economic growth 
was stronger than expected, CAP spending grew modestly 
(at least initially) and expenditure ceilings had generally been 
set rather generously. It remains to be seen whether the 
agreement will perform better under unfavourable circum-
stances than the failed attempts at discipline made prior to 
1988 when the Council flouted constraints it had imposed 
itself. 
It would seem that as long as the problem of overruns is not 
tackled at the root and no strict, legally enforceable, link is 
established between the decisions with regard to the budget 
and expenditure-intensive policies, derailments cannot be 
In a system of multi-layer government, there is a hierarchical 
set of principal/agent relationships and a corresponding 
chain of financial responsibility and accountability links. 
The EC's budgetary authority, constituted jointly by the 
Council and Parliament, acts as the principal on behalf of 
the European taxpayer. It devolves the better part of its 
See Article 6 of the Council Decision of 24 June 1988 concerning 
budgetary discipline (88/377/EEC). 
An important step to a durable solution could be to empower the budget 
ministers to overrule decisions by other Councils threatening to trespass 
their predetermined spending maximum. The present horizontal frag-
mentation of decision-making in the Council may well prove the chief 
institutional impediment to maintaining budgetary discipline. 
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'stewardship' of Community resources to the Commission, 
which, in its turn, relies on national and regional adminis-
trations to collect own resources and ensure that Community 
outlays end up with the intended recipient. 
However, whereas through the EC Court of Auditors (whose 
role has been strengthened in the Maastricht Treaty) and 
the official 'discharge' decision by Parliament, the budgetary 
authority has potent means at its disposal to judge the 
management performance of the Commission, the latter is 
not well-equipped to control the implementation of the 
budget at national or regional level, especially outside the 
field of the CAP.1 
As set out in Groutage (1993), the accountability of national 
and regional agencies handling EC funds is obscured be-
cause, on the one hand, the Commission appears rather 
reluctant in its internal audit operations to emphasize vis-
à-vis Member States its position of superior steward by 
examining national execution performances and making its 
findings publicly known through regular reports. On the 
other, the Commission cannot at present rely on other public 
bodies for external audit assurances. 
Such a role could ideally be played by national audit services, 
which possess the best knowledge available on Member 
States' public management. Drawing on national audit ser-
vices, admittedly, will not be without difficulties given that 
they report ultimately to their own parliaments.2 Counter-
arguments to this problem of conflict of interest are the 
tradition of discipline and independence of the accounting 
profession as well the possibility of the Commission to carry 
out quality assurance checks so as to 'audit the national 
auditors'. 
mand grows longer. In particular with regard to budget items 
such as the Structural Funds, that have rapidly expanded and 
where efforts so far have concentrated on the general design 
and adoption of policies, precise budgetary tasks are often 
ill-defined. 
Additionally, the complexity of procedures renders the 
budget liable to abuse. This dimension of 'government fail-
ure' appears a major weakness of the CAP, especially as 
regards export refunds. As pointed out in a recent Court 
of Auditors' report, procedural complexities form a prime 
reason why export refunds are highly vulnerable to fraudu-
lent exploitation. Rationalization of procedures is likely to 
go a long way towards reducing the scope for misunderstand-
ings, disclaimers of responsibility, and abuse. 
Inadequacy of compliance incentives 
Defective control mechanisms and imprecise assignments 
need not lead to problems of implementation if the agent 
has a strong interest in meeting the principal's objectives. 
The national or regional officials in charge of making EC 
payments or collecting own resources do not, however, face 
positive incentives to carry out their task to the best of their 
abilities, because their paymaster is the national or regional 
government and the latter may not always be seriously 
concerned as one is dealing to a large extent 'with other 
people's money'. Furthermore, spending agencies usually 
receive the better part of their financial means from national 
sources, such that, understandably, their first goal is to 
conform with national imperatives. 
Rationalizing budgetary management procedures 
Aside from the foregoing insufficiency of control mechan-
isms, the decentralized implementation of the budget also 
suffers from a lack of clarity and simplicity in the guidelines 
to be followed or goals to be achieved by the national 
and regional authorities. This shortcoming gives rise to the 
problem of poorly specified distributions of responsibility, 
which typically becomes more acute as the chain of corn-
in the field of the CAP, there exists a 'clearance of accounts' mechanism 
whereby the Commission's auditors verify that Member States' paying 
agencies have complied strictly with CAP regulations. 
In view of its capacity as an arm of the Community's budgetary autho-
rity, hence of its interest in the proper execution of the budget, the 
European Parliament could start talks to this end with its national 
counterparts. 
As a consequence of these circumstances, Member State 
administrations are normally unlikely, of their own volition, 
to do their utmost to ensure the sound execution of the 
EC budget. Besides the previously mentioned recourse to 
national audit bodies, a satisfactory response to this lack of 
commitment would appear to require measures directly 
aimed at the responsible officials or through specific-pur-
pose, conditional, grants to the governments in question. 
Unconditional grants, such as the 10% of traditional own 
resources Member States currently receive in compensation 
for the costs of collection they incur, do not seem capable of 
securing the intended objective: according to the previously 
mentioned report by the Court of Auditors, national support 
for customs' staffing and other organizational arrangements 
may well be insufficient to enable the required standards for 
Community controls to be met. 
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Chapter 11 
Social union and enlargement 
to the East 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union solemnly reiter-
ates that the peoples of Europe are creating 'an ever closer 
union, where decisions are taken as closely as possible to 
the citizens'. It thus by no means marks the end of the road, 
but, rather, will form the basis for yet another round of 
constitutional negotiations, starting in 1996, when a new 
intergovernmental conference will be convened. 
In the economic sphere, the integration process will have 
entered a further important stage with the establishment of 
EMU. As earlier chapters of this report make clear, EMU 
itself can be successfully accomplished with relatively modest 
increases in the Community budget. While the open-ended 
nature of economic union will call for recurring reappraisals 
of the assignment of competences between the Community 
and national levels of government in the light of growing 
interdependence, there is no reason to expect that once 
EMU has reached its steady state, there will be any further 
requirement for a substantial change in Community public 
finances on account of economic or monetary aspects of 
union alone. 
Instead, the development of the EC budget beyond EMU 
will be driven primarily by the implications of the intensifi-
cation of efforts to construct a 'social' union, as well as 
the prospective enlargement of the Community, especially 
towards the East. 
The purpose of the final part of this report is to explore in 
broad terms to what size Community public finance may 
need to expand in response to: 
(i) changes in the nature and volume of EC transfers in the 
'social union' context; 
(ii) membership for Central and East European countries. 
Before embarking on this exploration, it needs to be recalled 
that the EC is the first organization in history with union 
aspirations whose competences have been developing after 
the interventions of the constituent States in economic and 
social life had reached the degree of maturity that we have 
come to associate with the advent of the Welfare State. The 
surge in the role of central government in federal countries 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning in the inter-
war period, and has run parallel to the growth of public 
expenditure in general, and of the establishment of redis-
tributive policies and social insurance in particular. Put 
differently, the rise in federal outlays was not so much the 
outcome of a shift in powers, but rather essentially the result 
of filling vacant policy areas. This is totally different for the 
EC since there are few, if any, unexploited fields left. This 
characteristic, in conjunction with the systematic application 
of the subsidiarity principle, means that the current prepon-
derance of the central level of government in federations, 
surveyed in Chapter 3, cannot be taken, even using a long-
term horizon, as the normative benchmark for the evolution 
of the EC budget.1 
11.1. The budgetary incidence of defence union 
Besides a number of critical changes in the institutional 
balance of powers, e.g. granting more legislative com-
petences to the European Parliament, fleshing out the 'politi-
cal union' goal in operational terms will mean the develop-
ment of a common foreign and defence policy, as well as 
improved cooperation in internal security matters. 
Given the fact that the conduct of foreign affairs, sensu 
stricto, costs very little (0,02% of EC GDP among all Mem-
ber States), additional outlays or savings from common 
external representations are basically a non-issue from a 
macro-budgetary point of view.2 The present analysis will 
therefore centre on the budgetary consequences of a supra-
national role in the Community's external security. 
For more than 30 years following the breakdown in 1954 of 
the Pleven Plan to create a European Defence Community, 
no initiatives were developed to achieve a European external 
security policy. However, building on a long practice of 
informal political collaboration, initial progress was regis-
tered with the 1987 Single European Act establishing formal 
European cooperation in the technological and industrial 
aspects of security. At Maastricht it was decided that, upon 
the entry into force of the new Treaty, defence matters 
proper would no longer fall totally outside the ambit of the 
union. Although the latter's involvement is to be strictly 
Taking an unweighted average of column 3 in Table 6, central govern-
ment spending claims more than 60% of the sum of central and state 
expenditure. Over half of central outlays go to health, social security 
and welfare. Defence absorbs about 10%, the USA being a pronounced 
outlier with 27%. See the statistical annex to European Economy. Reports 
and studies No 5-1993. 
A similar remark can be made with respect to the budgetary cost of 
elaborating a common internal security policy, more specifically of 
developing the recently created Europol into some sort of Community 
FBI. The total cost (inclusive of counter-intelligence) of the American 
FBI amounted to USD 1,8 billion in 1991, or approximately 0,05% of 
US GDP. 
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confined to the purely political dimension, it may be expected 
that over time, perhaps after the intergovernmental confer-
ence of 1996, the WEU, which currently constitutes the 
military coordination forum for nine Member States, will 
form an integral part of the union's structure. As a result, 
the union could become active in the military domain as 
well. Bringing the political and military institutions and 
mechanisms under one roof would bolster the credibility of 
the European component in the NATO framework. 
As pointed out in Teutemann (1993), a supranational defence 
policy is economically justifiable on grounds of positive 
externalities — a country undertaking a large defence effort 
provides a deterrent to potential aggressors, which benefits 
neighbouring partners in the alliance — and clearly also 
of economies of scale and indivisibilities, as regards both 
procurement and the provision of military power. ' Fontanel 
and Smith ( 1991 ) argue that common procurement will allow 
important gains because of the large fixed R&D costs and 
learning curve effects attendant with weapons production. 
An integrated command structure will generate greater ef-
ficiency and effectiveness as it avoids duplication of support 
costs and fragmentation of forces. 
Due to the disappearance of the threat of a massive invasion 
from the East, modifications in strategic military thinking, 
as well as the continuous rise in the real cost of equipment 
for modern electronic warfare — on recent trends of the 
order of 7% per annum — the role, size, and composition of 
national armies is currently undergoing a sweeping overhaul. 
The fall-out from this fundamental review is likely to include, 
first, a sharp reduction of defence budgets so as to collect 
the 'peace dividend'; second, a lesser emphasis on protection 
against major attacks, and more on peace-keeping tasks 
abroad; and, third, increased flexibility and speed in inter-
ventions. 
Against this background, the provision of defence on a 
national basis will become increasingly problematic. By con-
trast, a defence union could cater for a high level of military 
deterrence, with much less than the current ECU 125 billion, 
or 2,5% of GDP, Community countries spend on defence. 
Only such a union would be able to cushion the withdrawal 
of US troops from the continent. 
Short of a fully-fledged defence union, which would mean a 
monumental change in national sovereignty, the response to 
the needs for peace-keeping abroad and greater flexibility 
and speed could take the form of the creation of a rapid 
deployment force under the authority of the union, which 
could act as a substitute for, or complement to, similar units 
that are currently being contemplated in several Member 
States. 
The budgetary cost of a European rapid deployment force 
would obviously depend on its size and the frequency of its 
interventions. However, provided the logistic services of the 
reduced national armies are relied on, the availability of a 
powerful rapid deployment force could, according to mili-
tary experts, be ensured with an annual budget of about 
ECU 10 billion per annum or 0,2% of EC GDP. 
11.2. Completing'social union' 
As was argued in Chapter 4 of this report, new steps in 
the direction of 'social union', characterized by guaranteed 
commonly defined minimum income and/or public service 
levels, will be either voluntary, expressing a stronger feeling 
of common citizenship and solidarity, or forced, if the inter-
national mobility of people frustrates the conduct of auton-
omous national interpersonal redistribution regimes.2 
11.2.1. From cohesion to equity 
In the case of the former scenario, the cohesion objective 
underlying present interregional transfers would fade and 
make room for explicit equity considerations. Under such 
circumstances, a first major change could be a move from 
conditional to unconditional lump-sum transfers. The Struc-
tural Funds would essentially disappear in their current 
shape and be superseded by equalization grants, operating 
vertically, or horizontally, like the German 'Finanzaus-
gleich'. The aim of such grants would be to equalize 'fiscal 
capacity' between Member States, where otherwise differ-
ences in taxable capacity or the cost of providing public 
The provision of power exhibits indivisibilities: below a threshold, little 
benefit is obtained. For instance, for deterrence to be effective, at least 
one nuclear missile submarine must be on patrol at all times, requiring 
a fleet of at least four. Thus the marginal benefit of a system is zero up 
to a certain threshold level. Moreover, larger size has a more than 
proportionate effect on the probability of winning, which may be subject 
to a quadratic function of numbers. See Fontanel and Smith (1991), pp. 
403-404. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the other major aspect of social union is 
of a regulatory nature and concerns a common set of minimum rights 
in the area of labour law and industrial relations. It is assumed here 
that this regulatory aspect, the further elaboration of which will hinge 
closely on the implementation of the so-called social charter, does not 
occasion any significant direct EC expenditure. 
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services would preclude countries from delivering basic levels 
of public services at similar levels of tax pressure.' 
Not only may 'social union' alter the nature of interregional 
transfers; more pronounced equity considerations may also 
set the stage for the acceptance of minimum national living 
standards, topping up a country's disposable income per 
capita to a pre-determined target level. As an alternative 
to the unconditional transfers just mentioned, which were 
associated with the notions of fiscal capacity and public 
service needs, one could thus also conceive of an interre-
gional transfer scheme where each Member State below (80 
or 90% of) the Community average receives a net grant such 
that initial income disparities are reduced by say 10% — 
which would still be considerably less than the 25 to 50% 
interregional redistribution (see Table 9) observed in mature 
federations. 
Relative income targets contrast with the present situation 
in which absolute levels of transfers (in real terms) are fixed 
ex ante for a five-year period. For the sake of illustration, 
and on the assumption that all countries contribute to the 
financing in a fiscally neutral fashion, a 10% net redistribu-
tive guarantee in favour of the four lagging Member States 
would imply, for 1992, a gross transfer of around ECU 28 
billion. This would be more than three times as high as 
the ECU 8,2 billion currently channelled to these countries 
through the Structural Funds, engendering, as shown in 
Table 20, a net redistributive effect of between roughly 2 
and 5%. 
So far, the adoption of the 'social union' objective has been 
argued to lay down the conditions for raising the volume 
of interregional transfers and making them unconditional. 
However, altruism being fundamentally a concern about 
people, equity is normally taken to relate to the reduction 
of interpersonal, not interregional, income disparities. As 
pointed out in Prud'homme (1993), interregional transfers 
display a dual disadvantage from this angle. They will not 
automatically tend to narrow interpersonal differences since 
poor people in rich regions may end up paying for rich 
people in poor regions. Similarly, aid to a region may not 
be used ultimately in support of the most needy inhabitants. 
This is why regional policies in several federal and unitary 
countries have been scaled down, putting greater emphasis 
on 'people-oriented' instruments. 
In line with federal practice, the criteria for distributing equalization 
grants among the lagging Member States should be laid down in a 
formula reflecting, first, a country's 'fiscal capacity', which is captured 
ideally by the size, on a uniform measurement, of the national tax base 
relative to the Community average, or, failing this, of national GDP 
per capita. The second main element in the formula should be an 
indicator of expenditure needs per capita, which are often taken to be 
a function of population density or surface/area. 
These considerations are also relevant in principle for the 
Community, but they need to be examined beside the power-
ful politico-economic arguments in Pauly (1973), Forte 
(1977), and Tresch (1981), put forward in Section 4.3.2, 
against a large role for central government in interpersonal 
redistribution. In brief, such a role can be contemplated in 
earnest only when altruism has taken on so strong a Euro-
pean dimension that nationality has basically become irrel-
evant for solidarity purposes and national preferences for 
redistribution have closely converged. These conditions may 
not be fulfilled within the EC for a very long time, if ever. 
Even before then, however, the supranational layer of 
government could play some subordinate role in the field of 
interpersonal redistribution. For instance, one could think 
of a system, broadly along the lines of King (1984), in which 
EC residents entitled to welfare or similar sorts of allowances 
would receive a European minimum income from the Com-
munity to be supplemented by national means. Apart from 
marking the beginning of solidarity among Europe's citizens, 
it would allow the Community to acquire indispensable 
managerial expertise for a possible more ambitious role later 
on. 
11.2.2. National redistribution and the challenge 
of cross-border migration 
The determinants of international labour mobility within 
Western Europe are largely unknown. However, the assump-
tion adopted so far in this report has been that mobility will 
remain very limited due to cultural and linguistic factors. 
Furthermore, cross-border migration in the Community is 
by no means actively promoted. 
If this hypothesis is dropped and it is instead supposed that 
soon in the next century mobility will increase considerably 
and that all EC nationals have access to the income support 
and social services of the Member State in which they reside, 
the budgetary sustainability of national redistributive 
schemes may be jeopardized. 
When migration takes place on the basis of relative price 
signals in the labour market, it elicits, much like capital 
mobility, a beneficial effect on the allocation of resources, 
hence on prosperity in the union. However, when it is motiv-
ated purely by tax or transfer considerations and it takes 
on economically significant proportions, it can give rise to 
difficulties because, apart from distorting resource allo-
cation, it may render the initial degree of redistribution 
within Member States no longer affordable by occasioning 
an 'adverse selection' problem: individuals who reckon them-
selves to be net beneficiaries will be attracted to the country 
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in question, while net contributors are repelled. This problem 
may arise even when countries enjoy the same level of pros-
perity, but choose to offer a different bundle of social ben-
efits or to finance a similar bundle differently. 
This observation has been the standard argument in the 
traditional fiscal federalism literature (Oates (1972), Mus-
grave (1968)) for assigning the primary responsibility for 
redistribution policy to the central level of government. 
However, the viability in practice of a federation like the 
USA, where important competences for public health, wel-
fare and unemployment matters in spite of presumably the 
relatively highest degree of inter-state mobility remain at the 
subcentral level, as well as more recent advances in public 
finance theory (Boadway and Flatters (1982), Wildasin 
(1991a)) show that centralization is not an inevitable conse-
quence. Neither, evidently, would it be a politically tenable 
one when interpersonal altruism remained strongly inter-
woven with feelings of national, as distinct from European, 
identity. 
A sharp rise in intra-EC migration by no means has to lead 
to a wholesale shift of interpersonal redistribution to the EC 
level. Fiscally induced migration is tantamount to a cross-
border externality and calls therefore for internalizing 
measures. 
Accordingly, national progressive tax and social security and 
benefit regimes can basically stay intact, provided minimum 
levels of effective personal tax rates are fixed and in-
tergovernmental grants are made available with the specific 
purpose of upgrading poorer countries' social protection 
and education and public health. In the real world, where 
migration arises from both labour market and tax/transfer 
signals, it is even possible, as demonstrated in Wildasin 
(1991b), that such an intergovernmental grant is also wel-
fare-enhancing for the donor country.1 
11.3. Enlargement to EFTA and the East 
Until three or four years ago, the prospect of a large-scale 
enlargement of the Community did not present itself in any 
acute way. The only question of major significance in this 
1 The model developed in Wildasin (1991b) can be used to show that, in 
the presence of a national redistributive policy, the net income of all 
those residing within a given jurisdiction can be raised by imposing 
taxes on them and handing over the proceeds to mobile households 
residing outside the jurisdiction. This result does not require any strong 
assumptions: it basically derives from the opportunity grants provide 
to limit migration to a maximum advantageous level for the host 
country. In other words, in a second-best environment with allocation 
distortions arising from domestic income redistribution, there may be 
'gains from giving'. 
respect concerned the application by Turkey in 1987, which 
the Community put on hold in 1990. 
Since 1989, however, historical events have succeeded one 
another at a tremendous pace, modifying the political map of 
Europe beyond recognition. One East European communist 
regime after another collapsed and Germany was reunited. 
Partly in response to these developments, but primarily 
because they realized during the negotiations on the estab-
lishment of the European Economic Area that staying out-
side would not serve their long-term economic interests well, 
most EFTA countries decided to opt for membership or at 
least to give the possibility of applying very serious consider-
ation. Because of its political stability and economic pros-
perity, the Community has been propelled into an anchor-
role for the whole continent, and the queue of actual and 
potential applicants has been lengthening rapidly. 
Several reasons were invoked in Chapter 1 to justify the 
assumption made throughout the report that before EMU 
has reached its steady state, none of the countries that 
used to live behind the iron curtain will have joined the 
Community. Over the next 10 to 15 years, they will benefit 
increasingly from the dismantling of Community import 
barriers and from technical and financial aid, perhaps in a 
framework analogous to the Marshall Plan, as recommended 
in Chapter 5, but they will not become subject to the entire 
set of rights and obligations of the acquis communautaire. 
All the same, it is quite obvious that the East European 
countries that remain faithful to democracy, human rights 
and a market-based economy cannot be denied access for 
very long, if only because the prospect of qualifying for 
membership has galvanized their preparedness to undergo 
painful reforms. Although economic adjustment is inescap-
able regardless of their accession ambitions, the danger of a 
slide-back into political and economic instability will defi-
nitely grow larger if their hopes are disappointed. 
The Community's future enlargement, at first limited to the 
present EFTA members and countries with small popu-
lations, subsequently extending to Central Europe and, per-
haps, at a still more remote point in time, the European 
republics of the former Soviet Union, will no doubt consti-
tute the greatest challenge the Community has been con-
fronted with since its creation. An increase, albeit spread 
over a decade, from 12 to perhaps more than 24 members 
will necessitate a renewed comprehensive review of the EC's 
tasks and decision-making process. 
The inclusion of the EFTA countries should be relatively 
straightforward because their economic structure and level 
of development are similar to those in northern Member 
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States. Moreover, their accession should have a favourable 
influence on the EC budget as, under current EC policies, 
they stand to be net contributors. Had Austria, Switzerland, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland been part of the Community 
in 1992, they would, according to calculations in Brenton 
and Gros (1993), have received ECU 0,14 billion Structural 
Fund transfers (by virtue of Objective 5b) and close to 
ECU 2 billion in CAP subsidies. To this should be added 
their participation in other EC policies, which, on the as­
sumption of a 10% incremental effect, would have occa­
sioned outlays of another ECU 850 million. However, with 
forecast extra revenue of around ECU 6,4 billion, the net 
positive outcome would have been in the region of ECU 3,7 
billion, thereby creating significant supplementary leeway 
within the constraint of the own resources ceiling. The entry 
of EFTA countries in 1995 or shortly thereafter should 
considerably facilitate compliance with the budgetary com­
mitments made at Edinburgh. 
The Community's enlargement to the East will unavoidably 
bring about a shift of emphasis in Community policies, also, 
if not largely, due to the budgetary implications. The latter 
are obviously quite impossible to foretell with any degree of 
accuracy, as it is unknown which countries the EC will 
eventually comprise, what will be their income level and 
economic structure at the time of accession, and how Com­
munity policies will have evolved by then. However, they 
are liable to pose a major challenge, in particular if by that 
time agricultural reform as outlined in Chapter 4 has not 
been brought to a successful conclusion. 
As the Structural Funds and the CAP at present claim more 
than 80% of total EC expenditure and will continue to do 
so at least until 2000, the analysis will be confined to these 
two budgetary items. 
Table 35 compares the EC's current 'cohesion' Member 
States with the countries of Eastern Europe in terms of 
population and relative levels of income per capita expressed 
in purchasing power standards. The estimates of the latter 
for Eastern Europe, relating to 1989 and based on OECD 
data, must be treated with a very high degree of caution, but 
they broadly correspond with casual empiricism of experts in 
the field. What those figures indicate robustly is that all East 
European countries, especially those in the Balkan area, are 
poorer per capita than the EC's lagging Member States. The 
harsh recession experienced by most of them during recent 
years can only corroborate this finding. 
In 1992, the two least developed Community Member States, 
Greece and Portugal, received by way of the Structural 
Table 35 
A comparison between the EC's 'cohesion' Member States and countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
Greece 
Spain 
Ireland 
Portugal 
EUR 4 
Poland 
Hungary 
Czechoslovakia 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Yugoslavia 
Albania 
Baltic republics 
Other European former USSR republics 
Subtotal 
Subtotal 
(except Russia) 
Total 
■ Population 
(million) (1991) 
10,1 
39,4 
3,5 
9,8 
62,8 
38,2 
10,6 
15,6 
64,4 
23,0 
9,0 
23,7 
3,5 
8,0 
131,6 
77,6 
209,2 
Income per capita 
(PPS) EC = 100(1991) 
52,2 
80,5 
69,0 
57,1 
71,66 
36,4 
40,5 
45,7 
23,7 
32,9 
Gross receipts from 
Structural Funds (ECU per capita) 
(1992) 
182,2 
89,6 
289,4 
195,7 
132,14 
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Funds a little less than ECU 200 per capita. As a conse-
quence of the commitment in the Edinburgh agreement to 
double structural expenditure to the benefit of the four 
cohesion countries, the per capita support to the currently 
two poorest Member States should approximate ECU 400 
in 1999. If it is supposed for a moment that Eastern Europe 
were part of the Community at the turn of the century, a 
ECU 400 transfer per head in their favour would seem, 
on current policies, a minimum in view of their relative 
backwardness and evident lack of modern infrastructure. 
Membership of the four Visegrad countries then would imply 
a rise in the Structural Funds of about ECU 26 billion. 
The additional inclusion of the Balkan and Baltic republics 
basically would double this rise to around ECU 54 billion, 
or roughly 0,85% of EC GDP as predicted for 1999. This 
compares with the ECU 3,5 billion per annum Eastern Eur-
ope (exclusive of the ex-USSR republics) has been receiving 
in the form of grants from the Twelve in 1990-92 (see Table 
25) or the ECU 16,5 billion to be spent in the 'cohesion' 
countries through the combined channels of the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund in 1993. Further enlargement 
to the European former USSR republics apart from the 
Baltic States would bring the increase in the Structural Funds 
to a total of ECU 86 billion, or 1,3% of EC GDP, being 
equal to the total budget as foreseen at present. ' 
Massive though the impact of enlargement to the East on 
structural expenditure could be, the longer-term implications 
for agricultural spending might be even greater if the general 
reform measures announced in 1992 were to remain a dead 
letter. 
Indeed, the application of the present CAP to Eastern Eur-
ope would not occasion a significant increase in EC outlays 
because most of the countries in question are currently net 
agricultural importers. The introduction of the CAP, which 
raises the European price level above that on world markets 
and thereby creams off consumer surplus, would as a matter 
of fact be against these countries' economic interests. It is, 
however, rather likely that, inter alia through better profit 
incentives and by means of the CAP's 'guidance' section, 
productivity in these local agricultural sectors will increase 
rapidly, turning around their trade position over time, the 
more so as, in line with Western nutritional patterns, dom-
estic consumption of basic agricultural products will prob-
ably decline. As surplus producing countries, they would 
Obviously, such transfers would be very major in terms of beneficiaries' 
real income. Even if they were to register high growth rates in the 
intervening period (say 5% per annum), these transfers would represent 
almost 10% of GDP (expressed in ecus) for the relatively richest among 
them, i.e. the Czech Republic, rising to about 20% for Romania. Unless 
basically all types of public and private investment were eligible for 
support, the recipient countries would not be able to absorb this volume 
of assistance at prevailing co-financing requirements. 
start benefiting from the export restitutions and swell CAP 
spending, particularly because East European agriculture 
happens to be specialized in products such as milk, beef and 
veal, cereals and sugar, which currently claim half of CAP 
expenditure. Brenton and Gros (1993) estimate that if East 
European countries were to close half of the current gap in 
agricultural yields relative to areas in the Community with 
similar climatic conditions, the Visegrad countries would 
obtain ECU 17 billion in CAP subsidies, Romania and Bul-
garia jointly almost ECU 6 billion, while the three Baltic 
republics, with a population of 8 million people but a high 
percentage of land under cultivation for cereals and dairy 
farming, would receive ECU 9 billion. Additional gains in 
productivity would further aggravate the bill. Moreover, 
because East European production is not complementary to 
that of the Community, the CAP's structural imbalances are 
liable to be reinforced. Surpluses will grow for products 
where there already exists an excess supply, depressing world 
market prices and hence the unit cost of export restitutions, 
whereas imports of products for which Europe is not self-
sufficient will rise. 
The prospect of enlargement to the East should thus act as 
a catalyst for a sweeping reform of the CAP from product 
to direct income support. Yet, if the latter were fully available 
to Eastern Europe as well, the budgetary consequences also 
could be very sizable. Although one will no doubt witness a 
massive exodus from the land concomitant with the mod-
ernization of agriculture, it is very likely, in the light of the 
current situation as shown in Table 36, that the share of 
agriculture in their active population will continue to be 
well-above the 6 to 7% level prevailing in the Community. 
Confronted with these unattractive alternative scenarios, the 
voices calling for a renationalization of agricultural policy, 
at least in part, look set to become louder. 
The above simple calculations and arguments point to a 
fundamental policy dilemma the Community will sooner or 
later need to come to grips with. According to mainstream 
integrationist doctrine, deepening should precede widening, 
i.e. the Community has first to bring further institutional 
reforms to fruition and bolster its economic and social acquis 
for it to be in a position to absorb successfully a spate of new 
entrants. The snag is, however, that whereas this strategy is 
well-suited for coping with newcomers from EFTA, policies 
aimed at promoting economic or social union objectives, 
like a renewed steep rise in the Structural Funds or the 
introduction of fairly generous interregional equalization 
grants, may grow unaffordable upon the accession of the 
Eastern countries. Accordingly, redistributive policies may 
have to be scaled down over time, which may feed back 
negatively on the Community's functioning as it disturbs 
the delicate systemic balance between economic efficiency, 
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stability and equity. Europe may then be whole and free, 
but with clearly more modest 'union' ambitions. 
Table 36 
Share of agriculture in employment and value-added, 1989 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (without ex-GDR) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 
Poland 
Hungary 
Czechoslovakia 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Albania 
Sources: Eurostat, OECD and Economist I 
% in active 
population 
2,8 
6,0 
3,7 
26,6 
13,0 
6,4 
15.1 
9,3 
3.4 
4,7 
18,9 
2,2 
7,0 
% in active 
population 
27 
18 
12 
28 
17 
50 
ilelligcncc Unit. 
% in gross 
value-added 
2,0 
4,2 
1,5 
15,8 
5,1 
3.5 
9,7 
3.7 
2.1 
4,3 
6,3 
1,0 
3,0 
% in net material 
product 
13,0 
20,4 
10,1 
15,2 
11,5 
32,7 
11.4. Institutional and political implications 
The aim of this report has been to thrash out the economics 
of the future of Community public finance. Nevertheless, 
the above sketch of the probable principal developments in 
the EC from around the turn of the century, and their 
potential budgetary impact, would be somewhat incomplete 
if no light were shed on the institutional and political changes 
that should parallel them. 
In fact, it would be desirable for the balanced development 
of the Community if the increase in EC spending and revenue 
that is recommended in this report to accompany the estab-
lishment of EMU, went hand in hand with an improvement 
in democratic accountability, i.e. with a strengthening of the 
role of the European Parliament in the budgetary field. 
This could encompass an enlarged say on expenditure by 
abolishing the present distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory spending and/or relaxing the so-called 
'maximum' rate of increase in non-compulsory spending, 
which continues to restrict severely the Parliament's room 
for manœuvre. Greater democratic accountability should 
also mean granting Parliament some competence over EC 
revenue-raising. 
However, the developments outlined in this final chapter 
are, from a political point of view, much more radical than 
EMU. Accordingly, they call for a much more profound 
overhaul of the institutional balance of powers and the 
decision-making process. 
Proposals towards the supranational funding of a common 
minimum living standard throughout the Community, will 
stand a chance of success only if they are based on strong 
feelings of common identity. This enhanced degree of 
togetherness should find its institutional expression in a 
major reinforcement of the role of the body whose mandate 
derives directly from the people, i.e. the European Parlia-
ment. 
On the other hand, it seems on the whole unlikely that 
the present largely intergovernmental fashion of decision-
making, and in particular the still strong reliance on the 
unanimity requirement, will remain sustainable with a sub-
stantially enlarged membership. The danger that the Com-
munity will succumb under its own weight may then loom 
large. 
Social union will not be acceptable without a concomitant 
remedying of the 'democratic deficit', whereas an enlarge-
ment from 12 to perhaps more than 20 will render the current 
decision-making process unmanageable. Put differently, the 
further 'deepening and widening' will be both cause and 
consequence of what could be a decisive move towards a 
'federal' Europe. 
Compared to the present situation, the distinctive core attri-
butes of a 'federal' Europe would include: 
(i) Community competences that are clearly delineated in 
a European constitution having the principle of subsidi-
arity as its cornerstone. 
(ii) A European Parliament with full legislative powers, 
inclusive of the right of taxation and of participation in 
intergovernmental conferences on an equal footing with 
the Member States. 
(iii) The replacement of the Commission by a genuine Euro-
pean government appointed by Parliament, instead of 
the Member States. Its composition would thus reflect 
the prevailing political majority of the Community in 
its entirety. 
115 
Part D — Further deepening and widening 
Institutional change might encompass in addition: 
(i) The transformation of the Council of Ministers into a 
publicly deliberating second chamber representing the 
intergovernmental dimension. Aside from participating 
in the legislative process, the latter's main task could 
consist of securing where needed the coordination of 
Member State policies. The requirement of Member 
State unanimity for decisions would be ruled out, except 
in a number of strictly circumscribed cases. 
(ii) As an additional safeguard against undue centralization, 
the possibility of a referendum, subjecting vital policy 
decisions and proposed changes to the European consti-
tution to direct democratic support.' 
Only when the foregoing institutional reforms have been 
achieved will the 'political union' project, launched at Maas-
tricht, have neared completion. 
1 Admittedly, a Community referendum would be a demanding operation 
from an organizational point of view, and would not correspond with 
democratic habits in some bigger Member States. 
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B-1000 Bruxe l les /B-1000 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 512 00 26 
Fax (02) 511 01 84 
Autres distributeurs / 
Overige verkooppunten 
Librairie européenne/ 
Europese boekhandel 
Rue de la Loi 244/Wetstraat 244 
B-1040 Bruxelles / B-1040 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 231 04 35 
Fax (02) 735 08 60 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Roi 202 /Koningslaan 202 
B-1 060 Bruxel les/ B-1 060 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 538 51 69 
Télex 63220 UNBOOK B 
Fax (02) 538 08 41 
Document delivery: 
Credoc 
Rue de la Montagne 34 / Bergstraat 34 
Bte 11 / Bus 11 
B-1000 Bruxe l les /B-1000 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 511 69 41 
Fax (02) 513 31 95 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
Herstedvang 10-12 
DK-2620 Albertslund 
Tlf. 43 63 23 00 
Fax (Sales) 43 63 19 69 
Fax (Management) 43 63 19 49 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
Breite Straße 78-80 
Postfach 10 05 34 
D-50445 Köln 
Tel. (02 21) 20 29-0 
Telex ANZEIGER BONN 8 882 595 
Fax 2 02 92 78 
GREECE/ΕΛΛΑΔΑ 
G.C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
Nikis Street 4 
GR-10563 Athens 
Tel. (01) 322 63 23 
Telex 219410 ELEF 
Fax 323 98 21 
ESPANA 
Boletín Oficial del Estado 
Trafalgar, 29 
E-28071 Madrid 
Tel. (91) 538 22 95 
Fax (91) 538 23 49 
Mundi­Prensa Libros, SA 
Castellò, 37 
E-28001 Madrid 
Tel. (91) 431 33 99 (Libros) 
431 32 22 (Suscripciones) 
435 36 37 (Dirección) 
Télex 49370-MPLI-E 
Fax (91) 575 39 98 
Sucursal: 
Librería Internacional AEDOS 
Consejo de Ciento, 391 
E-08009 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 488 34 92 
Fax (93) 487 76 59 
Llibrería de la Generalität 
de Catalunya 
Rambla deis Estudis, 118 (Palau Moja) 
E-08002 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 302 68 35 
302 64 62 
Fax (93) 302 12 99 
Journal officiel 
Service des publications 
des Communautés européennes 
26, rue Desaix 
F-75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tél. (1) 40 58 75 00 
Fax (1) 40 58 77 00 
IRELAND 
Government Supplies Agency 
4-5 Harcourt Road 
Dublin 2 
Tel. (1) 66 13 111 
Fax (1) 47 80 645 
ITALIA 
Licosa SpA 
Via Duca di Calabria 1/1 
Casella postale 552 
1-50125 Firenze 
Tel. (055) 64 54 15 
Fax 64 12 57 
Telex 570466 LICOSA I 
GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries du livre 
5, rue Raiffeisen 
L-2411 Luxembourg 
Tél. 40 10 20 
Fax 40 10 24 01 
NEDERLAND 
SDU Overheidsinformatie 
Externe Fondsen 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA 's-Gravenhage 
Tel. (070) 37 89 880 
Fax (070) 34 75 778 
PORTUGAL 
Imprensa Nacional 
Casa da Moeda, EP 
Rua D. Francisco Manuel de Melo, 5 
P-1092 Lisboa Codex 
Tel. (01) 69 34 14 
Distribuidora de Livros 
Bertrand, Ld.° 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Terras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 37 
P-2700 Amadora Codex 
Tel. (01) 49 59 050 
Telex 15798 BERDIS 
Fax 49 60 255 
UNITED KINGDOM 
HMSO Books (Agency section) 
HMSO Publications Centre 
51 Nine Elms Lane 
London SWS 5DR 
Tel (071) 873 9090 
Fax 873 8463 
Telex 29 71 138 
ÖSTERREICH 
Manz'sche Verlags­
und Universitätsbuchhandlung 
Kohlmarkt 16 
A-1014 Wien 
Tel. (0222) 531 61-0 
Telex 112 500 BOX A 
Fax (0222) 531 61-339 
SUOMI/FINLAND 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 
Keskuskatu 1 
PO Box 128 
SF-00101 Helsinki 
Tel. (0) 121 41 
Fax (0) 121 44 41 
Narvesen Info Center 
Bertrand Narvesens vei 2 
PO Box 6125 Etterstad 
N-0602 Oslo 6 
Tel. (22) 57 33 00 
Telex 79668 NIC N 
Fax (22) 68 19 01 
BTJ AB 
Traktorvägen 13 
S-22I00 Lund 
Tel. (046) 18 00 00 
Fax (046) 18 01 25 
30 79 47 
SCHWEIZ / SUISSE / SVIZZERA 
OSEC 
Stampfenbachstraße 85 
CH-8035 Zürich 
Tel. (01) 365 54 49 
Fax (01) 365 54 11 
C E S K A REPUBLIKA 
NIS CR 
Havelkova 22 
130 00 Praha 3 
Tel. (2) 24 23 09 07 
Fax (2) 242 21 484 
MAGYARORSZAG 
Euro­Info­Service 
Club Szlget 
Margitsziget 
1138 Budapest 
Tel./Fax 1 11 1 60 61 
1 111 62 16 
Business Foundation 
ul. Krucza 38/42 
00-512 Warszawa 
Tel. (22) 21 99 93, 628-28-82 
International Fax&Phone 
(0-39) 12-00-77 
Euromedia 
65, Strada Dionisie Lupu 
70184 Bucuresti 
Tel./Fax 0 12 96 46 
B A L G A R I J A 
Europress Klassica BK Ltd 
66, bd Vitosha 
1463 Sofia 
Tel./Fax 2 52 74 75 
CCEC 
9,60-letiya Oktyabrya Avenue 
117312 Moscow 
Tel./Fax (095) 135 52 27 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Chamber Building 
38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave 
3 Deligiorgis Street 
PO Box 1455 
Nicosia 
Tel. (2) 449500/462312 
Fax (2) 458630 
Miller distributors Ltd 
Scots House. M.A. Vassalli street 
PO Box 272 
Valletta 
Tel. 24 73 01/22 29 95 
Fax 23 49 14 
Pres Gazete Kitap Dergi 
Pazarlama Dagitlm Ticaret ve sanayi 
AS 
Narlibahce Sokak N. 15 
Istanbul-Cagaloglu 
Tel. (1) 520 92 96 - 528 55 66 
Fax (1) 251 91 97 
Telex 23822 DSVO-TR 
ROY International 
PO Box 13056 
41 Mishmar Hayarden Street 
Tel Aviv 61130 
Tel. 3 648 60 39 
Fax 3 544 60 39 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/ 
CANADA 
UNIPUB 
4611­F Assembly Drive 
Lanham. MD 20706-4391 
Tel. Toll Free (800) 274 4888 
Fax (301) 459 0056 
CANADA 
Subscriptions only 
Uniquement abonnements 
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd 
1294 Algoma Road 
Ottawa, Ontario K1B 3W8 
Tel. (613) 741 43 33 
Fax (613) 741 54 39 
Telex 0534783 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
58A Gipps Street 
Coll ingwood 
Victoria 3066 
Tel. (3)417 5361 
Fax (3) 419 7154 
Klnokuniya Company Ltd 
17-7 Shinjuku 3-Chome 
Shlnjuku-ku 
Tokyo 160-91 
Tel. (03) 3439-0121 
Journal Department 
PO Box 55 Chitóse 
Tokyo 156 
Tel. (03) 3439-0124 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
Legal Library Services Ltd 
STK Agency 
Robinson Road 
PO Box 1817 
Singapore 9036 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Safto 
5th Floor, Export House 
Cnr Maude S West Streets 
Sandton 2146 
Tel. (011) 883-3737 
Fax (011) 883-6569 
AUTRES PAYS 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
ANDERE LÄNDER 
Office des publications officielles 
des Communautés européennes 
2, rue Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Tél. 499 28-1 
Télex PUBOF LU 1324 b 
Fax 48 85 73/48 68 17 

